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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of an electrical power system is to supply electrical energy to the customers. 
Power transformers are required to transform the system voltage from generation to 
transmission and distribution levels. Protection and control systems must ensure that 
power system high voltage equipment such as transformers operate and deliver save, 
reliable and secure electricity supply.  
 
The aim of the project research work is to develop and implement a strategy, methods 
and algorithms for monitoring, protection and voltage control of parallel power 
transformers based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus standard.  
 
NamPower is a power utility in Namibia. The IEC 61850 protocol for electrical substation 
automation system is used for the protection and control of 5 power transformers 
operated in parallel in an existing substation system.  
The IEC 61850-9-2 process bus standard is however not used in regards of Sampled 
Values (SV). Protection and control devices are connected to a substation 
communication network, routers and switches using fibre optic linked Ethernet. Inductive 
Current Transformers (CTs) and Voltage Transformers (VTs) secondary circuits are 
hardwired to Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and fibre optic links are not used for 
this purpose at process level communication.  
The research focuses on the implementation of the IEC 61850 standard with Merging 
Units (MUs) and sampled values to improve the existing implemented protection and 
control system at NamPower. This includes substation communication networks and 
MUs used for transformer protection, voltage regulator control and cooling fan control. 
At the present the CTs located at the transformer bushings and switchgear and the VTs 
located at the switchgear are hardwired to the inputs on protection and control IEDs. The 
research focuses on issues with the copper wires for voltage and currents signals and 
how these issues can be eliminated by using the MUs and the SV protocol.  
The MUs which are considered in this Thesis is to improve the voltage regulator control 
and the control of the cooling fan motors. The voltage regulator control IED is situated at 
the tap change motor drive of the On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC). The IED of each 
transformer is required to regulate the voltage level of the secondary side bus bar it is 
connected to. All the regulating IEDs are required to communicate with each other and 
collectively to control the bus bar voltage depending on the switching configuration of the 
parallel transformers. 
v 
The control circuit for controlling the cooling fan motors is hardwired. Temperature 
analogue signal input into a programmable automation controller IED can be used for 
controlling the transformer cooling fans.  
 
A strategy, methods and algorithms for transformer protection, voltage regulator control 
and cooling fan motor control of parallel power transformers need to be developed and 
implemented based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
 
Power utilities and distributors can benefit from interpretation of the IEC 61850-9-2 
standard and implementing MUs and SV in substations. MUs can be included in the 
power transformer protection, automation and control systems. A cost reduction in high 
voltage equipment, substation installation and commissioning costs and better 
performance of protection and control system are anticipated.   
 
Key Words: 
Transformer differential protection, IEC 61850-9-2, Sampled Values, Merging Units, 
Transformer voltage control, Tap Changer Control, Process bus, Substation automation 
system, Transformer cooling fan control. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Terms 
 
Explanation 
Abstract communication 
service interface - 
Virtual interface to an IED providing abstract 
information modelling methods for logical 
devices, logical nodes, data, and data attributes, 
and communication services. 
 
A/D Conversion-  
 
The process of converting an analogue signal 
into an equivalent digital one, involving the use of 
an analogue to digital converter. 
 
Back up protection- A protection system intended to supplement the 
main protection in case the latter should be 
ineffective, or to deal with faults in those parts of 
the power system that are not readily included in 
the operating zones of the main protection. 
 
Biased relay- A relay in which the actuating quantity 
characteristics are modified by the introduction of 
some other quantity which is usually in 
opposition to the actuating quantity. 
 
Broadcast- Message placed onto a communication network 
intended to be read and acted on, as appropriate, 
by any IED. 
 
Bus- Communication system connection between 
IEDs with communication facilities 
 
Data link layer- Layer 2 of the OSI reference model for Open 
Systems Interconnection, responsible for the 
transmission of data over a physical medium. 
Layer 2 performs data rate control, error 
detection, contention/collision detection, quality 
of service monitoring and error recovery 
xxvi 
Data object- Part of a logical node object representing specific 
information for example status or part 
measurement. From an object-oriented point of 
view, a data object is an instance of a data class 
 
Dependability- A measure of a protection scheme's ability to 
operate correctly when it is called upon. 
 
Digital signal processor- A microprocessor optimised in both hardware 
architecture and software instruction set for the 
processing of analogue signals digitally, through 
use of the DFT and similar techniques. 
 
Digital signal processing- A technique for the processing of digital signals 
by various filter algorithms to obtain some 
desired characteristics in the output. The input 
signal to the processing algorithm is usually the 
digital representation of an analogue signal, 
obtained by A/D conversion. 
 
Earth fault protection 
system- 
A protection system which is designed to 
respond only to faults to earth. 
 
Earthing transformer- A three-phase transformer intended essentially 
to provide a neutral point to a power system for 
earthing. 
 
Gateway- The Gateway is a computer which provides 
interfaces between the local computer system 
and one or several SCADA or RCC systems 
 
Generic Object Oriented 
Substation Event- 
On the occurrence of any change of state, an IED 
will multicast a high speed, binary object, Generic 
Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) 
report. 
 
Global Positioning System- A system used for locating objects on Earth 
precisely, using a system of satellites in 
xxvii 
geostationary orbit in Space. Used by some 
numerical relays to obtain accurate UTC time 
information. 
 
Intelligent Electronic 
Device- 
A device incorporating one or more processors, 
with the capability to receive or send 
data/control, from, or to, an external source, for 
example electronic multi-function digital relays. 
 
Local area network- Communications network which covers the area 
within the substation. 
 
Logical Node- Standardised IEC61850 data model describing 
the logical attributes of a protection or control 
function. 
 
Main Protection- The main protection system which is normally 
expected to operate in 
response to a fault in the protected zone 
 
Merging unit- Interface unit that accepts multiple analogue 
CT/VT and binary inputs and produces time 
synchronised digital outputs. 
 
Network- Layer 3 of the OSI reference model for Open 
Systems Interconnection, provides functional 
and 
procedural means of transmission, also 
independence from routing and communications 
relaying considerations, enabling the transparent 
transfer of data between transport entities. 
 
On load tap changer- A tap changer that can be operated while the 
transformer is supplying load. 
 
Protection system- A combination of protection equipment designed 
to secure, the under predetermined conditions, 
usually abnormal, disconnection of an element of 
xxviii 
a power system, or to give an alarm signal, or 
both. 
 
Physical layer- Layer 1 of the OSI reference model for Open 
Systems Interconnection provides the 
mechanical, electrical, functional and procedural 
means to activate, maintain and de-activate 
physical connections for bit transmission 
between data-link entities. Physical layer entities 
are interconnected by means of a physical 
medium. 
 
Redundancy- Existence of more than one means for 
performing a required function 
 
Selectivity- When a fault occurs, the protection scheme is 
required to trip only those circuit breakers whose 
operation is required to isolate the fault. 
 
Security- A measure of a protection scheme's ability to 
restrain and prevent spurious operation, when no 
operation is required. 
 
Sensitivity- A term frequently used when referring to 
minimum operating level of relays or complete 
protection schemes. 
 
Speed- The function of protection systems is to isolate 
faults on the power system as rapidly as 
possible, to prevent widespread loss of 
synchronism and consequent collapse of the 
power system. 
 
Stability- refers to the ability of the protection system to 
remain unaffected by conditions external to the 
protected zone, for example through-load current 
and faults external to the protected zone. 
 
xxix 
Substation automation 
system- 
Provides automation within a substation and 
includes the IEDs and communication network 
infrastructure. 
 
Switch- Active network component. Switches connect 
two or more sub networks. Switches establish the 
borders for so called collision domains. Collisions 
cannot take place between networks divided by 
switches, data packets destined to a specific sub 
network do not appear on the other sub 
networks.  
 
Tap changer- A mechanism, fitted to the winding of a 
transformer, to alter the turns ratio of the 
transformer by small discrete amounts over a 
defined range. 
 
Unit protection- A protection system that is designed to operate 
only for abnormal conditions within a clearly 
defined zone of the power system. 
 
Universal Time 
Coordinated. 
The precise internationally recognised time 
reference, equivalent to GMT. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYM 
 
CAN - Controller Area Network 
 
CT -  Current Transformer 
 
CSAEMS -  Centre for Substation Automation and Energy 
Management Systems  
 
CPUT - Cape Peninsula University of Technology 
 
DANH - Doubly Attached Node running HSR 
 
DANP - Doubly Attached Node running PRP 
 
ESI - Electricity Supply Industry 
 
FO - Fibre Optic 
  
GIS - Gas Insulated Switchgear 
 
GOOSE - Generic Object Oriented Substation Event 
  
GPS  - Global Positioning System 
 
HSR - High-availability Seamless Redundancy 
 
IED -  Intelligent Electronic Device 
 
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission 
  
IT  - Instrument transformers 
 
LAN - Local Area network 
 
LCC - Local Control Cubicles 
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LN - Logical Nodes 
 
LVC - Low Voltage Cubicle 
 
MMS  - Manufacturing Message Specification 
  
MR  - Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen 
  
MSTP - Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol 
  
MTBF  - Mean Time Between Failure 
 
MU - Merging Unit 
 
NCIT - Non-Conventional Instrument Transformer 
 
NEC - Neutral Electromagnetic Coupler 
 
NER - Neutral-Earthing Resistor 
  
NTP - Network Time Protocol 
 
OLTC - On Load Tap Changer 
 
PRP  - Parallel Redundancy Protocol 
 
PTP - Precision Time Synchronization Protocol 
 
PTPv2  - Precision Time Protocol version 2 
 
REF - Restricted Earth Fault 
  
RSTP - Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol 
 
RTDS - Real-Time Digital Simulator 
  
SAS - Substation Automation System 
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SCSM - Specific Communication Service Mapping 
  
SEL - Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories 
 
SMV - Sampled Measured Values 
 
SV - Sampled Values 
 
VLAN - Virtual Local Area Network 
 
VT -  Voltage transformer 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Power utilities and distributors as part of the Power Supply Industry (PSI) play an 
important part of development in a country by supplying uninterrupted electricity at a 
cost-effective price to the customer.  
Generated electricity is transmitted and distributed through power transformers used in 
electrical substations to transform the system voltage to the different voltage levels.  
Substation equipment such as power transformers are monitored, protected, and 
automatically controlled by Substation Automation Systems (SASs) using Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IEDs) connected using high-speed communications network. 
The traditional way of connecting the IEDs in the control room at a station level to High 
Voltage (HV) equipment such as instrument transformers and control devices in the yard 
at the process level requires a lot of copper cables and wiring. The engineering, 
installation, commissioning time and cost can be reduced, if the copper cables are 
replaced with a fibre optic communication network.  
The replacement of copper wires also reduces wires and terminal connection blocks in 
the protection and control panels. This results in a reduction of the panel size, 
manufacturing time and cost. The size of the panels influences the size and cost of the 
control room. 
This document describes research done on an existing substation automation system by 
developing an algorithm that can apply the IEC61850-9-2 standard to improve 
transformer protection, voltage regulator control and cooling fan motor control. 
This chapter explains the components that are found in a SAS and transformer 
protection, automation and control schemes.  
This chapter also covers the Awareness of the problem, Description of the substation 
under study, Problem statement, Sub problems, Proposed problem solution, Research 
aim and objectives, Hypothesis, Delimitation of research, Assumptions, Research design 
and methodology, Literature review, Research investigation of transformer protection 
design and Evaluation. 
 
1.2 Awareness of the problem 
Initially a SAS in NamPower was vendor specific. It was difficult to integrate IEDs from 
different vendors into a SAS. It was also tough to extend existing substations by adding 
new IEDs from different vendors. An international standard was important to provide 
interoperability between different vendors of IEDs and SAS. 
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The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) developed the IEC 61850 standard 
that consist out of ten parts (Adamiak et al., 2009).The standard allowed interoperability 
between different vendor IEDs when they comply to the standard (Chen et al., 2014: 1). 
The standard is also independent of communication technologies and made the upgrade 
and implementation of new communication technologies easier. The IEC 61850 standard 
can be implemented in a SAS into three distinct levels, namely a Substation Level, a Bay 
Level and a Process Level. 
NamPower implemented the IEC 61850 standard for electrical substation automation 
systems in many substations mainly at a station and bay level. High ambient 
temperatures and a conservative approach to protection systems design were the main 
reasons for not installing IEDs in the high voltage yard and implementing the standard at 
a process level.   
In the most recent SAS, the implementation of the IEC 61850 standard was extended to 
the process level. The power transformers and switchgear are installed inside a 
substation building and the IEDs installed at the process level were not exposed to a 
harsh environment.  
The following are typical example of benefits with applications of a process bus at utility 
substations (Seco & Cardenas, 2016; Mackiewicz, 2006: 7). 
• Time reduction: Standardization results in time reduction in substation design and 
drawings, reduces installation time and reduces commissioning time. 
• Cost reduction: Less cable trenches, less man hours, instrument transformer savings, 
less protection and control panel space, less control room space. 
• Testing and IED configuration time may take initially longer but it also decreases with 
experience. 
 
1.3 Description of the substation under study 
 
The 132/11kV substation consists out of 5 x 40 MVA YNd1 connected power 
transformers, Double 132kV bus bar, 2 x 132kV Feeders, Single 11kV bus bar with 4 x 
Bus Sections, 3 x 11kV Feeders connected to loads and 3 x 11kV Feeders connected to 
two power stations. The simplified substation diagram is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Substation Case Study 
 
The 132kV switchgear is SF6 GIS and 11kV switchgear is metal enclosed. Schweitzer 
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL) Protection Automation and Control (PAC) 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) were used. SEL Merging Units (MUs) were not 
available at the time when the Substation Automation System (SAS) was designed and 
built. The IEC 61850 standard was implemented but 61850-9-2 process bus is not 
currently implemented. 
Data models defined in IEC 61850 are mapped to only MMS and GOOSE protocols and 
the SMV protocol is not used. 
Protection and Control IEDs are connected to a substation LAN, RUGGEDCOM RX 1500 
routers and switches using fibre optic linked Ethernet. 
 
SEL IEDs are used for protection automation and control of the power transformers. The 
detailed configuration of each transformer unit within network communication is 
described in this section. 
The dedicated transformer differential protection SEL 487E IEDs, Bay controllers using 
SEL 451-5 and SEL 751 IEDs are given in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Protection Communication network 
 
Protection panels in the control room contain the main transformer protection IEDs and 
a network switch. Redundancy is obtained with two identical SEL 487E IEDs connected 
in a ring configuration to a RX 1500 network switch. 
Bay control units are installed at the switchgear, a single unit for each bay and voltage 
level. The SEL 451-5 bay control unit is located at the 132kV switchgear in the Local 
Control Cubicle (LCC).   
The SEL 751 as bay control unit is located at the 11kV switchgear Low Voltage Cubicle 
(LVC). These SEL 451-5 and SEL 751 units are connected to the RX 1500 network 
switch in the transformer protection panel. 
SEL 2440 and 2411 Programmable Automation Controllers (PAC) are used as input 
/output units (IO) and are in the Transformer Marshalling Interface Box (MIB) (Schweitzer 
Engineering Laboratories, 2016b). Transformer alarms and trip signals are hardwired to 
the IO units. These units are connected in a ring configuration with the TAPCON OLTC 
IED to a RX 1500 network switch in the transformer protection panel. 
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The protection IEDs, bay control IEDs and IO units related to a transformer bay are 
connected using fibre optic to a RX 1500 network switch in the transformer protection 
and control panel. The fibre optic replaced a lot of copper wires from the HV equipment 
to the protection panel and reduced the size of the PAC panels in the control room. 
 
The 132kV and 11kV bus bars are protected with bus zone protection by using SEL 487B 
IEDs. A single line diagram showing the 132kV bus zone protection is shown in Figure 
1.3. Three IED devices are used, one IED for the red, white and blue phases each. The 
bay CT is hardwired to the IED and the isolator status and bus zone trip is done with 
GOOSE messages. A similar system is used on the 11kV Bus Bar. 
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Figure 1.3: 132kV Bus Zone Protection 
 
132 and 11kV inductive VTs are located at the switchgear. CTs are located at the 
switchgear and internal to the power transformer and the specifications for these CTs 
are not the same. This has an impact on the transformer protection scheme.  
The secondary sides of instrument transformers are copper hardwired to IEDs and fibre 
optic links are not used for these signals. The analogue signals from the secondary side 
of the CTs (1 Aac) and VTs (110 Vac) are to be converted to digital Sampled Value (SV) 
signals using Merging Units (MUs) at the process level. 
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1.4 Problem statement 
The IEC 61850 standard for electrical Substation Automation Systems (SAS) has 10 
parts. Parts 8 and 9 describe Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM). Data 
can be transmitted from the source, i.e. High Voltage (HV) equipment to where it is used, 
i.e. IEDs. Logical nodes can be mapped to various protocols, MMS in part 8 and SMV in 
part 9 (Hogan, 2014:30). The MMS protocol is regularly used by power utilities for the 
IEC 61850 implemented SAS compared to part 9-2 and the SMV protocol. The slower 
implementation of the SMV protocol may partly be due to the slow implementation of 
Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCIT) and compatibility issues between 
MUs and IEDs of different suppliers. 
 
The main research problem is to investigate the IEC 61850-9-2 standard related to 
SCSM in the SAS. The IEC 61850-9-2 process bus is not currently implemented using 
merging units and sampled values.  
 
1.5 Sub Problems 
This research work proposes to develop a complete monitoring, protection, and voltage 
control system for parallel power transformers based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. To 
complete this, the following sub-problems have been identified: 
 
1.5.1 Voltage control 
The Maschinenfabrik Reinhausen TAPCON voltage regulator control IED is situated at 
the tap change motor drive of the transformer On Load Tap Changer (OLTC). CTs and 
VTs are hardwired from the switchgear panels to inputs on the voltage regulator control 
IED. MUs and the SMV protocol are not used.  
The IED of each transformer is required to regulate the voltage level of the secondary 
side bus bar it is connected to. All the regulating IEDs is required to communicate with 
each other and collectively control the bus bar voltage depending on the switching 
configuration of the parallel transformers. The Tap Change Control IEDs use Controller 
Area Network (CAN) bus communication over copper wire. This was converted from 
analogue to digital communication to be able to use the existing FO network. 
A strategy, methods and algorithms for voltage regulator control of parallel power 
transformers need to be developed and implemented based on IEC 61850-9-2 process 
bus. 
 
1.5.2 Transformer protection 
The transformer protection is done with two SEL 487E IEDs as Main 1 & 2 protection to 
cover the two different protection zones. One differential IED is using internal transformer 
1-7 
bushing CTs covering only for internal faults. The other differential IED uses the CTs at 
the 11 and 132kV switchgear covering the cable and transformer bushings. 
The transformer with vector group YNd1 requires an earthing transformer on the 11kV 
delta connected side. This is achieved with a Neutral Electromagnetic Coupler (NEC) / 
Neutral-Earthing Resistor (NER) transformer. The neutral on the NEC/NER transformers 
is switchable for transformer units no 4 and 5, they can be disconnected when the power 
transformers are connected to generators. This is shown in Figure 1.4. Transformer units 
no 1 to 3 have auxiliary transformers added to the NEC/NER transformers for station 
auxiliary supply.  
 
BS
TRFR 
5
TRFR 
4
NEC
NER
NEC
NER
 
Figure 1.4: Transformers with NEC/NER units 
 
Issues of using copper wires for voltage and currents can be eliminated by applying MUs 
and the SMV protocol. Time Synchronised SV streams is used for MUs. Unsynchronized 
SV streams cannot be used to accomplish for example differential protection. 
 A strategy, methods and algorithms for transformer protection need to be developed 
and implemented based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
 
1.5.3 Cooling fan control 
The control circuit for controlling the cooling fan motors is hardwired. A temperature 
analogue signal input into a programmable automation controller IED can be used for 
controlling the transformer cooling fans. The protection can switch of the fans during a 
fault in case a transformer fault develops into a fire. A strategy, methods and algorithms 
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for transformer cooling fan motor control need to be developed and implemented based 
on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
 
1.5.4 Communication network 
The currently implemented communication network connecting IEDs to network switches 
in the SAS needs to be evaluated to determine if is suitable for addition of MUs to the 
process bus. The process and station bus can physically or virtually be separated. 
A strategy, methods and algorithms for a communication network need to be developed 
and implemented based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
 
1.5.5 Time synchronisation 
The time synchronisation for IEDs is done with an IRIG-B signal over a separate network. 
Evaluation of the network is needed to determine if this is adequate when a process bus 
network for sampled values is added. A strategy, methods and algorithms for time 
synchronisation need to be developed and implemented based on IEC 61850-9-2 
process bus. 
 
1.6 Proposed problem solution 
Communication between protection IEDs at a bay level and control IEDs at a process 
level is a combination of an Ethernet-Based Local Area Network (LAN) and conventional 
copper wires. Data models defined in IEC 61850 are mapped to only Manufacturing 
Message Specification (MMS) and Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) 
protocols, the Sampled Measured Values (SMV) protocol as part of IEC 61850-9-2 
process bus is not currently implemented. A process bus using GOOSE and MMS is 
shown in Figure 1.5. The instrument transformers secondary sides are copper hardwired 
to inputs on the transformer protection, control and voltage regulator control IEDs.  
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Figure 1.5 Process level communication using GOOSE and MMS 
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The area of implementing IEC61850-9-2 is the focus of this research work and the author 
focuses on how to develop an existing implementation of IEC 61850 to include SVs in a 
NamPower SAS. This is shown in Figure 1.6. 
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Figure 1.6 Process level communication using a Merging Unit & SV 
 
1.7 Research aims and objectives 
The aim of the research project is to develop and implement a strategy, methods and 
algorithms for monitoring, protection and voltage control of parallel power transformers 
based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
To provide solutions to the problems listed above the following objectives are proposed: 
 
1.7.1 Theoretical Background 
To provide theoretical background of power transformers, transformer tap change 
control, instrument transformers, merging units, substation communication, substation 
automation, protection, and control. 
 
1.7.2 Literature Review 
To provide a literature review on IEC 61850-9-2, transformer protection, tap changer 
controls, merging units, instrument transformers, time synchronisation, SAS 
communication networks. 
 
1.7.3 Real-Time RSCAD application 
To develop a Real-Time RSCAD simulation of the parallel power transformer system. 
 
1.7.4 Protection and control strategy 
Development of a strategy for monitoring, protection and voltage control of power 
transformers. 
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1.7.5 Power Transformer Protection 
To design and implement the protection schemes for power transformers based on IEC 
61850-9-2 process bus. 
 
1.7.6 Tap Changer Voltage control 
To design and implement the IEC 61850 standard-based voltage regulating IEDs to 
control on load tap changers of the parallel connected power transformers. 
 
1.7.7 Integration of the protection and voltage control schemes 
To develop a method to integrate the protection and voltage control schemes for the 
automation of the parallel power transformer system. 
 
1.7.8 Test-Bench 
Development of a test-bench for real-time implementation and testing of the developed 
system using hardware-in-the-loop tests with a Real-Time Digital Simulator, Merging 
Units and transformer protection and control IEDs. Physical Merging Unit devices can be 
used, or they can be simulated in the RTDS. 
  
1.7.9 Experiments 
Experiments with the test-bench to be conducted for various scenarios using the RTDS 
simulated Merging Units and conventional instrument transformers signals. The IEDs 
performance to be evaluated using the RTDS simulated current and voltage as inputs to 
the IEDs. Different communication networks for a process bus to be considered and 
tested. 
 
1.7.10 Analysis of the results, recommendations, and conclusions.  
The experiment results to be analysed to make recommendations and conclusions on 
the proposed system for protection and control of the parallel power transformers 
according to the IEC 61850 standard. 
 
1.8 Hypothesis  
• The MUs connected to IEDs with a fibre optic network can successfully replace 
hardwired connections from the instrument transformers in the yard to the IEDs in the 
control room. 
• The MU and sampled value implementation at the process level will improve a 
protection and control system for power transformers, by solving issues related to 
copper wired instrument transformers, reduce the cost of high voltage equipment, 
increase flexibility of the design and reduces the installation cost. 
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• The research work will contribute to the knowledge base and develop scares skills at 
universities and the Electricity Supply Industry in Southern Africa. 
 
1.9 Delimitation of research  
• Only 5 x 40 MVA, 132/11kV parallel power transformers are considered in the 
implementation of IEC 61850-9-2 standard at the process level of a Substation 
Automation System. 
• The tap changers of the transformers have 17 taps each. The voltage range referred 
to the primary 132kV side is from +5 % to – 15% 
• The five paralleled power transformers are connected to a 132kV and 11kV bus bar 
system. 
• The battery voltage of the SAS is 110 Vdc. 
• The protection and control of the 11kV and 132kV bus bars, feeders, bus couplers and 
bus sections will not be covered in the research work. 
• Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCITs), such as optical current trans- 
formers will not be covered in the research work. The focus will be to use the 
conventional CTs and VTs connected to the MUs. 
 
1.10 Assumptions  
• All software and hardware equipment required for the completion of this research work 
is available at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology laboratory at the Centre 
for Substation Automation and Energy Management Systems. 
• The process bus application area for the transformer protection and control is based 
on an existing NamPower implementations of SAS communication network in a 
substation. 
• Differential and restricted earth fault protection are considered for the transformer 
protection and discussed in this document. 
• The transformer on load tap changer control function can be included in the transformer 
protection and control IED or in a separate IED. Tap changer IEDs can be installed at 
the transformer marshalling box or in the control panel. 
• The proposed station and process bus communication topologies can be implemented. 
 
1.11 Research design and methodology 
 
The research aim is to develop a strategy, methods and algorithms to improve the 
transformer protection and control scheme by the implementation of Merging Units and 
sampled values without sacrificing on the reliability of the complete scheme. The above 
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objective can be met by making use of the IEC61850-9-2 process bus standard. The 
research methods that will be used in achieving the thesis aim are: 
 
1.12 Literature review 
• The literature provides transformer protection and control functions from different 
vendor’s IEDs. IEDs using conventional analogue signal inputs from instrument 
transformers need to be compared with the IEDs using sampled value inputs.  
• Different protection and control functions are included in the IEDs. The transformer on 
load tap changer control function is included in some vendor transformer protection 
IEDs. A separate tap changer control IED is required if this function is not included in 
the transformer protection IED.  
• Time synchronisation of IEDs and Merging Units is vital for using sampled values. 
Different methods for time synchronisation are available. 
• The different substation communication networks need to be reviewed to determine the 
best possible solutions that can be used for the sampled value implementation. 
 
1.13 Research investigation of transformer protection design 
Transformer protection uses conventional Instrument Transformers (IT) in the HV yard 
which are copper hardwired to the IED inputs. Modern protection using IEC 61850-9-2 
considers ITs connected to Merging Units where the analogue current and voltage 
signals are converted to digital sampled values and sent to the IEDs using optical fibre 
connections. Figure 1.7 is shown to compare the two systems. 
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Figure 1.7 Protection with ITs using copper wires & MUs with Fibre Optic communication 
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1.14 Research investigation of transformer OLTC control 
The substation bus bar voltage is regulated by an IED with a voltage regulating function 
to control a transformer on load tap changer. This function can be included in a 
transformer protection IED or in a separate control IED. CT and VT signals are used for 
controlling the transformer tap changer. The best location for this function needs to be 
determined for implementing the Merging Units and sampled values. A transformer 
protection function can block the tap changer operation during faults conditions, because 
a high current flowing through the tap switch can damage it. Figure 1.8 shows how an 
OLTC IED can be connected to a protection IED and a MU using a fibre optic network. 
GOOSE and SV messages can be sent over this network. 
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Figure 1.8 Tap Changer Control 
 
1.15 Research investigation of time synchronisation 
Time synchronisation of merging units and IEDs will be established using several 
methods. The best method needs to be investigated that is suitable for implementing a 
process bus and sampled values. 
 
1.16 Research investigation of substation communication network 
The availability and reliability of the communication network need to be considered for 
the process bus implementation using MU sampled values. 
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1.17 Research investigation using a Test-Bench 
A power system Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) is required to simulate a part of the 
power system that is used to test the transformer protection and control scheme. The 
simulator from the RTDS technologies is also used to simulate the power system, MUs, 
VT and CT signals.  
IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value messaging or analogue outputs from instrument 
transformers can be simulated using the RTDS. The trip signals for both digital hardwired 
copper communication and GOOSE messages using optical fibre communication will be 
considered and tested. 
The analogue CT and VT output signals from the RTDS need to be amplified to typically 
power system values and connected to the protection IEDs shown in Figure 1.9. The 
RTDS sends equipment status, for example the Circuit Breaker (CB) position to the IED 
and the IEDs send CB trip and close signals to the simulator to simulate CB operation. 
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Figure 1.9 RTDS with analogue VT & CT Outputs & Digital Inputs/Outputs 
 
 The test-bench setup using process bus options needs to be considered and 
implemented. The process bus communication network includes the use of network 
switches. The instrument transformer digital signals need to be communicated to the 
protection and control IEDs in an application where the IEDs use sampled value 
messages. 
Sampled values and GOOSE messages can be produced inside the RTDS, see Figure 
1.10. Equipment status and operation messages are sent with GOOSE messages 
between the IED and the RTDS. 
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Figure 1.10 RTDS with SV & GOOSE messages 
 
The RTDS can produce power system simulated analogue CT and VT values which can 
be amplified. External Merging Units can be used to digitise it to sampled value 
messages. GOOSE messages can be used for control and status indication of the 
simulated high voltage equipment. This is shown in Figure 1.11. 
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Figure 1.11 RTDS with analogue & GOOSE outputs, External MU   
 
1.18 Evaluation 
The performance of transformer protection and control when replacing copper wired 
connections for analogue CT & VT signals with digital converted SV messages over Fibre 
Optic (FO) networks need to be evaluated. 
 
1.19 Thesis chapters  
The documentation of the research investigations is divided into 8 chapters and 9 
appendixes as follows: 
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1.19.1 Chapter One  
This chapter covers the Awareness of the problem, Description of the substation under 
study, Problem statement, Sub problems, Proposed problem solution, Research aim and 
objectives, Hypothesis, Delimitation of research, Assumptions, Research design and 
methodology, Literature review, Research investigation of transformer protection design 
and Evaluation are described. 
 
1.19.2 Chapter Two  
This chapter covers the literature review of different types of primary equipment 
components in protection and control of power transformers, substation control systems 
and communication networks. The importance of using merging units connected to 
conventional instrument transformers is described and compared with systems where 
conventional instrument transformers are copper hard wired to IEDs. 
 
1.19.3 Chapter Three 
This chapter covers the IEC 61850 standard and digital substation Ethernet technology. 
The IEC 61850 standard is discussed under the following point: 
• A standard name space of logical nodes, data objects and attributes,  
• A System Configuration Description Language (SCL) and, 
• Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) services that can be mapped 
to specific protocols to exchange this information 
The communication network architecture, communication protocols, physical layer, data 
link layer and time synchronization of substation communication networks in an IEC 
61850 standard digital substation is discussed.  
 
1.19.4 Chapter Four 
In this chapter, the system of five 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers connected 
in parallel is modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS).  
The system configuration is changed by controlling different circuit breakers. 
The quantity of power transformers connected in parallel can be controlled in this way. 
Faults are applied at different points in the system and for different system 
configurations. The fault currents are measured and analysed. 
The configuration of the RTDS / RSCAD software models, power source, power 
transformer, power system load and instrument transformers models are shown. 
The simulation results are discussed. 
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1.19.5 Chapter Five 
In this chapter, the protection system for two 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 paralleled power 
transformers is modelled, simulated and tested in the Real-Time Digital Simulator 
(RTDS). 
The configuration of the RTDS RSCAD differential protection function, overcurrent 
protection function and IEC 61850 -9-2 LE sampled values are shown. 
The protection system simulation results are discussed. It is shown that power 
transformer protection settings can be adapted when the system configuration for parallel 
power transformers is changed. 
 
1.19.6 Chapter Six 
 
In this chapter, the controller design of tap changers for a system of two 40MVA 
132/11kV YNd1 paralleled power transformers is modelled, simulated and tested in the 
Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS). 
The configuration of the RTDS RSCAD tap changer model is shown. 
The tap changer controller simulation results have shown that the power transformer tap 
changer controller can be adapted to the system configuration for parallel power 
transformers. 
 
1.19.7 Chapter Seven 
Conclusion on the application the IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and 
systems used to implement IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values for a typical substation 
system with parallel power transformers is described. 
In this chapter, different Test-Benches are setup and discussed. The configurations of 
Merging Units (MUs), transformer protection and control Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) and Ethernet equipment are shown. 
The Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) is used to run the real-time power system model 
and do simulations. IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Values (SV) streams are published from 
the RTDS as well as using stand-alone MUs. 
A Micom P645 transformer differential protection IED and a differential protection 
function configured in the RTDS RSCAD are used for experimentation. 
It is shown that Analogue Merging Units (AMUs) publish successfully IEC 61850-9-2 
Sampled Value (SV) streams on the Ethernet network. 
The RTDS GTNET_SV9−2 component publishes IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Value (SV) 
streams successfully on the Ethernet network.  
The MiCOM P645 IED subscribes to the SV streams and measures the analogue signal 
correctly. 
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The RTDS RSCAD developed transformer protection component is tested successfully. 
The RTDS IEC 61850-9-2 SV streams are used to show that the burden on the 
Instrument Transformers is less when using MU and SV streams compared to copper 
wired instrument transformers 
 
1.20 Conclusion 
The Awareness of the problem, Description of the substation under study, Problem 
statement with Sub problems, Proposed problem solution, Research aim and objectives, 
Hypothesis, Delimitation of research, Assumptions, Research design and methodology, 
Literature review, Research investigation of transformer protection design and 
Evaluation are described and explained. 
The topics covered in the different chapters are explained. 
In the next chapter the literature in protection and control of power transformers is 
described and different types of papers and articles based on primary and secondary 
equipment related to the protection and control of power transformers are reviewed and 
analysed. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Power transformers are required to transform the system voltage from generation to 
transmission and distribution levels.  
Protection and control devices must ensure that power system high voltage equipment 
such as transformers operate correctly to deliver safe, reliable and secure supply. This 
is achieved using protection and control schemes. Different standards were developed 
over the years that are related to protection, automation and control of power systems 
and are used by power utilities (Kanabar et al., 2012). Real-time simulations is important 
to test these new technologies (Dufour & Belanger, 2014). 
The IEC 61850 standard series defines the communication between Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IEDs) in the substation and the related system requirements (IEC, 2002b). The 
standard also allows interoperability among automation devices of different vendors and 
is needed for digital substation application. Utilities implement the digital substation 
technology in substations to proof the concept, learn and understand the different 
components of a digital substation (Vardhan et al., 2018)  
Methods to synchronizing different devices clocks over the network like IRIG-B and IEEE 
1588 standard are discussed (Bhardwaj et al., 2014). 
Reliability, selectivity, stability, speed, sensitivity are fundamentals that need to be 
considered when a protection system is designed (Alstom, 2002: 11–12).  
Protection, automation, and control of power transformers is reviewed in this chapter for 
the following cases: 
• Protection relays using copper hardwired instrument transformers. 
• Protection relays using merging units connected to conventional instrument 
transformers. 
 
Primary and secondary substation equipment at station and process levels are involved 
in a protection and control system. The following equipment need to be considered when 
a protection and control system is designed: 
• Secondary equipment reviewed in section 2.2 : substation automation and control 
system, time synchronization source, communication network, Merging Units, power 
transformer protection and control, 
• Primary equipment reviewed in section 2.3: instrument transformers and earthing 
transformers. 
Real-time digital simulation is discussed in section 2.4. 
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2.2 Secondary substation equipment 
The protection and control IEDs, network equipment and Merging Units are regarded as 
secondary equipment in the substation. Secondary equipment are reviewed with the 
focus on how these fit into a digital substation. A review of different topics regarding 
digital substations are done. A total of 61 conference proceedings and journal articles 
are reviewed on substation control systems, communication networks, network 
redundancy protocols and Ethernet equipment. Most of the papers were published 
between 2006 and 2019,Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Digital substation documents reviewed per year 
 
2.2.1 Substation control system 
Different communication protocols and standards are used in a modern substation, The 
two most used standards are IEC 61850 and IEC 60870 (Bhardwaj et al., 2014). 
(Skendzic et al., 2007: 1) divide a substation protection and control system using the IEC 
61850 standard into three distinct levels, namely a Substation Level, a Bay Level and a 
Process Level.  
The protection and control Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) related to a specific 
transformer bay can be connected to each other in a communication network at a bay 
level, and to other bays or the substation SCADA network at a station level. 
The status collection and the control of high voltage equipment such as breakers and 
disconnectors can be done at a process level (IEC, 2015). A Protection, automation and 
control scheme for power transformers is discussed where high voltage equipment and 
1
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switchgears are connected to IEDs in the yard at substation process level making 
Ethernet networks in the substation a requirement (Ali Raza, Khalil Ullah, Saleem 
Ahmed, 2009; Stark et al., 2013; Stefanka et al., 2013). The IEDs in the yard are 
connected via a fibre optic network to IEDs in the control room. The transformer 
marshalling interface box and the switchgear such as circuit breakers and isolator / 
disconnectors are hard wired to IEDs in the high voltage yard. The IED can be situated 
at the device or in a yard junction box close to the equipment. Equipment status and 
control at process level is then possible when this IED is connected to the substation 
communication network. A control room environment were protection and control IEDs 
are located, can be air conditioned. The ambient temperature needs to be considered 
when IEDs are in yard enclosures. 
 
Analogue data, in addition to binary data, can also be gathered at the process level. 
Conventional Instrument Transformers (IT) wired to Merging Units (MUs) can gather the 
analogue data and digitise them per the standard to sampled values. Replacing the 
copper wires with fibre optic from the yard to the control room can reduce some 
hazardous voltages and currents and therefore increase the safety of substation control 
rooms (Ingram et al., 2013a: 5941). The interface where Merging Units are used at 
process level and connected to the protection and control devices at the Bay Level is 
described (Apostolov & Vandiver, 2010: 2). The performance of a process bus based 
protection scheme must be comparable to a conventional hardwired scheme (Crossley 
et al., 2011). 
The research will focus on how to improve the SAS by using sampled values in the 
process level communication. Investigations on the performance of the Process Bus and 
different protection functions have been of interest to researchers (Adewole & Tzoneva, 
2014; Chen et al., 2014; Ingram et al., 2013b)  
IED vendors can apply the IEC 61850 standard differently when they offer IEDs capable 
to receive sampled value and interface with the MUs. The IEC 61850-9-2 LE is an 
Implementation Guideline for Digital Interface to Instrument Transformers Using IEC 
61850-9- 2, issued to get a uniformed standard implementation (Bhardwaj et al., 2014: 
2). 
The instrument transformers connected hardwired from the yard to the control room are 
compared to instrument transformers connected to Merging Units in the yard which are 
connected via a fibre optic network to IEDs in the control room.  
 
The substation automation system uses IEC 61850 messaging not only for control 
related functions like blocking and interlocking schemes but for protection as well. 
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Message types can be subdivided into performance classes: (a) control and protection 
and (b) metering and power quality applications (Hasan Ali et al., 2014). 
 
The engineering and the process of designing an IEC 61850 protection and control 
scheme are not the same in comparison with the hardwired scheme. The IEC61850 
functional specification and a testing system for the automation system is required 
(Ryono et al., 2019; Huang, 2018a). The documentation is another issue that is different. 
The DC key diagrams that contains conventional hardwires for tripping and indication 
signals are different to when GOOSE messages are used, this can no longer be indicated 
in the conventional way. New ways need to be considered in fault finding and other 
operational tasks where normal printed DC key diagrams are used in the field (Chang et 
al., 2014: 19). 
 
2.2.2 Substation communication network 
Protection and control IEDs perform critical functions in the electrical substations. One 
of the major advantages of implementing process bus GOOSE-based control and 
protection tripping is that it replaced a lot of copper hardwired networks to transfer 
information between the equipment in the yard and the protection and control IEDs in 
the control building. The copper is now replaced with fibre optic networks. In an IEC 
61850 based protection and control systems the IEDs depend on a reliable Substation 
Communication Network (SCN) architecture that meets redundancy requirements when 
failures do occur. Networks must be capable of reconfiguring and self-healing in case of 
communication device or link failures (Goraj & Harada, 2012: 1). 
The ring and star architectures are the most used in communication networks. The ring 
architecture has an advantage over a star where switches connected in a ring have no 
single point of failure compared to a network where a central switch is a single point of 
failure (Liu et al., 2014: 2). 
The data flow in substations is divided in three proposed kinds of mathematical models, 
cyclic data, stochastic data, and burst data. Network performance and data flow were 
analysed for a typical sub-station while taking network topologies, Virtual Local Area 
Network (VLAN) and impacts of system faults into account (Zhang et al., 2015). The cost 
of duplicating the complete communication network needs to be compared with the 
requirement for redundancy. Other network designs can be considered to have some 
redundancy at a lower cost. The star and ring topologies have each there own 
advantages and disadvantages (Rahat et al., 2019). A combination of star and ring 
topologies is considered for this network design. The SEL IEDs have two Ethernet ports 
connected to an internal switch with failover technology. This enables a redundant design 
where devices can be connected in a ring topology, each IED connected with two ports.  
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All the transformer bay protection and control devices are connected in ring networks to 
one bay level layer 2 switch. The switch can be considered as a single point of failure. 
The risk, probability and consequences of the switch failure need to be considered 
against the cost of duplicating the switches. The RUGGEDCOM RX1500 series switches 
considered in this design have two redundant load sharing power modules to provide a 
secure/redundant power supply (Siemens Industry, 2015). The different bay level layer 
2 switches are connected in a ring network to a layer 3 station level router. The station 
router can be duplicated for redundancy. 
The communication network requirements for a process bus may not be the same for 
GOOSE and MMS messages compared to SV messages. The traffic produced by SV 
messages is much more than that of GOOSE messages (Konka et al., 2011). GOOSE 
messages containing the same information are sent and resent at defined intervals after 
the original message was sent. SV messages are, in comparison, a continuous stream 
of digitised current and voltage measurements. The information lost will therefore not be 
the same for the different types of messages during communication failures. To prevent 
SV data lost, networks must be capable of fast reconfiguring and self-healing in case of 
communications device or link failures (Goraj & Harada, 2012: 1). 
The use of time critical sampled value and GOOSE messages increases the overall 
performance requirements of the IEC 61850 communication system. The system 
performance must be tested, assessed and certified (Meier et al., 2016; Lopes et al., 
2015; Rinaldi, Ferrari, Flammini, et al., 2016; Sidhu et al., 2011). 
The reliability and availability of the communication network have an impact on the 
operation of the protection IEDs and a protection system when MUs with digital 
information replace the hardwired analogue CT and VTs information. It is shown how the 
Reliability Block Diagram and state space approaches can be combined to analyse the 
reliability and availability of all the components in a substation communication network 
(Younis, 2016). 
The ring architecture where all bay IEDs are connected to one bay network switch 
applied to a network without MUs may not be appropriate when MUs are added. The bay 
network switch will be a single point of failure. Different mechanisms and protocols must 
be implemented in these networks to obtain better redundancy and shorter outage time. 
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) uses two communication links or loops from the 
source to destination. The MU will need two communication ports with RSTP to connect 
to the process buss network. IEDs connected to a process bus as well as a station bus 
will need two ports to connect to each network.  
MSTP that allows Multiple instances of Spanning Tree Protocol on Virtual LANs may be 
a suitable solution. In a single physical network, there can be multiple VLANs, each with 
2-6 
their own instance of Spanning Tree Protocol. An example could be where GOOSE 
applications and SV streams are logically segregated by various VLANs  
 
Merging units will require two Ethernet ports or Doubly Attached Nodes (DAN) if Parallel 
Redundancy Protocol (PRP) is used to provide redundancy. It will be possible for 
merging units running PRP to connect to two separated and independent networks.  
A Redundancy Box (Redbox) is needed for Merging Units with Singly Attached Nodes 
(SAN) to connect to PRP or High Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) networks. 
The HSR nodes require more processing power because every node needs to process 
a frame twice. This also has an impact on the bandwidth used due to every frame sent 
twice over the same network. This is important when a network is used for multicast SV 
sent from MUs (Goraj & Harada, 2012: 4). 
 
2.2.3 Network protocols 
Different mechanisms and protocols can be implemented in networks to obtain 
redundancy and to have the outage time as short as possible. The outage time that can 
be tolerated can depend on the type of substation, how critical it is for the power system 
and the importance and supply contract of the customer. 
A Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) is one of the network redundancy protocols 
(Cisco Systems, 2004). RSTP is an improved and faster version of STP. A Spanning tree 
topology such as RSTP consist out of a Root Bridge, Designated Switches and End 
Nodes connected in a LAN in such a way that all equipment is connected and there are 
no loops. 
Any switch in a network can be a Root Bridge but only one Root Bridge can exist at a 
specific time. The priority part and MAC address of a switch or bridge ID can be selected. 
The switch with the lowest value priority is the Root Bridge. The lowest MAC address is 
used to select a Root Bridge if two switches have the same priority. The Designated 
switch is responsible to forward information from the Root bridge to the End Node 
(Wojdak, 2003). 
RSTP uses two communication links or loops from the source to the destination. The 
redundant links are temporary disabled until a failure in the primary link occurs. (Goraj & 
Harada, 2012) reason that one of the disadvantages of RSTP, is that Ethernet root switch 
failures can be non-deterministic in highly meshed networks and is recommended to be 
avoided using RSTP in highly meshed networks for substation automation. 
Another spanning tree protocol, MSTP, allows multiple instances of Spanning Tree 
Protocol on Virtual LANs. In a single physical network, there can be multiple VLANs, 
each with their own instance of Spanning Tree Protocol. An example could be where 
GOOSE applications are logically segregated to a separate VLANs. 
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Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) 
are bus redundancy architectures proposed by the IEC 62439-3 standard (Igarashi et 
al., 2015: 3; Kumar et al., 2015a). PRP is tested by (Darby et al., 2014) in a case study 
for new substations and considered to be multi-vendor interoperable. HSR topologies 
are compatible with the Ethernet standard IEEE802.3 and considered to offer zero 
recovery time (Araujo et al., 2012). Network redundancy can be managed within the 
network or in the end nodes. 
 
2.2.4 Time synchronization source 
A review of types of time synchronization sources is done. A total of 29 conference 
proceedings and journal articles were reviewed, Figure 2.2. Only one was published 
before 2010 and most were published in the last decade. Precision Time Synchronization 
Protocol (PTP) and Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) are reviewed for use in 
process bus networks. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Time synchronization documents reviewed per year 
 
The equipment status collected at the process level by protection and control devices 
need to be time stamped and published in a frame format on the substation 
communication network. All the devices therefore need internal clocks that are 
synchronized with a substation GPS clock. Bhardwaj et al.,(, 2014: 4) showed that these 
synchronised device clocks can in addition to time stamping, also be used to calculate 
delays in the communication network. The synchronization is performed through IRIG-
B, or indirectly over a network using one of several standards.  
The IEC 61850 standard recommends the Network Time Protocol (NTP) as a 
synchronization method (Rinaldi, Della Giustina, et al., 2016). The NTP time accuracy 
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(0.1 to 1 ms) can be considered enough for data acquisition and control applications. 
The IEEE came up with IEEE 1588 standard (De Dominicis et al., 2011; Guo & Crossley, 
2017) to synchronize multiple devices over a network where their clock is in master/slave 
mode (Bhardwaj et al., 2014: 4). A single network implementation can be accomplished 
using IEEE 1588 Precision Time Synchronization Protocol (PTP) (Skendzic et al., 2007: 
5). Part 9-3 of IEC 61850 specifies a PTP profile of IEC 61588:2009. The IEEE Std 1588-
2008 applicable to power utility automation allows compliance with the highest 
synchronization classes of IEC 61850-5 and IEC 61869-9 (IEC, 2016a). IRIG and PTP 
can be considered as alternatives to NTP.  
The timing class is defined in IEC 61850-5 standard (IEC, 2013b). 
The substation under discussion for the research project uses a GPS receiver for time 
synchronization by distributing IRIG-B encoded time signals to protection and control 
IEDs. IRIG-B is a time code format, which provides date and time in a coded form. The 
accuracy of 1 µs can be achieved by 1 pulse per second (PPS) input (Bhardwaj et al., 
2014). The SEL-2440 Discrete Programmable Automation Controller (DPAC) is 
considered as an input/output (I/O) unit for control and collecting equipment status in the 
yard (Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, 2016a). The DPAC can use IRIG-B or SNTP 
for time synchronization. The 1 µs IRIG-B accuracy offered is better than ±5ms SNTP 
accuracy for this device. The IRIG-B network requires additional cabling compared to 
SNTP that can use the communication network to all the devices to be synchronised. 
A time synchronization source is required for the MUs to time stamp the sampled 
analogue signals and convert these into digital information. Skendzic et al. (, 2007: 5) 
explain that the SV streams must be synchronized to a common time reference. This is 
of importance when this information is used for power system protection and especially 
differential protection where data are sampled at different locations, sent over a 
communication network, and compared in a protection IED.  
Network Time Protocol (NTP) as synchronization method is previously discussed. The 
NTP time accuracy (0.1 to 1 ms) can be considered insufficient for SV applications which 
require <1 µs accuracy.  
Time synchronization by distributing IRIG-B encoded time signals to the MUs in the high 
voltage yard can provide better accuracy but additional cabling is required to the MUs. 
A single network implementation can be accomplished using PTP on the 
communications network (De Dominicis et al., 2011). PTP is recommended and used for 
the synchronization of SV messages in process bus implementations (Ingram et al., 
2013a: 5935). The data traffic can affect the synchronisation accuracy (Liu et al., 2016). 
The coexistence of SNTP and PTP by using Time Gateways to translate the time from a 
time domain to the other are analysed (Ferrari, Flammini, Rinaldi & Prytz, 2011; Ferrari, 
Flammini, Rinaldi, Prytz, et al., 2011). 
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Attacks on time synchronisation and other vulnerabilities can affect the functionality and 
security of the power network (IEEE, 2019; Fodero et al., 2017). 
The paper (Ingram, Schaub, et al., 2012: 1179) demonstrates that PTPV2 is a viable 
method of providing time synchronization for an SV process. The paper also notes 
“transparent clocks” and how this impacts the PTPV2 timing system where “sampling 
errors increase as transparent clocks are added to the system”. 
 
2.2.5 Equipment 
PRP uses IEDs with two Ethernet ports or Doubly Attached Nodes (DAN) to provide 
redundancy. The IED with two Ethernet ports, DAN running PRP (DANP), makes it 
possible to connect the IEDs to two separated and independent networks. Duplicated 
Ethernet packets are sent simultaneously through these two networks. The destination 
IED can still receive the data from one network if one data frame fails to reach the IED 
from the other network. A Redundancy Box (Redbox) is needed for IEDs with Singly 
Attached Nodes (SAN) to connect to PRP networks (Liu et al., 2014: 2). 
 HSR also uses IEDs with DAN but running HSR (DANH) it is not connected to separate 
networks as with PRP. A frame is duplicated when a multicast frame is sent from the 
DAN on the same network. Each duplicate frame is tagged with the destination MAC 
address and a different sequence number. The first of the two duplicated frames received 
is passed on at the destination, and the other frame is discarded. A Redbox is needed 
for SAN to connect to HSR networks in the same way as with PRP networks (Alstom, 
2002: 440). 
The HSR nodes require more processing power because every node will need to process 
a frame twice. This also has an impact on the bandwidth used due to every frame sent 
twice over the same network. This is important when a network is used for multicast SV 
sent from MUs (Goraj & Harada, 2012: 4). 
Managed network switches allow configuration on how it functions for different IEC 
61850 messages e.g. GOOSE and SV. VLANs and Quality of Service (QoS), which is 
defined in IEEE 802.1Q. can be configured (Oliveira et al., 2016: 3). 
 
2.2.6 Merging Unit (MU) 
A review of Merging Units is done. A total of 51 conference proceedings and journal 
articles are reviewed. Only a few were published before 2010 and most were published 
in the last decade, Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 Merging Units documents reviewed per year. 
 
The first papers described Merging Units (MUs) and Sampled Values (SV), their benefits, 
and application. The substation total cost of ownership can be reduced, compact 
substations can be build and the availability of real-time operational and maintenance 
data are believed to be some of the benefits (Buhagiar et al., 2016; Wuthayavanich et 
al., 2019). That is followed by discussions on the reliability and performance of the 
related process bus Ethernet network used for publishing SV. Calibration and testing of 
merging units and devices producing sampled values is also discussed. 
 
The use of Sampled measured Values (SV) is described in IEC 61850-9-2 and IEC 
61869 to replace analogue current and voltage measurement. IEC 61869-9 provides a 
product standard for instrument transformers with a digital interface according to the IEC 
61850 series (IEC, 2016b; Brunner et al., 2004). The copper cabling is replaced with a 
digital communication network. A Merging Unit is the equipment that can digitize the 
analogue signals. Results show the good comparison of measurements between 
Merging Units and conventional systems (Dutra et al., 2014). 
 
Merging Units can have a point to point connection to the IEDs as described in 
IEC61850-9-1 (IEC, 2003a) or can be connected to a LAN as a process bus. Research 
is required to determine if a point to point connection will be more secure compare to a 
design where the MU is connected to a process bus and the protection and control IEDs 
are connected to the same process bus. Communications conditions, such as bandwidth 
limitations, latency, and packet loss are presented for sampled value based line 
protection (Chase et al., 2019) and this can be eliminated by using point to point 
connections. 
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It is important to understand that there is a difference in sampling process of data in IEDs 
and MUs. The first differences between the data sampling in an IED and the MU is the 
control of the sampling rate. The IED generally uses frequency tracking and the MU uses 
a fixed number of samples per cycle at the nominal frequency. Another difference is that 
the A/D conversion is done in the MU before the data is multicast to all the IED 
subscribers. In the absence of MUs, the IED will do the A/D conversion (Apostolov & 
Vandiver, 2010: 2). 
 
Sampled values can be sent from the MU in two modes per IEC 61850-9-2, depending 
on the application. 80 samples per cycle is used for protection application where one 
Ethernet frame has one set of samples. 256 samples per cycle is used for waveform 
recording where 8 sets of samples in an Ethernet frame is sent 32 times in a cycle 
(Apostolov & Vandiver, 2010: 3). 
 
The reliability of a new SAS design is important. The analogue to digital conversion is 
moved to a new devise, (the MU) and this device is relying on a dc supply and a time 
synchronization source (for multiple SV streams) the same as what the protection IED 
requires. In the paper of (Skendzic et al., 2007: 2–3) it is discussed how the addition of 
devices can influence the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of the system and how 
combining different functions in devices can improve the system MTBF This is relevant 
for the power transformer as it has multiple instrument transformers that are located at 
different locations. The system MBTF can negatively be influenced when several MUs 
are added to produce SVs. 
 
The SV messages need to be time stamped and a time synchronization system is 
required for a SV process bus. The type of time synchronization system is not specified 
in IEC 61850-9-2. The IEEE Std 1588-2008 Precision Time Protocol version 2 (PTPV2) 
for precision timing is discussed and evaluated by (Ingram, Schaub, et al., 2012; Moore 
& Goraj, 2011; Puhm et al., 2016). PTPV2 is recommended to be use for time 
synchronization mandatory for a SV process bus. 
 
MUs is proposed to have additional functionality to include substation equipment health 
condition monitoring functions as well (Gaouda et al., 2016; Balan & Mathew, 2018). 
 
An approach for the real-time compression of SV data based on the IEC 61869-9 
recommendations is demonstrated by typically compressing data to less than half of the 
original size (Blair et al., 2016). The author reason that this can be done to reduce MU 
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encoding time and IED decoding time. The reduced data frame size can reduce the 
transmission times and bandwidth requirements where many sampled value massages 
are sent from MUs over a network.  
 
Calibration and testing of merging units and devices producing sampled values is needed 
and can be achieved using real-time simulations (Ingram et al., 2011). Different 
calibration setups are proposed (Agustoni & Mortara, 2017a; Lehtonen & Hällström, 
2016; Carvalheira & Coronel, 2015). It is presented that commercial test sets can 
generate analogue outputs simultaneously with their IEC 61850-9-2 LE SV messages 
that can be used as calibrators for Merging Units (Djokic & Parks, 2018). Researchers 
use different tools to analyse sampled values (Bajanek & Sumec, 2016b). Merging units 
can be used to produce sampled values or test set like the OMICRON CMC 353 can be 
used to play back a record of a sampled value message (Wannous et al., 2019). A simple 
over-current protection relay model is described which is programmed in LabVIEW and 
used to process the sampled values. The Sampled Value Analyzer software and other 
software are used for verification and visualization of sampled values (Bajanek, 2014; 
Sumec, 2014). Other protection models such as a negative sequence protection relay 
can be programmed and tested in a similar way (Bajanek & Sumec, 2016a). Total Vector 
Error (TVE) is an important concept that is applicable to phasor measurements. Merging 
Units and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) measure phasors and TVE is therefore also 
related. This allowable TVE compares the vectoral difference of the estimated Phasor to 
the theoretical Phasor in percentages (Abdolkhalig & Zivanovic, 2015). Cyber treads, 
digital signatures and the detection of spoofed sampled values is discussed (El Hariri et 
al., 2019; Farooq et al., 2019). 
 
The implementation of an SV estimation algorithm with a buffer is proposed in a 
protection IED as a corrective measure for loss or delay of SV messages. Busbar 
differential and line impedance protection functions were evaluated for an IEC 61850-9-
2 system in a laboratory environment using simulated protection IEDs and a MU 
(Kanabar et al., 2011). 
 
An IED functional test platform using software MU (sMU) is proposed by researchers. 
This concept has been proved by performing accuracy and operate-time tests with 
transformer differential protection (Wu et al., 2015; Honeth et al., 2013). 
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2.2.7 Power Transformer Protection 
A review of different topics regarding substation protection are done. A total of 52 
conference proceedings and journal articles are reviewed, Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Substation protection documents review per year. 
 
Transformer faults can be caused by abnormal system conditions or external faults. 
Transformer faults are categorized into two classes: external faults and internal faults 
(Lin et al., 2015: 17). Transformer protection can be achieved using protection IEDs to 
detect faults e.g. winding, core and tap changer faults.   
Fault currents in the transformer can be due to phase to phase faults or phase to earth 
faults and the magnitude will depend on the transformer impedance, winding 
connections, positions of the fault on the winding, fault voltage and on the type of earthing 
for star connected windings (Alstom, 2002: 272). Faults need to be cleared as fast as 
possible to limit the damage to the transformer. 
Temperature measuring devices installed on the power transformers can detect 
abnormal temperature and produce alarm or trip signals for the protection scheme and 
controlling the cooling fans of the power transformer. 
Instrument transformers at the high voltage yard measuring power system currents and 
voltages are used by the protection IEDs to determine abnormal system conditions.  
Current transformers can be installed external to the power transformer or internally in 
the bushings of the power transformer. CTs can also be situated on the neutral of a star 
connected winding or earthing transformer.  The conventional instrument transformers 
can be copper hardwired to the protection IEDs in the control room or Merging Units in 
the HV yard. 
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Protection function e.g. Restricted Earth Fault (REF), Differential, Over Current (O/C) 
and Earth Fault (E/F) can be included into the same modern IED. Each IED would be 
wired to a separate CT protection core where possible. Different IEDs wired to the same 
protection core would increase the burden on the CT. The distance between the CT and 
the IED and the cross section of the copper wires also influence the burden on the CT. 
 
Adaptive protection is when the protection characteristic is changed by an outside 
variable (Moxley & Becker, 2018). Adaptive protection is becoming a regular topic due 
to the changes in power systems as a result of increasing renewable energy sources or 
Distributed Energy Resource (DER). Adaptive protection is using a combination of 
algorithms, communications and shared information and can be used in a digital 
substation. Modern protection relays can have multiple setting groups. This can be 
activated/selected by substation configuration information as the information is changing 
in real-time. 
 
Time synchronization is reviewed separately under its own section. Time synchronization 
is important when sampled values are used but also when GOOSE messages are used 
for protection application. It is noteworthy that using SNTP is enough for GOOSE 
messages, however the time discrepancy of 10ms can be considered too long during 
system event analysis. IRIG-B or Precision Time Protocol (PTP) has better accuracy 
within 1ms and a better choices for captured events and records (Theron et al., 2018). 
 
Protection functions such as Over Current (O/C), Earth Fault (E/F), Restricted Earth Fault 
(REF) and Differential are described separately in the following sections.  
 
2.2.7.1 Over current protection 
Over current protection can be used to protect against over loading and faults on the 
primary winding. A high-set instantaneous overcurrent relay element is often used to trip 
for primary side short circuits. It is not effective for faults on the secondary winding due 
to the low magnitude of fault current transferred to the primary side. Timed delayed 
overcurrent protection chosen to discriminate with protection on the secondary side of 
the transformer increases the trip time to disconnect the faulted equipment from the 
power system. The O/C protection can be supplemented with an earth fault element. The 
E/F element can be connected in the residual circuit of the three phase CTs or on the 
neutral conductor of a star connected winding. A P protection class CT can be used for 
O/C protection. 
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Unit protection is used to have a shorted tripping time as it can be set more sensitive 
compared to O/C protection and it does not have to grade with other protections external 
to the transformer zone of protection. Examples of transformer unit protection is 
restricted earth fault and differential protection (Alstom, 2002).  
 
A resistor in a secondary winding neutral point of a Delta /Wye connected power 
transformers is used to limit ground fault currents.  The neutral resistor will negatively 
impact the sensitivity of a Differential and REF protection. A Bridge-Type Fault Current 
limiter (BFCL) in transformer neutral point is proposed to rectify the problem 
(Ghafourifard et al., 2016). 
 
2.2.7.2 Restricted earth fault protection 
Restricted Earth Fault (REF) protection is typically applied to one winding of a power 
transformer and act as a unit protection differential scheme. It can be of a high or low 
impedance type protection. The residual current of the three phase CTs are balanced 
out with the neutral CT. The REF protection system will operate only for faults in the zone 
between the phase CTs and neutral CT on a star connected winding and will not operate 
for external faults. The effectiveness of REF protection is related to issues with 
mismatched CTs, CT saturation and varying copper lead resistance. The shorter 
distance from the MU to the instrument transformer decreases the influence of these 
factors on the biased low impedance type REF protection (Alstom, 2002: 16–7). 
 
2.2.7.3 Differential protection 
The differential protection IED compares the primary and secondary currents flowing in 
and out of a power transformer. The currents flowing into and out of a power transformer 
is nearly equal and no or a small differential current is present in normal operating 
conditions (Alencar et al., 2014: 78–79)  
A differential current is however present and measured by the differential protection for 
a transformer internal fault in the differential zone. The fault current in the protected zone 
is equivalent to the differential current or the difference between the primary and 
secondary currents. 
The following factors can influence the differential current measured by the protection 
IED during normal load conditions: winding phase shift and earthing, filtering of zero 
sequence currents, CT ratio miss match and different taps for voltage control. 
Magnetising inrush during initial energisation and occurrence of over fluxing can also 
influence the differential current (Alstom, 2002: 277; Blackburn & Domin, 2006: 322). 
Differential protection IEDs must be highly sensitive for internal faults and at the same 
time stable and reliable for external fault conditions. An adaptive differential relay is 
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proposed that can self-adjust its protection characteristics according to the differential 
current measured (Dhinesh kumar et al., 2016). Internal fault has a high differential 
current compared to external faults that has low differential current. The adaptive relay 
can similarly be done with different characteristic curves according to different operation 
conditions (Huang et al., 2016). 
Phase shift correction is required where there is a 30-degree phase shift between the 
primary and secondary side currents of a transformer with star-delta connected windings 
and YNd1 vector group. Star connected windings can pass zero sequence currents to 
faults external to the differential zone, this can operate the differential IED for faults out 
of the protected zone. Zero sequence current filters are required for star connected 
windings. The phase shift correction, zero sequence current filtering and CT ratio 
mismatch correction is done in the software of the digital differential protection IEDs.  
A transformer protection algorithm is proposed in a research publication where the 
negative sequence differential current, the phase difference between the primary and 
secondary currents and the fundamental frequency for the primary and secondary 
currents are used. The proposed protection technique offers a reliable, secure and 
dependable solution compared to false operation of the conventional differential 
protection that has problems such as vector group, CT mismatch and saturation 
problems (Htita et al., 2016). 
An adaptive protection criterion is proposed, which can change the percentage 
differential relay parameters according to the transformer operating conditions. Test 
results show that the proposed scheme can give high sensitivity on internal faults as well 
as high security on external faults (Zhang et al., 2013). 
The sensitivity of Differential protection is related to issues with mismatched CTs, CT 
saturation, lead resistance and tap settings. An adaptive differential protection algorithm 
can be investigated by including the transformer winding tap-position information 
available at a process level, into the protection IED algorithm. 
The shorter distance from the MU to the instrument transformer decreases the influence 
of the sum of factors such as mismatched CTs, CT saturation, and lead resistance on 
the biased low impedance percentage differential protection. 
 
The process bus implementation where the main protection uses MUs and the backup 
protection uses copper wires is an interesting application of IE 61850 process bus where 
they wanted to get familiar and confident with the process bus technology (Bonfiglio et 
al., 2016). The loss of time synchronisation can have an effect on the performance of 
sampled-value-based differential protection (Igarashi & Santos, 2014b). 
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2.2.7.4 Magnetising inrush current 
Magnetic flux needs to be formed in the power transformer core when it is energised. 
The core can have some or no remnant or residual flux after it was previously energised. 
A power transformer is designed to operate magnetically close to saturation. Consider a 
power transformer that is energised with no residual flux. The additional energising 
current to produce the flux when the power transformer is energised causes saturation. 
This draw additional high current. This phenomenon is called magnetising inrush current. 
The time constant of this transient condition can be from cycles up to a second depending 
to the size of the power transformer (Alstom, 2002: 274; Blackburn & Domin, 2006: 322; 
Horowitz & Phadke, 2008: 210). Magnetising inrush can be separated in to three types: 
initial, recovery, and sympathetic. 
Recovery inrush can occur after a voltage dip during a fault or momentary dip in system 
voltage. The worst case will be when the voltage is reduced to zero and increase to 
normal again. This magnetizing inrush has not the same magnitude as the initial inrush 
because the transformer was already energized. A sympathetic magnetizing inrush can 
occur with parallel transformers, in an energized transformer when paralleled transformer 
is energized. This is caused by a DC component of the inrush current (Blackburn & 
Domin, 2006: 324). 
Magnetising inrush is a transient condition that causes a differential current, but the 
protection should be stable and not operate for this condition.  
Different methods are used to detect magnetising inrush currents and distinguishing it 
with internal faults current (Naseri et al., 2017; Cano-González et al., 2015; Hosny & 
Sood, 2014). A method is proposed to identify sympathetic magnetizing inrush that can 
occur with parallel transformers to prevent differential protection mal-operation (Wang et 
al., 2015). 
 
Differential protection is proposed using negative sequence current and negative 
sequence voltage to improve sensitivity during energization and detect turn-to-turn faults 
(Zacharias, 2013). Transformer differential protection combined with a core saturation 
detection-based blocking scheme is offered as an alternative to harmonic blocking 
schemes. This proposed saturation detection scheme also successfully discriminates CT 
saturation from the power transformer saturation (Lee et al., 2014). Transformer 
protection based on comparisons of sequence components of the current from both sides 
of a transformer is proposed to discriminate internal fault with external faults, a 
magnetizing inrush condition and CT saturation (Patel et al., 2015). 
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2.2.7.5 Automatic voltage control 
Power transformers are equipped with manual or automatic On-Load Tap-Changers 
(OLTC). The load that the power transformer supplies can change and that causes a 
change in the secondary voltage level. The secondary voltage level can be adjusted by 
changing the voltage ratio on the transformer with an OLTC. The voltage regulator 
measures and compares the setpoint voltage with a measured voltage and controls the 
on load tap changer by lowering or raising the tap position.  
Power transformers can be connected in parallel. The main methods of controlling 
parallel transformers are Master-Follower control, Circulating Current control and 
Reactance control (Constantin et al., 2014). 
The regulator can regulate the voltage at the receiving end substation by measuring the 
local load current to compensate for the voltage drop over the line. This function is called 
line drop compensation. 
 
2.3 Primary substation equipment 
The high voltage equipment such as the power transformers, circuit breakers and 
instrument transformers are regarded as primary substation equipment.  
The monitoring of transformers and circuit breakers is not reviewed in this document but 
is important in a substation protection and control system. Online monitoring of power 
transformers is not novel. Circuit breaker monitoring has advantages (Costa et al., 2018) 
and is more feasible as equipment status information like circuit breaker SF6 gas level, 
contact wear, the stored energy system and the status of the control circuit, becomes 
further available in a digital substation. 
 
2.3.1 Instrument Transformers 
Current and voltage transformers are generally called Instrument Transformers (ITs). 
The function of IT is to transform high power system currents and voltages to lower 
magnitudes suitable for measuring devices in the substation (Ganesan, 2006). They are 
designed to operate in normal and abnormal system conditions. Protection current 
transformers are designed to withstand fault currents for a few seconds, while voltage 
transformers are required to withstand power system dynamic over voltages (Horowitz 
& Phadke, 2008: 61) 
The primary windings of current and voltage transformers are connected differently to 
the power system and respond differently to conditions in the power system. Current 
transformer primary windings are connected in series with the circuit and voltage 
transformers are connected in parallel to the power circuit (Alstom, 2002: 88). According 
to Alstom (2002:87), protection systems are required to operate during the transient 
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disturbance in the power system following a system fault by reacting to the output of the 
measuring transformers. Errors in the measuring transformer output may delay the 
operation of the protection or cause unnecessary operations. 
The lead resistance from the Instrument Transformers (ITs) in the yard to the IEDs in the 
control room as well as the IED input impedance have an influence on the IT burden. 
The distances from different bay equipment in the HV yard to the control room are 
different. The burden on each IT will be different depending on the installed position due 
to the varying lead resistance when copper wires are used. The manufacturing cost is 
influenced by the IT specification, for example the burden. The lead resistance does not 
have such a large effect on the VT burden compared with CTs where high currents occur 
during fault conditions.  
The interface between the instrument transformer with digital or analogue outputs and 
the substation is managed by IEC 61869 and IEC 60044-8 standards (Bhardwaj et al., 
2014: 3; IEC, 2002a). A typical power system CT or VT can have several protection and 
metering cores. A typical 132kV CT can have 6 different cores.  A power system VT or 
CT connected to a MU does not have the need for several protection and metering cores. 
The MU distributes the sampled values to the different protection and control IEDs. This 
can also reduce the cost of an instrument transformer. 
 
2.3.1.1 Current transformers 
The IEC standard provides for different protection and metering accuracy classes. The 
metering accuracy classes are related to currents in the normal operating range of the 
power system for metering application. The protection accuracy classes are applicable 
when currents several times higher than the rated current are measured for protection 
during system fault conditions. 
Modern protective IED may demand a different current transformer performance 
compared to the old electro-mechanical relays (Ganesan, 2006). The IEC protection 
accuracy classes P and PX are considered for protection applications. Class PX is 
typically used for unit protection such as TRFR differential protection. The knee-point 
voltage and exciting current are important specifications for a class PX CT. 
Two types of CT saturation can occur. The first type is with a symmetrical AC primary 
input current and occurs because a high secondary burden. The second type occurs 
because of a DC offset of the AC primary current (Blackburn & Domin, 2006: 183; 
Hargrave et al., 2018). The saturation can also be due to a combination of the DC offset 
and the burden. 
The core saturation voltage or knee-point voltage of a current transformer is the point at 
which the output current ceases to linearly follow the input current. At this point on the 
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excitation curve, a further increase of 10% of secondary e.m.f. would require an increase 
of the exciting current of 50% (Alstom, 2002: 95). 
 
The CT knee-point voltage requirement is a function of the total circuit resistance. 
VK = f (RCT, RL, RRP)  ( 2-1)  
 
Where: 
VK = Required CT knee-point voltage (volts) 
RCT = Resistance of the current transformer secondary winding (ohms) 
RL = Resistance of a single lead from relay to current transformer (ohms) 
RRP = Impedance of a relay phase current input (Apostolov & Vandiver, 2010: 5). 
 
The total CT burden when connected with short leads to a MU is much less compared 
to when long copper leads are used from the CT in the yard to the IED in the control 
room. The lead resistance from the CT to the MU can be reduced and the MU input 
impedance is also typically very small.  
The Differential protection compares the current values of CTs at different locations in 
the high voltage yard. The burden on CTs is significantly different depending on the 
location of CTs due to the varying lead resistance of the wires from the CT to the 
protection relay. The burden on CTs is similar when MUs are used and not depending 
on location of the CT, as fibre optic is used from the MU to the control room. 
The cost of manufacturing the CT can be reduced if the knee-point voltage requirement 
is less when the MU is installed close to the CT. 
 
2.3.1.2 Voltage transformers 
Power systems are operated at voltage close to the rated system voltage. Over voltages 
during unbalanced faults depend on systems earthing. It also can occur due to switching 
or low load conditions on long power lines.  The voltage factor of a VT is a quantity 
expressed in per unit of the rated voltage and the upper limit of operating voltage (Alstom, 
2002: 89). In the IEC standard, the maximum voltage factor is 1.2 for a continuous 
operation and 1.9 for a short duration. 
 
A fault in the power system may reduce the system voltage to a low value. The accuracy 
of voltage measurement for protection purposes have to be maintained during these low 
voltage levels (Alstom, 2002: 89).  
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Saturation is not a problem in VTs because power systems should not be operated above 
normal voltage, and faults result in a collapse or reduction in voltage (Blackburn & Domin, 
2006:188).  
The VT can be connected to a VT junction box from where separate supplies are 
distributed to the different protection and control IEDs. A second design can be 
implemented where a VT bus is created, for example a bus bar VT, between the different 
protection and control bays. The lead resistance and burden on the VT need to be 
considered for these different applications. Typical VT connections to IEDs are shown in 
Figure 2.5. 
 
VTJB
CB
Main 2
Prot
Main 1
Prot
BB 
VT
VT
Main 2
Prot
Main 1
Prot
VT
VTJB
VTJB
CB
 
Figure 2.5 VT Connections 
 
The lead resistance from the VT to the MU can be reduced for an application where the 
MU is close to the VT. The total VT burden when connected with short leads to a MU is 
much less compared to when long copper leads is used from the VTJB in the yard to the 
IED in the control room. The cost of manufacturing the VT can be reduced if the burden 
requirement is less. 
 
2.3.2 Earthing Transformer 
An auxiliary (AUX) transformer is combined with a Neutral Electromagnetic Coupler 
(NEC) and Neutral-Earthing Resistor (NER). The NEC is to provide a neutral point in the 
delta connected system and a (NER) connected to the neutral point to limit earth fault 
current. The NEC/NER AUX transformer is connected on each of three power 
transformers in the substation under study. The auxiliary transformers supply the 
substation auxiliary loads with 400VAC.  
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Two of the five transformers have NEC/NER transformers without auxiliary windings. 
Power stations are connected to these transformers via the 11kV bus bar. The NER limit 
the fault current to 360A. The 11kV Generators connected are not capable to handle this 
magnitude of currents flowing in their neutrals. The NER is switched and disconnected 
when one or more generators are running.  
 
2.4 Real-time digital simulation 
The use of a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for testing of a differential relay and 
discrimination among magnetizing inrush and internal fault currents for a power 
transformer is described (Moravej & Bagheri, 2015). 
A power system model can be executed in real-time with a digital simulator. Protection 
IEDs can be connected as Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) to the simulator to evaluate their 
performance. This is called hardware-in-the-loop testing (Almas & Vanfretti, 2013). The 
RTDS can simulate the actual behaviour of the power transformer in a power system. 
The RTDS exports signals to an external hardware/ IED and receives inputs from the 
hardware. The RTDS software i.e., RSCAD is used to create a power system model for 
simulation of a power transformer. 
A project to develop a methodology and facility for protection and control coordination 
studies implementing real-time simulation and HIL testing of the protective relays and 
new technologies using RTDS is described (Kong et al., 2015). 
A RTDS was also used in research work where system tests incorporate hardware-in-
the-loop transformer differential relay test included merging units, PTP time 
synchronization, network traffic tests (Ingram et al., 2014). 
 
2.5 Analysis of the findings of the literature review  
In an IEC 61850 based protection and control systems the IEDs depend on a reliable 
Substation Communication Network (SCN) architecture that meets redundancy 
requirements when failures do occur. 
A SCN requires a time synchronisation network. The different types are reviewed. 
 
2.5.1 Network architecture and redundancy protocols 
Research is done to determine the reliability of different network topologies and how 
effective different redundancy protocols are. These papers are summarised in Table 2-1 
below. 
The most common architectures used are star and ring but cascaded and mesh 
structures are used as well (Sun et al., 2011). 
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Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP), Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High 
Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) are mostly used to obtain redundancy in the 
communication network. 
The reliability studies results depend on the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of individual 
components. The outcome of the research will therefore depend on the MTTF value that 
the researcher uses for the different components in the study. A specific component, like 
a switch or an IED will have different MTTF values for different suppliers. 
The network design must be cost effective. The network design engineer must choose 
the architecture for the communication network to be reliable and cost effective. 
A star connected network has a switch as a single point of failure. The star architecture 
can be combined with a PRP based SCN architectures to provide a solution to fulfil the 
availability and performance requirements in SAS for strategic important substations. 
Practical implementation depends on the components used in the SCN. An example is 
for the case where an existing station bus network is implemented in a substation and 
the process bus is required to be added. An IED will require 4 communication ports if the 
station bus and the process bus are two separate networks and PRP is considered for 
each network. It may not be economical to replace all the IEDs to implement the process 
bus. 
The IED must support the selected redundancy protocol. The IED of a specific 
manufacturer may support SNTP and not PRP as an example.  
The reliability requirement for a SCN that is used to send GOOSE messages at a station 
bus level is different than a network that is used to send Sampled Value (SV) messages 
at a process bus level. The mechanism for sending GOOSE messages allows for 
messages to be resend. SV messages are sent only once. All the messages are 
significant for the correct operation of bus zone and differential protection schemes that 
compares station wide SV messages. A delayed or lost message can cause incorrect 
protection operation. 
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Table 2-1 Network Architectures and redundancy protocols 
Paper Aim of the paper Network 
Architecture 
Protocol Result 
Araujo et al.,2012 A prototype of a HSR node has been 
developed and proved over some virtual 
machines connected in a ring network as 
the standard states and achieved the 
target of seamless availability. 
Ring PRP and 
HSR. 
The comparison of PRP and HSR experiments 
shows solutions to get high availability of the 
communication with zero time recovery. 
Bhardwaj et 
al,2014 
This paper discusses standards IEC 
61850 and IEC 61869 used in the 
communication profile with data 
availability standard IEC 62439  
 
 PRP and 
HSR 
Standards IEC 61850, IEC 61869, and IEC 
62439 were discussed with methods IRIG-B and 
IEEE 1588 to synchronize  
Buhagiar et 
al,2016 
The paper describes a French smart 
substation project, as part of the French 
government’s plan for smart sub stations. 
 
 HSR Extra IED (MPx), connected to the substation 
buses, to replace the functions inside another 
IED in the case of failure 
Darby et al,2014 The paper discusses the principle of 
operation of PRP, and the benefits for use 
in an IEC 61850-based SAS. 
 
 PRP Interoperability is proven by extensive multi-
vendor interoperability testing and by utility in-
service use 
Ferrari et al,2103 This paper discusses synchronization 
systems applied to redundant network 
infrastructures for substation automation.  
infrastructures for substation automation: 
in these systems the reconfiguration of 
the network after a 
 PRP & 
RSTP 
PRP performs better as RSTP and guarantees 
seamless synchronization performance in case 
of a single fault. 
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Goraj et al,2012 This paper provides an overview of high 
availability networks and redundancy 
protocols for seamless failover critical 
substation automation applications. 
 
Ring and Star PRP and 
HSR 
PRP and HSR is discussed and compared for 
substation, station and process bus applications 
Kanabar et al,2011 This paper presents the hardware 
implementation of a process bus 
communication network and investigate 
the proposed corrective measure for 
Sampled Value (SV) loss/delay. 
 
Cascaded  the SV estimation algorithm as a corrective 
measure for SV loss/delay can enhance the 
reliability and security of digital protection 
functions using an IEC 61850-9-2-based process 
bus 
 
Kanabar et al,2012 This paper review available standards for 
Power system protection, control and 
monitoring and discusses their 
applications and current developments. 
 
 PRP and 
HSR 
Available standards for Power system PCM are 
discussed 
Kumar et al.,2015 This paper presents simulation results 
with respect to the delay in GOOSE and 
SV packets transfer in an Ethernet 
environment related to a digital protection 
scheme. 
  
Ring  It was observed that the increase in the SV 
frequencies caused higher packet losses for 
GOOSE messages 
Liu et al,2014 This paper proposes a methodology to 
evaluate the reliability of a Substation 
Communications Network (SCN) 
considering different architectures. 
 
Star and Ring RSTP 
and PRP 
The ring architecture station bus is proved to be 
reliable and cost effective. PRP based SCN 
architectures is an economical and solution to 
fulfil the availability and performance 
requirements in SAS 
Meier et al.,2016 Example substations are used to verify 
the standardized performance figures 
 HSR The paper discussed the validity of fault 
clearance timings for digital substation 
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defined in IEC 61850, IEC 60044 and IEC 
61869 standards. 
 
architectures with reference to timing and 
performance requirements. 
Rahat et al.,2019 A mathematical approach is used to 
analyse the reliability and availability. A 
suitable design for efficient operation is 
proposed. 
Ring and Star  Advantages and disadvantages of different 
network topologies are discussed. Simulation 
results are discussed 
Raza et al.,2009 This paper presents analysis and the 
crucial need for the deployment of Gigabit 
Ethernet in the substation. 
 
  Gigabit Ethernet in the substation is optimized for 
the current IEC61850 constraints but can also 
support future considerations smoothly 
Stark et al.,2013 This document describes the utilization of 
the nonconventional measurements and 
advanced features of IEC 61850 standard 
for substation automation systems. 
 
 PRP and 
HSR 
Non-conventional instrument transformers 
together with IEC 61850 provide cost-efficient 
solutions with higher availability compared to 
traditional instrument transformers 
Sun et al.,2011 This paper describes the different 
Ethernet based process bus 
architectures, analysis of the mean time 
to failure and availability  
 
Cascaded, Star 
and Ring  
 The star architecture provides the highest MTTF 
and availability. The ring and cascade 
architecture have the same MTTF and 
availability. 
 
Younis,2016 The objective of this paper is to evaluate 
the reliability and availability of different 
substation communication architectures 
by using the Reliability Block Diagram 
(RDB) method. 
 
Cascaded, Star 
and Ring 
 Reliability of the specific IEC 61850 SAS has 
been significant approved when adding 
redundancy components to the system  
Wester and 
Adamiak,2011 
This paper is a tutorial in Ethernet 
communications and architectures. 
Star, Mesh and 
Ring 
 The paper address Ethernet fundamentals and 
cover the most common elements of an Ethernet 
architecture 
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2.5.2 Network time synchronisation methods 
Research is done to determine the accuracy of different time synchronisation methods 
and the effect they have on the performance of an IEC 61850 digital substation. A 
summary of papers is shown in Table 2-2.  
The same physical fibre optic network for the process bus communication can be used 
for time synchronisation. Precision Time Synchronization Protocol (PTP) and Simple 
Network Time Protocol (SNTP) are reviewed for use in process bus networks. The SNTP 
time accuracy (0.1 to 1 ms) is adequate when only GOOSE messages are used but is 
not adequate for SV applications which require <1 µs accuracy (Crossley et al., 2016). 
The papers demonstrate that PTPV2 is a viable method of providing time synchronization 
for an SV process bus network.  
PRP as redundancy protocol, performs better than RSTP with regards to SNTP 
seamless synchronization performance in case of a single network fault (Ferrari et al., 
2013). 
Different papers also discuss protection schemes where the time synchronisation time 
stamp of the measure values is critical. Differential protection compares two 
measurement values which must be compared at the identical time values (Aichhorn et 
al., 2016). 
It is a practical consideration that not all IEDs supports PTPv2 as it is a newer time 
synchronisation protocol then SNTP. It may not be economical to replace all the IEDs 
and network switches in the SCN to have a PTPv2 solution. 
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Table 2-2 Time synchronization 
Paper Aim of the paper Synchronisation Result 
Agustoni and 
Mortara, 2016 
The working principle and the architecture of a 
calibration system for devices operating with the 
IEC 61850-9-2 standard are described. 
 
PTP The setup described in this document allows 
performing calibrations for IEC 61850-9-2 devices 
such as merging units (MU) 
Agustoni and 
Mortara, 2017 
The Calibration system for commercial test sets, 
operating with IEC 61850-9-2 standard, is 
described 
 
PTP Preliminary results show that the setup described 
allows performing the required measurements for 
calibrating IEC 61850-9-2 test sets. 
Bhardwaj et 
al,2014 
This paper discusses the methods to 
synchronize different devices clocks over the 
network like IRIG-B and IEEE 1588. 
 
PTPv2  
Hogan,2014 The report details the literature review, design, 
construction, and performance evaluation on the 
IEC 61850 substation automation designs with 
the use of a test facility. 
 
SNTP The successful development and evaluation of an IEC 
61850 SAS with multiple vendor devices. 
IEEE,2019 A modelling and analytical technique is 
proposed based on queueing theory. The model 
behaviour is studied for IEC 61850 standard for 
deliberately limited and weak adversaries 
regarding time accuracy de-synchronisation 
attacks. 
SNTP & PTP De-synchronisation attacks was demonstrated against 
IEC 61850 time synchronisation systems with minimal 
strength adversaries based on a novel queueing 
model. 
Igarashi et 
al,2014 
The paper presents a summary of challenges 
implementing a process bus according to 
IEC61850-9 Standard. 
SNTP & PTP IEC61850-9 variations, process bus reliability, time 
synchronization between devices, cyber security and 
measurement accuracy was discussed 
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Igarashi et 
al,2015 
Our aim is to show the results from a 
mathematical simulation of the behaviour of a 
differential protection algorithm for power 
transformers compared with the loss of the time 
synchronization signal in the process bus 
according to IEC 61850-9-2. 
 
PTP An algorithm is adapted for power transformer 
differential protection relays, used in a process bus 
network, when sampled values synchronisation is 
lost. The algorithm shows satisfactory results. 
 
Igarashi et 
al,2015 
Presents a summary of the most significant 
factors for implementing a process bus 
according to IEC61850-9 Standard. 
 
 Important standards were highlighted for the 
successful implementation of the process bus 
according to IEC61850-9 Standard 
Ingram et 
al,2012 
This document presents a technique to assess 
the overall network performance of sampled 
value process buses based on IEC 61850-9-2 
using measurements from a single location in 
the network. 
 
PTPv2 Time synchronisation to a time source is required for 
this method of measuring the network performance of 
an IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value process bus 
network. 
Ingram et 
al,2012 
The suitability of PTPv2 to synchronize 
sampling in a digital process bus is evaluated, 
PTPv2 The results presented demonstrate that PTPV2 is a 
viable. method of providing time synchronization for a 
SV process bus using IEC 61850-9-2. 
JV et al,2008 SNTP Time synchronization system in digital 
substation is applied  
 
SNTP It is concluded that time synchronization system 
based on SNTP has a bright future in digital 
substations 
Kanabar et 
al,2011 
This paper presents the performance evaluation 
of the IEC 61850-9-2 process bus for a typical 
345 kV/230 kV substation. 
 
 A sampled value estimation algorithm is presented 
and tested in this paper. 
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Kumar et al,2015 This paper presents simulation results with 
respect to the delay in packets transfer in an 
Ethernet environment. 
 
 The results shows that the lost of data packets can 
have a significant effect on the reliability of a 
protection system. 
Moore and 
Goraj, 2011 
This paper describes the experience from a 
design and implementation of a digital high 
voltage substation, based on fibre optic 
switchyard with IEEE 1588 v 2 time 
synchronization. 
 
SNTP & PTP  NCIT, Merging Units IEC 61850-9-2, multiple vendors 
IEDs had been used. Sampled Values, GOOSE and 
IEEE 1588 v.2 used in the same Ethernet network 
Rinaldi et 
al,2016 
In this paper a new distributed measurement 
system for the estimation of IEC61850 Transfer 
Time over Smart Grid communication 
infrastructure is introduced. 
 
SNTP Test case has been realized to show the 
effectiveness of the proposed instrument in 
highlighting the performance of real IEC61850 
devices. 
Ussoli & 
Prytz,2013 
To investigate the kind of accuracy level with 
the use of SNTP in modern switched networks. 
SNTP & PTP It is possible to reach the milliseconds level accuracy 
with SNTP when sufficient timestamping accuracy is 
implemented 
Yamada et 
al,2012 
A high-accuracy error measurement system for 
calibration of digital-output equipped electronic 
current transformers (ECTs) is described. 
 
  
Yung et al.,2017 The aim is to measure the time delay of SV 
packets transmission in a network switch, 
 
 The test result shows that the SV transmission time 
delay measurement value can be measured.is 
basically same as the set value. 
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2.5.3 Merging Units 
Research is done on the testing and calibrating of Merging Units (MUs). Different test 
systems are required to do the calibration tests on the MUs (Agustoni & Mortara, 2017b; 
Song et al., 2017). Merging Units have analogue signals as inputs that must be 
compared to digitals signals as outputs. Suppliers must ensure that the MUs can be 
calibrated and that the MUs perform as required. However, is can benefit the Utility as 
end user to perform acceptance tests on the MUs before it is put into service (Sheng-
zong & Tie-zhu, 2017). 
The main function of Merging Units is to produce SV messages from analogue voltage 
and currents. Process interface of high voltage equipment such as circuit breakers and 
power transformers, digital inputs and outputs, can be added to the MU. With this 
additional information available, it is realised that additional functionality can be included 
in the MU. Protection algorithms and control functionality can be added. 
A case is presented that compares the tripping times of transformer differential protection 
when using hardwired current transformer connections is compared with sampled values 
and process bus application. The result is that the tripping times are the same. This is 
expected due to the following. The same protection algorithm is used for the differential 
protection. The difference is that the Digital to Analogue (D/A) conversion is performed 
in the IED located in the control room with a hardwired protection scheme. The D/A 
conversion is performed in the Merging Unit located in the yard when sampled values is 
used. 
Sampled value packet delay or lost is important factors that will influence the correct 
operation of differential protection schemes that compares different sampled value 
messages with each other (Kanabar & Sidhu, 2011). Direct point to point connection 
from the Merging Unit to the protection IED without using a network and network switches 
can be a solution to prevent packet loss or delays due to the Ethernet network(Qin et al., 
2014). 
Cybersecurity is an important component that must be considered for a digital substation 
communication network (Ishchenko & Nuqui, 2018). 
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Table 2-3 Merging Units 
Paper Aim of the paper Key word Result Comment 
Abdolkhalig and 
Zivanovic,2013 
This paper evaluates the 
performance of proposed 
phasor estimator using IEC 
61850-9-2 Sampled Value 
(SV) measurement for Phasor 
measurement. 
Merging Units (MU), 
Sampled Values, Total 
Vector error, 
The Kalman Filter is 
employed for computing the 
Phasor based on IEC 
61850-9-2 Sampled 
Measured Values. The Total 
Vector Error is analysed for 
the effects of the IEC 
61850-9-2 samples loss. 
The data traffic, frame size 
and number of ASDUs 
influences the TVE. 
Agustoni and 
Mortara, 2016 
The working principle and the 
architecture of a calibration 
system for devices operating 
with the IEC 61850-9-2 
standard are described. 
Merging Unit, calibrating The setup described in this 
document allows performing 
calibrations for IEC 61850-
9-2 devices such as 
Merging Units (MU) 
Merging Units cannot be 
calibrated with traditional 
systems 
Agustoni and 
Mortara, 2017 
The Calibration system for 
commercial test sets, 
operating with IEC 61850-9-2 
standard, is described 
IEC 61850-9-2, calibration 
test 
Preliminary results show 
that the setup described 
allows performing the 
required measurements for 
calibrating IEC 61850-9-2 
test sets. 
Will allow performing 
calibrations for a MU. 
Almas and 
Vanfretti, 2013 
In this paper a power system 
is modelled in 
SimPowerSystems and is 
executed in real-time using 
Opal-RT’s eMEGAsim real-
time simulator 
Process bus, Hardware-in-
the-loop, Differential 
protection 
Hardware-in-the-Loop 
testing of process bus 
performance for differential 
protection is presented. The 
results are that the tripping 
time is very similar to hard 
wired protection scheme. 
The Digital to analogue 
conversion is moved from 
the IED in the control room 
to the yard. The process 
bus has other advantages 
on a protection scheme. 
Apostolov and 
Vandiver, 2010 
Distance protection and IEC 
61850 Process Bus - 
Principles, Applications and 
Benefits are discussed 
Distance protection, merging 
units 
Substation protection 
applications based on 
Sampled Values are 
described in the paper and 
demonstrates the 
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advantages and 
Improvements in 
functionality. 
Bajanek,2014 This document deals with 
usage of Sampled Values for 
over current protection 
functions. 
Sampled Values, Protection Overcurrent protection relay 
was tested. Functions of the 
algorithm was tested 
successfully with sampled 
values. 
 
Bajanek and 
Sumec, 2016 
This paper is focused on 
software developed to use 
Sampled Values in LabView 
development environment. 
Sampled values, testing Software tools is presented 
that can be used for 
generating Sampled Values, 
visualize them and SVRLIB 
library in LabView  
Can be used to test 
protection algorithms.  
Bajanek and 
Sumec, 2016 
This paper focuses on 
development of negative 
sequence relay model that is 
processing IEC 61850-9-2 
Sampled Values. 
Sampled Values, negative 
sequence current, protection 
The developed negative 
sequence protection relay 
was tested compared to a 
conventional relay with 
comparable results. 
LabView can be used to 
develop other protection 
relay algorithms. 
Balan et al,2018 This paper discusses the 
details of a novel concept for 
Merging Units. The MU has 
additional functions to serves 
as a control unit with the 
capabilities of real- time 
decision making as well.  
Merging Units A Merging Units was tested 
that has analogue input 
module to produce SV. 
Additional Digital Input / 
Output (DI/DO) modules are 
included in the MU 
The process bus is not only 
related to SV messages 
Other process interface 
must be included for the 
substation high voltage 
equipment. 
Chase et al, 2019 This paper discusses 
communications conditions, 
such as bandwidth limitations, 
latency, and packet loss, and 
analyses them with respect to 
SV-based protection. 
Merging Units, Sampled 
Values, Protection 
A SV-based line protection 
schemes using SV 
messages from multiple 
MUs was tested. The 
scheme is impacted by 
communications conditions 
in several ways. It is 
recommended to monitor 
the SV channel status and 
appropriately make 
The same issues related to 
line current differential 
protection schemes may 
be applicable to 
transformer differential 
protection schemes. 
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protection blocking or 
alarming decisions. 
Crossley et al, 
2011 
The design and performance 
evaluation for a protection 
system utilising IEC 61850-9-
2 process bus is discussed. 
The paper describes an 
overview of the concepts and 
benefits of the process bus, 
and how it affects the design 
a protection scheme. 
Process bus, Merging Unit, 
protection 
The presented results show 
the performance of a 
process bus based 
protection scheme is 
comparable to a 
conventional hardwired 
scheme. 
The process bus 
architecture and the 
ethernet switches influence 
the system performance 
Djokic et al,2018 A synchronized current-
comparator-based power 
bridge for calibrating 
analogue merging units at 
power frequencies is 
described 
Merging Unit, calibrating  A current-comparator-
based system for the 
calibration of analogue 
merging units at power 
frequencies of 60 Hz and 50 
Hz is devolved. 
Commercial test sets is 
required that generate 
analogue outputs 
simultaneously with IEC 
61850-9-2 LE SVs that is 
used as calibrators for 
merging units. 
Dutra et al, 2014 The performance of a process 
bus based protection scheme 
is compared to a conventional 
hardwired scheme 
Merging Units, sampled 
values 
The presented results show 
process bus based 
protection scheme performs 
the same a conventional 
hardwired scheme 
Analogue to Digital 
conversion the same for 
conventional relays and 
merging units  
Farooq et al,2019 This paper describes a 
developed software 
framework, S-GoSV (Secure 
GOOSE and SV), that 
generates custom GOOSE 
and Sample Value messages. 
Sampled Values, cyber 
security 
MAC based digital signature 
algorithm HMAC-SHA256 is 
implemented for GOOSE 
messages to solve security 
issues. 
Digital signature algorithm 
for SV messages is not 
implemented 
Gaouda et 
al,2018 
This paper proposes the 
functionality of a smart IEC 
61850 Merging Unit that 
supports self-healing and 
asset management functions 
of future power grids. 
Merging Unit The proposed IEC 61850 
MU as a smart tool that can 
monitor, control, protect, 
and initiate corrective 
actions 
MU can be equipped with 
protection algorithms to act 
as protection IEDs in the 
high voltage yard 
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Hariri et al,2019 This paper investigates the 
feasibility of using neural 
network forecasters to detect 
spoofed sampled values and 
proposes an algorithm to 
detect the accumulation of the 
forecasting error. 
Merging units, Sampled 
values 
An algorithm is presented, 
to enhance the reliability of 
the neural network 
forecaster in terms of 
detecting spoofed SMV 
packets. 
Each IED will be able to 
verify the integrity of the 
SMV packets coming into 
it. 
Honeth et al, 
2013 
The paper presents the 
development of an IEC 
61850-9-2 software Merging 
Unit (sMU) 
Merging Unit, process bus 
protection 
The results show that the 
sMU platform provides a 
useful tool for testing 
protection and SAS 
experimentation. 
 
Igarashi et 
al,2014 
The paper presents a 
summary of challenges 
implementing a process bus 
according to IEC61850-9 
Standard. 
IEC 61850-9 IEC61850-9 variations, 
process bus reliability, time 
synchronization between 
devices, cyber security and 
measurement accuracy was 
discussed 
 
Igarashi et 
al,2015 
This article presents a 
prototype development of a 
digital optical Instrument 
Transformer with lEC 61850-
9-2 interface. 
lEC 61850-9-2, instrument 
transformers 
A prototype of a digital 
optical IT for high voltage 
metering with IEC 61850-9-
2 interface was presented 
with satisfactory results. 
A digital optical IT has 
advantages over a system 
with a conventional IT and 
MU 
Igarashi et 
al,2015 
A summary is presented of 
the most significant factors for 
implementing a process bus 
according to IEC61850-9 
Standard 
IEC 61850-9 Important standards were 
highlighted for the 
successful implementation 
of the process bus 
according to IEC61850-9 
Standard 
 
Ingram et al,2012 This document presents a 
technique to assess the 
overall network performance 
of sampled value process 
buses based on IEC 61850-9-
IEC 61850-9-2, network 
latency. 
The latency introduced by 
Ethernet switches is 
measured to determine the 
Network latency. 
That is the reason why 
sampled value messages 
is time stamped. 
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2 using measurements from a 
single location in the network. 
Ingram et al,2013 This paper analyses the 
performance of a process bus 
network including the impact 
on network switches when 
using high sampled values 
traffic. 
Ethernet networks, Merging 
Units, network performance 
Process bus networks have 
been shown to be reliable at 
very high network loads. 
This developed test 
methodology can identify 
when network capacity is 
reached, and this can be 
used to assess the safe 
limits of operation for a 
network. 
Ingram et al,2014 This paper presents an 
investigation of process bus 
transformer differential 
protection performance 
IEC 61850, Transformer 
differential protection  
Test results showed that the 
protection relay operated 
correctly with process bus 
network traffic at full 
capacity.  
 
Kaibo et al,2015 This paper proposed a 
scheme of high sampling rate 
data in Merging Unit for relay 
protection. 
High sampling rate, low pass 
filter, Merging Unit 
The conclusion of the study 
showed that low pass 
filtering and interpolation 
synchronization scheme is 
simple and efficient for high 
rate sampling.  
 
Kanabar et 
al,2010 
This paper presents the 
performance evaluation of the 
IEC 61850-9-2 process bus 
for a typical 345 kV/230 kV 
substation 
Sampled values, delayed 
and lost packets 
The delay and packet loss 
for the sampled value 
packets is analysed by 
considering various 
communication parameters, 
the sampled value 
estimation algorithm is 
tested as corrective 
measure to address the 
issues  
 
Kanabar et 
al,2011 
This paper presents the 
hardware implementation of a 
typical IEC 61850-9-2-based 
process bus communication 
Sampled values, delayed 
and lost packets, differential 
The SV estimation algorithm 
is implemented as a part of 
bus differential and 
transmission-line distance 
protection IEDs. it is tested 
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network for digital protection 
systems 
for various SV loss/delay 
scenarios. 
Konka et al,2011 a traffic generation system 
has been developed for IEC 
61850 Sampled Values 
Sampled Values, testing, 
performance 
an accurate and realistic 
model of a IEC 61850 
Sampled Values traffic 
generator was shown. 
The process bus 
communication network 
can be tested with realistic 
sampled value traffic. The 
interoperability of devices 
can be tested. 
Kumar et al,2015 This paper presents 
simulation results with respect 
to the delay in packets 
transfer in an IEC 61850-9-2 
Ethernet environment. 
Packet delay, Sampled 
Values 
Packet delays and losses 
was increasing as SV 
messages was increased. 
The GOOSE packet losses 
were monitored. GOOSE 
packets are resent 
frequently. SV packet 
losses are more important 
to consider. 
Lehtonen and 
Hällström, 2016 
This paper describes a 
reference Merging Unit for 
producing a stream of 
sampled values over 
Ethernet. A measurement 
setup for calibrating other 
equipment is built around the 
Merging Unit. 
Merging Unit, calibration A calibration setup with a 
reference Merging Unit to 
calibrate other devices is 
shown. 
 
Moore and Goraj, 
2011 
This paper describes the 
experience from a digital high 
voltage substation, based IEC 
61850-9-2 sampled values 
with IEEE 1588 v 2 time 
synchronization. 
Merging Units, process bus, 
time synchronization 
A communication network 
uses sampled values data 
and time synchronization 
IEEE 1588 version 2 signals 
over the same fibre optic 
network. 
No test results were 
provided in the paper. 
Sheng-zong and 
Tie-zhu, 2017 
Accelerated life test was 
studied on Merging Units 
used in intelligent substation 
to reveal reasons and 
potential defects for units with 
a high field failure rate. 
Merging Units, Test The tests were carried out 
successfully on the Merging 
Units to expose the potential 
defects  
An acceptance evaluation 
method was developed 
Performance testing to 
evaluate MUs before they 
are put into service  
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Skendzic et 
al,2007 
This paper analyses the 
Sampled Value Process Bus 
according to the IEC 61850-9-
2 standard 
Sampled Values, Process 
Bus, IEC 61850-9-2 
Protection reliability, 
Ethernet network traffic, 
time synchronisation issues 
are shown and discussed  
These issues are solved by 
new technologies. 
Song et al,2017 This paper proposes a 
passive interoperability test 
method for IEC 61850-9-2 
based Merging Units. 
Merging Units, 
interoperability 
The interoperability of two 
commercial MUs from 
different vendors has been 
tested based on IEC 61850-
9-2 LE. The MUs passed 
the interoperability test as 
defined. 
IEC 61850-9-2 LE assist 
with the implementation of 
the standard by different 
vendors  
Stark et al,2013 This document describes the 
utilization of sampled values 
according IEC 61850 part 9-2 
can be used to improve the 
reliability and functionality of 
the system 
Sampled values Calculated results indicate 
improvements on 
availability, performance 
and reliability of the system. 
 
Stefanka,2013 The paper discusses how the 
application of IEC 61850-9-2 
can improve the 
measurement system in MV 
switchgear using sensors. 
MV switchgear, sensors, IEC 
61850-9-2 
The paper has described 
the advantages of an 
arrangement where IEC 
61850-9-2 is used together 
with sensors in MV 
Switchgear, 
Sensors have advantages 
over conventional 
instrument transformers 
and merging units. 
Sumec,2014 Paper introduces a tool 
designed for verification of 
sampled values generated by 
various devices using the IEC 
61850-9-2 protocol. 
Sampled values, Ethernet 
network 
Diagnostic tool for 
verification and visualization 
data from a merging unit 
was introduced in this paper 
 
Sun et al,2011 This paper describes these 
different types of process bus, 
their implementations and 
their relative advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Reliability, architecture A methodology used to 
calculate the reliability and 
availability of the 
communication networks 
based on component failure 
modes was shown 
The mean time to failure 
(MTTF) values used for the 
calculations will not be the 
same for different 
equipment and different 
manufacturers  
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Wu et al,2015 This paper proposes a novel 
IED functional test platform 
using software MU (sMU), 
with less limitation on the 
number of MUs and higher 
flexibility in MU modification. 
IEC 61850-9-2, Merging Unit, 
functional testing 
This paper presents an IED 
function testing platform 
using software Merging 
Units. The sMU has design 
flexibility, cost savings, no 
limitation on the number of 
required MUs and time 
saving benefits. 
This test sMU platform 
does not require expensive 
amplifiers to test IEDs. 
Yamada et 
al,2012 
A high-accuracy error 
measurement system for 
calibration of digital-output 
equipped such as electronic 
current transformers (ECTs) 
is described. 
IEC 61850-9-2, Merging Unit A high-accuracy error 
measurement system for 
calibrating digital-output 
equipment, according to IEC  
61850-9-2, has been 
presented. 
The Measurement system 
is used for electronic 
current transformers but is 
required for Merging Units 
as well. 
Yang et al,2017 The aim is to measure the 
time delay of SV packets 
transmission in a network 
switch, 
Process bus, network 
switches 
The test result shows that 
the SV transmission time 
delay measurement value 
can be measured. 
This method can enhance 
the reliability and security 
of digital protection 
functions of an IEC 61850-
9-2 process bus network 
Yaojia et al,2015 This paper analyses the 
quantization error produced in 
the data transmission process 
of the electronic the electronic 
transformer merging unit. 
Quantization, signal 
processing, Merging Units 
Matlab is used to do the 
simulation and verification., 
This paper drew a 
conclusion through analysis 
and calculation that the 
quantization error is so 
small that it can be ignored. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The literature on the different types of primary equipment components in protection and 
control of power transformers, substation control systems and communication networks 
is reviewed.  
The importance of using Merging Units connected to conventional instrument 
transformers is described and compared with systems where conventional instrument 
transformers are copper hard wired to IEDs. Network redundancy and time 
synchronisation are critical in an IEC 61850-9-2 network and affects the protection 
system performance.  
In the next chapter the network architecture, communication protocols and devices of 
substation communication networks in an IEC 61850 standard digital substation are 
covered. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
THE IEC 61850 STANDARD AND DIGITAL SUBSTATION ETHERNET 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
IEC 61850 is a standard used for communication networks and systems for Power Utility 
Automation (PUA). The functions of a PUA system are protection, monitoring and control 
of the primary equipment in substations and of the grid.  
The first edition of the IEC61850 standard was as a standard for communication 
networks and systems in substations. Its scope was expanded in edition 2 to include the 
modelling of other parts of the power system. The modelling of hydropower plants (see 
IEC 61850-7-410) distributed energy resources (see IEC 61850-7-420) are also covered 
by the IEC 61850 series. The standard has also been extended to substation to 
substation communication (see IEC 61850-90-1). The application scope of IEC 61850 is 
shown below in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scope of application of IEC 61850, IEC/TR 61850-1 (IEC, 2013a: 14) 
 
The architecture of an IEC 61850 substation consists out of a station level, a bay level 
and a process level. Digital technologies and the implementation of these technologies 
in substations were first done at station and bay levels and now also at the process level.  
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The IEC 61850 standard series defines the communication between the intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) in the substation and the related system requirements. The 
standard also allows interoperability among automation devices of different vendors for 
digital substation application. (Bhardwaj et al., 2014). 
Part 2 of the IEC 61850 series contains the glossary of specific terminology and 
definitions used in the context of Substation Automation Systems (IEC, 2003b).  
 
The chapter covers the three levels of IEC 61850, standard namespace of logical nodes, 
system configuration description language and abstract communication service interface 
in section 3.2.  
The functions and communication interfaces are discussed in section 3.3, data modelling 
in section 3.4, the SCL language in section 3.5, the SCL file types in section 3.6 and the 
communication services in section 3.7. 
Digital substation Ethernet technology is discussed at the end of the chapter in section 
3.8. Communication network architecture, network redundancy protocols and Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model physical and data link layers are covered in sub 
sections 3.8.1 to 3.8.4. 
Time synchronisation is discussed in the last section 3.9. 
 
3.2 The levels of definition of the IEC61850 standard 
The IEC 61850 standard provides three main levels of definition: 
• A standard name space of logical nodes, data objects and attributes (IEC 61850 part 
7-3 and 7-4),  
• a System Configuration description Language (SCL) covered in IEC 61850 part 6 
and, 
• Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) services (part 7) that can be 
mapped to specific protocols: MMS (part 8) and Sampled values (part 9) to 
exchange this information. The Mapping is done by using Specific Communication 
Service Mapping (SCSM) 
The original name space focused on electrical data for protection, monitoring and control 
purpose mainly. New name spaces were added for hydro power plants and distributed 
energy resources recently.  
SCL is based on the XML meta language. It can describe IED capabilities, how IED are 
configured and can also describe a power system. 
The IEC 61850 standard defines transmission protocols used to handle specific types of 
data transfer. The abstract data models defined in IEC 61850 can be mapped to a few 
protocols, including MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification), GOOSE (Generic 
Object Oriented Substation Events), and SMV (Sampled Measured Values). The IEC 
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61850 part 9-2 determines the specific communication service mappings for the 
communication between the bay and process levels (IEC, 2011c). These protocols can 
run over high speed TCP/IP networks to ensure the fast response time (< 4 ms) needed 
for protective relays. 
 
3.3 Functions and communication interfaces 
IEC 61850 part 5 specifies the communication requirements of the functions being 
performed and the device models in systems for power utility automation. All known 
functions and their communication requirements are identified. Transfer time classes are 
also specified in part 5 (Rinaldi, Ferrari & Loda, 2016).  
The devices of a power utility automation system may be physically installed on different 
functional levels (station, bay, and process). Bay level devices consist of secondary 
control, protection or monitoring units. Process level devices are typically remote input 
/output units (I/Os), Merging Units, intelligent sensors and actuators at the primary 
equipment such as breakers and instrument transformers. 
The functions of a Substation Automation System (SAS) or Power Utility Automation 
System (PUAS) refer to tasks which must be performed in utility substations. These are 
control, monitoring and protection functions and are allocated to the devices. The 
allocation can depend on availability requirements, performance requirements, cost 
constraints, technology, utilities’ philosophies etc.(IEC, 2013a) The standard is not 
restrictive and allows a free allocation of functions to IEDs  
The IEC 61850 standard supports the following communication at the process level: 
sampled value exchange for CTs and VTs, fast exchange of I/O data for protection and 
control, control signals and trip signals. 
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Figure 3.2 Interface model within substation and between substations, IEC61850-5 (IEC, 2013b: 
19) 
 
The logical communication interfaces (IF) within substation and between substations are 
presented in IEC 61850. The different interfaces are shown in Figure 3.2 (IEC, 2013b: 
19). 
Two interfaces, namely IF4 and IF5 are between the bay and process levels. IF 4 is 
related to the CT and VT instantaneous data exchange, and IF 5 control-data exchanges 
between the process and bay levels. 
 
3.4 IEC 61850 data modelling 
The modelling concept virtualises real physical power system primary and secondary 
devices. These devices contain information that can be exchanged with other devices 
and the IEC 61850 standard provides interoperability of the devices to exchange this 
information to be used in the protection and automation system(Huang, 2018b; Vandiver 
& Rietmann, 2018).  
The Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) models provide information 
models and information exchange services models (Liang & Campbell, 2007). This is 
covered in part 7-2 of the IEC 61850 standard. 
The different protection and control functions in the substation are modelled into standard 
logical nodes which can be grouped under different logical devices. The IEC 61850 data 
model is based on two main levels shown in Figure 3.3 below: 
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• The breakdown of a physical device into logical devices, 
•  and the breakdown of a logical device into logical nodes, data objects and 
attributes. 
 
Figure 3.3 IEC 61850 Data modelling, IEC/TR 61850-1 (IEC, 2013a: 24) 
 
The generic models or meta models for logical nodes and data classes including their 
services, are defined in Clause 5.3 of part 7.2 and are applied in parts 7-3 and 7-4 of IEC 
61850 standard. 
 
3.4.1 Logical Device and Logical Nodes 
A Physical Device (PHD), i.e. multifunction IED can be modelled with this IEC 61850 
modelling concept and can be broken down into Logical Devices (LDs). A LD usually 
represents a group of typical automation or protection functions. Common functions in a 
power utility automation system have been identified and split into Logical Nodes (LN). 
One LD cannot be part of more than one physical device. 
The modelling concept can also be used to specify the IEDs of a power utility automation 
system.  
The LNs may reside in different devices and at different levels. Examples are shown 
below in Figure 3.4 (IEC, 2013a: 31). In the example below it is shown that two functions, 
each having a logical node for distance and over current protection can be allocated to 
one device. PHD number three has distance protection unit with integrated overcurrent 
function. The other devices in the figure are: PHD 1 Station computer, PHD 2 
Synchronised switching device, PHD 3 Distance protection unit with integrated 
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overcurrent function, PHD 4: Bay control unit, PHD 5 Current instrument transformers 
and PHD 6 & 7: Voltage instrument transformers. 
 
Figure 3.4 Relationship between functions, logical nodes, and physical devices IEC61850-5 
(IEC, 2013a: 31) 
 
A LD hosts a communication access point of the physical device and provides nameplate 
and health information about the physical device.  
A LD is built up by Logical nodes (LN). LN are the smallest entities of application 
functions which are used to exchange information. 
Each LN in a logical device may have a working mode, e.g. the LN may be in a test 
mode. This working mode of the LN may be different to the Logical Device that it belongs 
to.  
3.4.2 Standard name space 
The standard name space of the IEC 61850 series, defined in part 7, contains standard 
logical nodes, data object and data attributes classes. 
The relationship between the LN data and data attributes is shown in Figure 3.5 (IEC, 
2013a) 
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Figure 3.5 Relationship between logical nodes, data and data attributes  
(IEC, 2011a: 21)(IEC, 2013a) 
 
IEC 61850-7-4 defines more than a hundred Logical Nodes divided into Logical Groups. 
The first letter of the Logical Node name identifies the group. See Table 3-1 of the Logical 
Node Groups below. 
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Table 3-1 Logical Node Groups IEC 61850-7-1 (IEC, 2011a: 18) 
 
 
3.4.2.1 Logical nodes (LN) 
The LN instance name shall be composed of the class name, the LN-Prefix and LN-
Instance-ID according to IEC 61850-7-2, Clause 22. 
The LN for a circuit breaker function, XCBR belongs to the switchgear group X. Another 
example is the PDIF LN for the differential protection function that belongs to the 
protection group P. 
Several logical nodes build a logical device. An IED with the differential protection 
functions can have the LN differential protection function, PDIF and differential 
measurements, RXMU. The RXMU LN provides current values for PDIF and can use the 
current samples sent from the local TCTR current sensors  
A transformer protection IED can have the following LN: 
PDIF- A function that operates on a percentage, phase angle, or other quantitative 
difference of two or more currents or other electrical quantities, 
PTDF Special for transformers are inrush currents with dedicated harmonics which 
request the use of the harmonic restraint function (PHAR), 
PHAR This LN represents the harmonic restraint data object especially for the 
transformer differential protection. There may be multiple instantiations with different 
settings, especially with different data object HaRst, 
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ATCC is the LN name for automatic tap changer controller. CCGR is the LN name for 
cooling group. 
 
3.4.2.2 Data objects 
Specific Data Objects (DO) are provided by each logical node as defined in IEC 61850-
7-4. Each of the data contains several data attributes. 
Data object names are listed alphabetically in part 7-4, Clause 6 (IEC, 2010c). The data 
objects in the logical node classes are grouped into status, measured and meter values, 
controls, and settings categories: 
• Status information contains DO, which show either the status of the process or 
of the function allocated to the LN class. This information is produced locally and 
cannot be changed via communication for operational reasons unless 
substitution is applicable. Data objects such as “start” or “trip” are examples listed 
in this category. Most of these data objects are mandatory. 
• Measured values are analogue data objects measured from the process or 
calculated in the functions such as currents, voltages, power, etc. Metered values 
are analogue data objects representing quantities measured over time, for 
example energy. This information is produced locally and cannot be changed 
remotely unless substitution is applicable. 
• Controls contain data objects which are changed by commands such as 
switchgear state (ON/OFF), tap changer position or resettable counters. They are 
typically changed remotely and are changed during operation much more often 
than the settings. 
• Settings are data objects which configure the function for its operation. Since 
many settings are dependent on the implementation of the function, only a 
commonly agreed minimum is standardised. They may be changed remotely, but 
normally not very often. 
Descriptions are data objects, which give information about the LN itself or an allocated 
device. This information consists of identification information and general properties like 
configuration revision, hard and software revisions, etc. 
A Data object can be mandatory (M), optional (O) or conditional (C). 
A circuit breaker is defined in the logical node XCBR. The data name for the position of 
a circuit breaker is named Pos and is part of Controls category. The data Pos can be 
controlled via a control service. 
 
3.4.2.3 Data attributes 
Each of the data has data attributes. A whole set of all the data attributes defined for i.e. 
the position data (Pos) is called a common data class (CDC). The common data classes 
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are defined in Clause 7 in part 7-3 of the IEC 61850 standard. Common Data Classes 
(CDC) are specified and categorised as follows: for status information, measurand 
information, controls, status settings, analogue settings, configuration and description 
information. 
Examples of CDC for status information are Single Point Status (SPS), Double Point 
Status (DPS) and Integer Status (INS). Each of them has mandatory data attributes i.e 
status value of the data (stVal), quality (q) and timestamp (t). 
Examples of CDC for measurand information are measured value (MV), complex 
measured value (CMV) and sampled value (SAV). In addition to quality and time stamp 
data attributes they have other mandatory data attributes. The sampled value CDC has 
a magnitude of the instantaneous value of a measured value (instMag) data attribute. 
Examples of CDC for control information are controllable single point (SPC), controllable 
double point (DPC) and controllable analogue process value (APC). 
Examples of CDC for settings are single point setting (SPG), integer status setting (ING) 
and time setting group (TSG) with the data attribute, value of a status setting (setVal). 
Every specification for a CDC has defined services according to part 7-2 of the IEC 61850 
standard. These services may include services such as GetDataSetValues or 
SetDataSetValues according to the Data set model; SendGOOSEMessage and 
SendMSVMessage occording to the GSE and Sampled value models.  
Data attributes are defined primarily by an attribute name and an attribute type. Other 
information is of functional constraint, trigger condition, value or value range and the 
indication of the attribute. See the type of information in Table 3-2 (IEC, 2011a: 22) 
 
Table 3-2 Data Attribute information IEC 61850-7-1 (IEC, 2011a: 22) 
 
The data attribute names are standardised names that have a specific semantic as 
defined in clause 8, Table 64 in part 7-3 of the IEC 61850 standard. 
Other information that specify the date attributes are: 
• the services allowed or Functional Constraint (FC), 
• the trigger conditions that cause a report to be sent (TrgOp), 
• the value or value range, 
• the indication if the attribute is Optional (O), Mandatory (M) or Conditional (C).  
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The Functional Constraint data attribute (FC) shall be as specified in Table 20 of IEC 
61850-7-2 under clause 12.3.3.2 of the standard. Only some of the FC values are shown 
below in Table 3-3 (IEC, 2010a: 54). 
Table 3-3 Functional Constraint Values IEC 61850-7-2 (IEC, 2010a: 54) 
 
The status information data attribute (ST) can be used in the circuit breaker logical node 
XCBR to represent the status information. This information value may be read, 
substituted, reported, and logged, but is not writeable. The measurand data attribute can 
be used in a current sensor (TCTR) logical node. This information may be shared to the 
logical nodes RXMU as part of a merging unit logical device LD, and logical nodes for 
Automatic Tap Changer Controller (ATCC) and differential protection function (PDIF) in 
logical devices for a multifunction protection IED. 
A data attribute may have a sub data attribute. The sub data attribute of a data object 
having a specific Functional Constraint (FC) value shall be called Functional Constrained 
Data Attribute (FCDA) according to the standard. 
The trigger condition (TrgOp) information specifies the condition that may cause a report 
to be sent or a log entry to be stored into a log.  The services associated with the TrgOp 
shall be as specified in Table 21 of IEC 61850-7-2 under clause 12.3.3.3 of the standard. 
The services allowed for data change, quality change or data value update conditions 
are shown in Table 3-4 ((IEC, 2010a: 56) below. 
Table 3-4 Trigger Condition services allowed IEC 61850-7-2 (IEC, 2010a: 56) 
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The status information of a circuit breaker is represented by the status data attribute 
(stVal) for the position data (Pos) of the circuit breaker logical node (XCBR) shown in 
Figure 3.5 on page 3-6. (IEC, 2011a: 21)(IEC, 2013a). The attribute stVal can be 
represented in four states: intermediate, off, on, bad.  
 
3.5 IEC 61850 SCL language 
Part 6 of IEC 61850 specifies a file format, of the System Configuration description 
Language (SCL) for describing IED, substation automation and communication system 
configurations. SCL is also used to describe the substation equipment and power system 
functions through logical nodes. The SCL is used to exchange IED capability 
descriptions, and substation automation system descriptions using IED and system 
engineering tools. This data exchange shall be interoperable between an IED 
configuration tool and a system configuration tool from different manufacturers. The 
configuration language is based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML). 
The SCL object model has three basic parts, a substation structure part, a product or 
IED structure part and a communication structure part. These parts are discussed in 
more detail in Appendix A. The substation part and the product part form hierarchies. 
The overview of the SCL object model is shown in Figure 3.6 (IEC, 2009: 20) by using 
UML notation. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 SCL object model IEC 61850-6 (IEC, 2009: 20) 
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3.6 SCL file types 
There are different purposes for SCL data exchange and Part 6 of the standard defines 
six types of SCL files each having a different file extension (Peng et al., 2017). The data 
exchange using these files between a system configuration tool and an IED configuration 
tool is also defined. 
A sender creates or produces a SCL instance for processing or to be used by a receiver.  
The file types: a System Specification Description (SSD) file, an IED Capability 
Description (ICD) file, a Substation Configuration Description (SCD) file, a System 
Exchange Description (SED) file, an Instantiated IED Description (IID) file and a 
Configured IED Description (CID) file are discussed in Appendix A.  
 
3.7 IEC 61850 communication services 
Part 7-2 of IEC 61850 applies to the Abstract Communication Service Interfaces (ACSI) 
communication for utility automation. The ACSI provides abstract interface: 
• describing communications between a client and a server, 
• for event distribution between a publisher and subscriber, 
• for transmission of sampled measured values from a publisher to a subscriber. 
The ACSI is defined in terms of a hierarchical class model of all information and the 
associated services that can be accessed via a communication network. 
ACSI and the meta model for IEC 61850 is discussed in more detail in Appendix B. 
 
3.7.1 Abstract communication service interface (ACSI) 
The Object Management Group (OMG) meta model hierarchy is used for the ACSI model 
in the conceptual model of IEC 61850. The top level meta-meta model definitions is a list 
of base types and rules how to build the meta model and hierarchical structures. The 
meta model defines generic model classes for logical nodes, data objects and common 
data classes including their services. The ACSI model also provides domain type models 
at level M1 and instance models at level M0 in part 7-2 of the IEC 61850 standard(IEC, 
2010a)  
 
3.7.1.1 The meta model 
The meta model comprises classes for the description of data models and information 
exchange models. 
a) Information modelling classes  
The following overall classes are defined: Server, Logical device, Logical node and data 
objects. 
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All other ACSI models are part of the server. A server communicates with a client and 
sends information to peer devices. 
Each of these models is defined as a class and the classes comprise attributes and 
services. 
b) Information exchange modelling classes 
The ACSI includes the following models for data objects and data attributes services: 
Data set, Substitution, Setting group control, Report control and logging, Control blocks 
for generic substation events, Control blocks for transmission of sampled values, Time 
and time synchronization, File system and Tracking. 
 
3.7.2 ACSI mappings to Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) 
Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) is a standardised procedure which 
provides the mapping of ACSI services and objects onto a particular protocol stack or 
communication profile. (IEC, 2003b: 22). Part 8-1 of the IEC 61850 standard specifies 
the SCSM of the objects and services of the ACSI, IEC 61850-7-2) to Manufacturing 
Message Specification (MMS), ISO 9506 and ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames. 
The SCSM uses the 7-layer OSI reference model (ISO/IEC 7498-1) where layering of 
communication functions is defined. The layers are grouped in an application profile (A-
Profile) and transport profile (T-Profile)  
The upper three layers of the ISO A-Profile consist out of application, presentation, and 
session layers. The lower 4 layers of the ISO T-Profile consist out of the transport, 
network, datalink and physical layers. The combination of A and T-profiles is specified 
for each SCSM. 
Each SCSM consists of: 
• the mapping of the abstract specifications of IEC 61850-7 series on the real 
elements of the stack being used, and 
• the implementation specification of functionality, which is not covered by the stack 
being used. 
The Server, Logical device and Logical node objects models of 61850 as well as the 
generic substation event model (GSE) can be mapped to MMS (IEC, 2011b). These 
models are discussed in detail in Appendix B as part of the Communication services. 
  
3.7.3 ACSI mappings to Sampled Values (SV) 
The ACSI mapping of sampled values can be done for two types of services: 
• The first is client/server services bases on MMS and, 
• The second is SV publisher/subscriber mechanism with services based on the 
data link layer. 
Two methods to exchange SV are specified: 
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• The first is between a publisher and one or more subscribers, a multicast-
application-association.  
• The other method uses unicast or two-party-application- association. 
Different combinations of A-Profiles and T-Profiles are defined to support the 
transmission of SV. 
 
3.7.3.1 Client/server services and communication profiles 
This communication profile is used if the client requires access to the sampled value 
control blocks. (e.g. GetMSVCBValues and SetMSVCBValues for the multicast sampled 
value control block). Similar control blocks are specified for unicast sampled values. The 
services and protocols are specified for each of the layers in the A and T-profiles in 
clause 5.2 of IEC 61850 part 9-2. Services for each of the ISO layers are specified to be 
mandatory, optional or recommended. Parallel redundancy protocol and high availability 
seamless ring are specified but are optional. Fibre optic transmission system 100Base-
FX is specified but to make provision for future technologies, it is recommended for the 
physical ISO Layer. 
 
3.7.3.2 SV service and communication profile 
Multicast SV message and Unicast SV message services are supported. Services and 
protocols of the A-Profile and T-Profiles are specified for SV.  
Ethernet addresses in the link layer of the T-profile are specified. The destination 
ISO/IEC 8802-3 multicast/unicast address must be configured for sampled values. A 6-
octet string multicast addresses are recommended to have the following structure: The 
first three octets are assigned with 01-0C-CD. The fourth octet will be 01 for GOOSE, 02 
for GSSE, and 04 for multicast sampled values. The last two octets will be used as 
individual addresses. (e.g. 01-0C-CD-04-00-00 for an SV string). 
Priority tagging and virtual LAN configurations are also important at the link layer. Priority 
tagging according to IEEE 802.1Q is used to separate time critical high priority SV 
messages. Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) field indicates the Ethernet type and the value 
shall be 0x8100. The Tag Control Information (TCI) fields consist out of the priority, CFI 
(Canonical Format Indicator) and VLAN identifier (VID). The value 1 is used for the 
priority of untagged frames. Higher priority frames shall have a value from 4-7. The 
default priority of an SV is 4. This standard specifies the single bit flag value of the CFI 
to be = 0. Virtual LAN support is optional and if it is not used the VID shall be set=0. 
 
3.7.3.3 Mapping of the sampled value buffer 
Clause 19 of IEC61850 part 7-2 defines a buffer structure for the transmission of sampled 
values. The SV information exchange.is based on a publisher/subscriber mechanism. 
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The publisher samples the inputs with the specified sample rate and is responsible to 
write the values in a local buffer at the sending side (Kaibo et al., 2015). The subscriber 
read the values from a local buffer at the receiving side. The information is time stamped 
for the subscriber. The communication system shall be responsible to update the local 
buffers of the subscribers. The publisher uses a Sampled Value Control Block (SVCB) 
to control the communication  
The Application layer has the functionality where the mapping can be done such as to 
concatenate more than one Application Service Data Unit (ASDU) into one Application 
Protocol Data Unit (APDU) before the APDU is posted into the transmission buffer. The 
number of ASDUs is indicated in the Application Protocol Control Information (APCI). 
 
3.8 Digital Substation Ethernet Technology 
There was an evolution of substation secondary equipment from electro-mechanical 
devices to digital devices in the Power Utility Automation Systems (PUAS). PUAS use 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) to perform protection, monitoring and control 
functions. There was a need for an efficient communication network between the IEDs 
and a standard protocol to use. The IEC 61850 standard was developed as a 
communication standard that meets functional and performance requirements as well as 
supports future technological developments.  
The Technical Report TR 61850-90-4 provides definitions, guidelines and specifications 
for the network engineering of IEC 61850-based substation automation (SABS, 2014). 
This section covers the communication network architecture, communication protocols, 
physical layer and data link layer of substation communication networks in an IEC 61850 
standard digital substation. 
 
3.8.1 Communication Network Architecture 
Different architectures can be implemented in a digital substation communication 
network. The same substation may have different network architectures implemented for 
the station and process bus networks. The architecture depends on the budget available 
as well as the reliability and availability requirements. The most common used 
architectures are cascaded, star, ring and a combination of them. The communication 
network architectures are discussed in Appendix C. 
 
3.8.2 Network redundancy protocols 
Redundant network connections are essential when designing high availability 
communication networks. Different mechanisms and protocols can be implemented in 
substation communication networks to obtain redundancy and to have high availability 
by keeping the outage time as short as possible. The outage time that can be tolerated 
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can depend on the type of the substation, how critical it is for the power system and the 
importance and supply contract of the customer. IEC 62439-1:2010 is applicable to high-
availability automation networks based on the ISO/IEC 8802-3 (IEEE 802.3) Ethernet 
technology. Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) and MSTP are network spanning tree 
redundancy protocols. Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High Availability 
Seamless Redundancy (HSR) are bus redundancy architecture proposed by the IEC 
62439-3 standard (Igarashi et al., 2015: 3; Kumar et al., 2015b). RSTP, PRP and HSR 
is discussed in Appendix B 
 
3.8.3 Physical layer 
The physical layer defines specifications of the data physical transmission medium. The 
IEC 61850 caters for future development and therefore is not specific on the 
communication medium and required speed. It usually considers networks with copper 
and fibre physical layers and 100 Mbit/s and 1 Gbit/s rates. 
Fibre has the advantage of galvanic isolation over copper. Each medium has a specific 
price, bandwidth and distance that it can cover. The distance that can be covered 
decreases with increasing data rate  
IEC 61850 assumes that communication is full-duplex and auto-negotiated. The peer 
ports are configured to recognize automatically the polarity, the duplex setting and 
highest common speed.100Mbit/s copper, 100Mbit/s and 1Gbit/s optical fibre as physical 
layers is discussed in Appendix E. 
 
3.8.4 Data Link layer 
The data link layer or layer 2 is the second layer of the seven-layer Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model. It defines the protocol for the transmission of data frames 
and establishes and terminates a connection between two physically connected devices. 
The data link layer has two sublayers: logical link control (LLC) and media access control 
(MAC). 
A media access control address (MAC address) is a 48-bit address space and a unique 
identifier assigned to network interface controllers (NIC) for communications at the data 
link layer. The Data link layer, Unicast and multicast filtering, Virtual LAN traffic control 
and quality of service are discussed in more detail in Appendix F. 
 
3.8.4.1 Unicast and multicast MAC addresses 
Each data frame carries a source and destination address.  
A frame sent to one receiver is called unicast. In IEC 61850, the MMS traffic use unicast 
addresses. 
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A frame sent to a group of destinations is a multicast one. The IEC61850, GOOSE and 
SV traffic use multicast addresses. Packets sent to a multicast addresses are received 
by all devices on a LAN that have been configured to receive it. 
Data frame enters the bridge on ingress ports and leave the bridge on egress ports. 
When a frame enters an ingress port it will use the MAC address to determine on which 
egress ports the frames are to be forwarded to. 
MAC address filtering is traffic control mechanism that reduces the traffic. The bridge 
sends only the relevant part of the traffic to the end device. In IEC 61850, the MAC 
address filtering only reduces the MMS traffic, since the GOOSE and SV traffic is 
multicast. A bridge does not apply MAC address filtering to multicast traffic, since the 
multicast frames are forwarded on all egress ports. The network is flooded by multicast 
messages if not filtered. This results in excessive bandwidth consumption and 
unnecessary processing of unwanted traffic by IEDs or end devices.  
Multicast filtering can reduce the traffic to end devices by letting through only those 
multicast addresses the end device is interested in. A bridge port uses a configurable 
multicast filtering table to know which multicast addresses may egress from that port. 
 
3.8.4.2 Virtual LANs (VLAN) traffic control 
VLANs is a method to separate different types of traffic that share the same bandwidth 
on physical medium at the data link layer (OSI layer 2). The protocol most commonly 
used to configure VLANs is IEEE 802.1Q. The IEEE 802.3 frames carry a header, called 
the VLAN tag, 32-bit field between the source MAC address and the Ether Type fields of 
the original frame.  
The header consists out of a 16-bit field Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) and a 16-bit field 
Tag Control Information (TCI).  
The TPID field is set to a value of 0x8100 to identify the frame as an IEEE 802.1Q-tagged 
frame. This field is located at the same position as the EtherType field in untagged frames 
and is used to distinguish the frame from untagged frames. 
The VID with hexadecimal reserved value 0x000 indicates that the frame does not carry 
a VLAN ID and is called a priority tag. 
 
3.8.4.3 Quality of Service (QoS) 
Priority tagging (IEEE 802.1p) and VLANs are specified in the same standard IEEE 
802.1Q and share the same tag, but they are separate concepts.  
The QoS technique, class of service (CoS) is the 3-bit field PCP and specifies a priority 
value that can be used by QoS to priorities the traffic. Priority means that a bridge that 
receives several frames simultaneously will forward the highest priority frames and 
queue the other lower priority frames. IEC 61850 prescribes that GOOSE and SV frames 
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are priority-tagged. The value 1 is the lowest priority mark and priority 7 is the highest. 
Default priority is 4 for GOOSE and SV message given in IEC61850-9-2 but different 
priority can be assigned for GOOSE and SV messages. 
 
3.8.4.4 Bridge port filtering 
The bridge needs to be VLAN-aware to recognise the frames with the IEEE 802.1Q tag. 
The bridge ports need to be configured or set to allow the frames to enter. This can be 
done by a Port VLAN member set (PVMS) or VLAN ID table. Frames will not be allowed 
to ingress when a frame does not have a VLAN ID that is a member in the PVMS of that 
port. According to IEEE 802.1Q-2011, A bridge port can be set to admit the following 
frames: 
• only VLAN-tagged frames; 
• only untagged and priority-tagged frames; 
• all frames (not VLAN-aware). 
The option to admit all frames or VLAN un-aware, must be used when an IED connected 
to a port, sends tagged (GOOSE, SV) and untagged (MMS) messages. 
The egress from a port of a bridge is also controlled by the Port VLAN Member Set 
(PVMS). This port will forward the frames tagged or untagged. 
An egress port sends the frame only if the frame VID belongs to the port membership 
set PVMS. 
The port sends the frame without a change if it is configured to forward tagged frames. 
The port removes the VLAN tag including the PCP if it is configured to forward untagged 
frames. 
 
3.8.4.5 Static and Dynamic VLAN configuration 
Static VLAN configuration is done by using a network management and configuration 
tool to assign the priority PPCP and PVIDs to all device ports. 
Dynamic VLAN configuration can be done by using protocols such as Generic VLAN 
Registration Protocol (GVRP) or Multiple VLAN Registration Protocol (MVRP)  
It is recommended by TR 61850-90-4 Technical report that substation automation should 
avoid dynamic VLAN assignment. 
 
3.9 Time Synchronization 
The equipment status collected at process level by protection and control devices needs 
to be time stamped and published in a frame format on the substation communication 
network. All the devices therefore need an internal clock that is synchronized with a 
substation GPS clock. The synchronization is performed through IRIG-B, or indirectly 
over a communications network using one of several standards.  
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Timing classes are defined in IEC 61850-5 standard (International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2013: 68). The IEEE came up with IEEE 1588 standard (De Dominicis et 
al., 2011) to synchronize multiple devices over a network where their clock is in 
master/slave mode (Bhardwaj et al., 2014: 4). A single network implementation can be 
accomplished by using IEEE 1588 Precision Time Synchronization Protocol (PTP) 
(Skendzic et al., 2007: 5). IRIG and PTP can be considered as better alternatives to 
Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) for process bus applications. 
IRIG time codes, Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP), Precision Time Protocol (PTP) 
and Time gateways are discussed in Appendix G. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter the IEC 61850 standard was discussed under the following parts: 
• A standard name space of logical nodes, data objects and attributes (IEC 61850 part 
7-3 and 7-4),  
• a System Configuration description Language (SCL) covered in IEC 61850 part 6 
and, 
• Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) services (part 7) that can be 
mapped to specific protocols (part 8 and 9) to exchange this information. 
 
The communication network architecture, communication protocols, physical layer and 
data link layer of substation communication networks in an IEC 61850 standard digital 
substation were reviewed. The Technical Report TR 61850-90-4 provides definitions, 
guidelines and specifications for the network engineering of IEC 61850-based substation 
automation  
The most common used architectures are cascaded, star, ring and a combination of them 
were discussed. The architecture will depend on the budget available as well as the 
reliability and availability requirements. 
Redundant network connections are essential when designing high availability 
communication networks. Network redundancy protocols such as Spanning Tree 
Protocol (STP), Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High Availability Seamless 
Redundancy (HSR) are reviewed. 
The physical layer defines the data physical transmission medium. The IEC 61850 caters 
for future development and therefore is not specific on the communication medium and 
required speed. Copper and fibre physical layers and 100 Mbit/s and 1 Gbit/s bit rates 
are reviewed. 
The data link layer or layer 2 is the second layer of the seven-layer Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model. It defines the protocol for the transmission of data frames. 
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MAC address and multicast filtering, VLANs, IEEE 802.1Q and Quality of Service are 
described. 
Time synchronisation of time stamped information on the process bus network of a 
substation communication network was considered as a requirement for the proper 
performance of the substation automation system. Time synchronization can be 
performed through IRIG-B over a dedicated system, or indirectly over a communication 
network. The number of devices to be synchronized and the distances between devices 
affect the IRIG-B system architecture. The NTP time accuracy was considered as not 
enough for the process bus using Sampled Values. IEEE 1588 Precision Time 
Synchronization Protocol (PTP) version 2 can be used to synchronize multiple devices 
over a network where the clocks are in master/slave mode. PTP has less cabling 
infrastructure requirements as IRIG-B due to not needing a dedicated network for time 
synchronization. The Thesis test-bench set up used a combination of 1 PPS time signals 
and an IRIG-B signal. A 1 PPS time synchronisation source from the RTDS, was used 
for time signals via fibre optic for the synchronization of the MUs. The P645 IED has an 
IRIG-B input with BNC connector for time synchronization. The IRIG-B signal is supplied 
from a network switch. 
The modelling and simulation of the system of parallel power transformers is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
MODELING AND SIMULATION OF THE SYSTEM OF PARALLEL 
TRANSFORMERS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The modelling and simulations of the system of parallel power transformers is discussed 
in this chapter. A system of parallel transformers is modelled in the Real-Time Digital 
Simulator (RTDS) for simulation, faults are applied to the system and the fault currents 
are measured and analysed. The system configuration is changed, and the fault currents 
are analysed for the different system configurations. 
A system of five 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers connected in parallel is 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the simulation 
Case 1,Figure 4.1. 
The system has a source connected to the 132kV bus bar. The 11kV bus bar has 4 x 
Bus Sections, 3 x 11kV loads and 2 x 11kV sources connected to the 11kV bus bar 
sections. Primary substation equipment such as instrument transformers and circuit 
breakers are modelled. 
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Figure 4.1 A System of five parallel power transformers 
 
Faults are applied to the 132kV high voltage side and 11kV medium voltage side of the 
system of power transformers and the fault currents are measured and analysed. 
The different bus section circuit breakers are opened to change the system configuration 
and the fault currents are analysed for the different system configurations. 
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The RTDS hardware and software are discussed in section 4.2. The configuration of the 
power system models is described in sub sections for the power source, the transformer 
model and the load model in section 4.3. The configuration of current and voltage 
instrument transformer models is discussed in section 4.4. 
RSCAD/RunTime is used to interact with and control the Draft simulation case being 
performed on the RTDS hardware. Set point adjustment, fault application and breaker 
operation are performed through the RunTime Operator’s Console. This is described in 
section 4.5. 
The simulation results for different cases are shown in section 4.6 and discussed in 
section 4.7 of this chapter.  
 
4.2 Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) 
The RTDS Simulator is used to run the real-time power system model of the system of 
parallel power transformers. Current transformers (CTs) are modelled in the RTDS 
software to provide analogue signals that are proportional to the real-time secondary 
current signals. The CT model used in simulation software must represent the saturation 
and remanence characteristics of CT core accurately (Kanokbannakorn & Penthong, 
2019).  
 
4.2.1 Hardware 
RTDS processor cards are mounted in racks which together with input/output cards are 
housed in cubicles. Each RTDS rack includes a GTWIF card which provides 
communication between the RTDS rack and the computer workstation running the 
RSCAD software. 
The processor cards are used to solve the equations representing the power system 
components modelled within the RTDS. Two types of processor cards are used, Giga 
processor card (GPC) and PB5 cards. An RTDS rack typically contains between 2 and 
6 processor cards. 
 
4.2.2 Software 
RSCAD is a software package providing a graphical interface to the RTDS. RSCAD 
includes several modules that allow real-time simulations to be created, executed, 
controlled and analysed. The RSCAD/FileManager (Fileman) module is the home page 
and is used for project and case management. All other RSCAD programs are launched 
from the Fileman module. 
RSCAD/Draft is used for circuit assembly and parameter entry of components. The Draft 
screen is divided into the library section and the circuit assembly section. Individual 
component icons are selected from the library and placed in the circuit assembly section. 
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Power System and Protection and Automation models from the library are 
interconnected to build a simulation circuitry. 
RSCAD/RunTime is used to control the simulation case being performed on the RTDS 
hardware. Simulation can be controlled (start / stop commands) as well as other controls 
e.g. set point adjustment, fault application and breaker operation can be performed 
through the RunTime Operator’s Console. Online metering and recording functions are 
available in RunTime. 
RSCAD/MultiPlot is used for post processing and analysis of results captured and stored 
during a simulation study. Report can be generated by MultiPlot. 
 
4.3 Development of a power system model in RTDS 
RSCAD is a software package providing a graphical interface to the RTDS. 
 
The following steps are required to prepare and run a new simulation case  
•  Start the RSCAD Software 
•  Create a new Project and Case directory in the FileManager module 
•  Start the RSCAD/Draft software module 
•  Create a new circuit diagram for simulation 
•  Compile the new circuit 
•  Start the simulation case from RSCAD/RunTime  
 
RSCAD/Draft is used for circuit assembly and parameter entry of components. The Draft 
screen is divided into the library section and the circuit assembly section. Individual 
component icons are selected from the library and placed in the circuit assembly section. 
The method of modelling of the power system in the RTDS/ RSCAD Draft software is 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
Firstly, a Single Line Diagram (SLD) of the system to be modelled is to be determined. 
The power system circuits are drawn using circuit components from the RSCAD library. 
Components for power systems, protection, automation and control are used. The 
component's parameters must be edited. 
The project must be compiled after it is completed. 
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Figure 4.2 RSCAD/Draft modelling flow chart 
 
4.3.1 Power Source 
A three phase source model with a balanced sinusoidal 132kV three phase ac infinite 
bus voltage without harmonics is selected as a main source for the system of power 
transformers. Two smaller sources are connected to two 11kV bus bar sections to 
simulate two power stations. The Source model is configured by choosing an impedance 
type of connections of resistive branches and inductive branches. The connection can 
be series (R-L) or parallel (R//L). A combination of R-R//L is selected for the sources of 
simulation case 1. R−R//L source’s positive sequence impedance is specified in absolute 
terms by entering the actual R series, R parallel and L parallel parameters. The zero 
sequence circuit consists of a resistive branch and an inductive branch connected in 
parallel. The source positive sequence impedance is specified by entering the source 
impedance magnitude of 55ohms and 80° angle. The source negative sequence 
impedance is specified by entering the source impedance magnitude of 45ohms and 80° 
angle. The configuration window is shown in Figure 4.3 below.  
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Figure 4.3 RSCAD Power source model configuration 
 
4.3.2 Power transformer model 
Different types of basic power transformers for various applications can be represented 
on the RTDS. Two, three winding or auto transformer configurations on a single 2 limb 
core with each winding connected in either wye−grounded, wye−ungrounded or delta 
can be configured. Online tap changers are available to be configured with the three 
phase two winding transformer model. 
Five transformers are configured, each being a three phase 50Hz 40MVA 132/11kV two 
winding transformer with YNd1 connected windings and on-line tap changer, for the 
power system circuit.  
The transformer can be configured to be Ideal or Non-ideal type. An ideal transformer 
will have no magnetizing inductance and will be represented by the specified leakage 
reactance only. Non−ideal transformers will involve a reactance magnetizing branch with 
the specified leakage reactance value. The core saturation and hysteresis can be 
modelled in the three phase two winding transformer model. The configuration window 
is shown in Figure 4.4 below.  
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Figure 4.4 RSCAD Transformer 1 model configuration 
 
Two selections are available for setting the tap positions for the on-line tap changer. A 
position Table “POS Table” or a step Table “Step/Limit”. The position Table requires all 
tap positions to be entered whereas the Step/Limit Table requires an initial position, an 
increment and an upper limit. The Step/Limit Table is used for the system of power 
transformers and is shown in Figure 4.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 RSCAD Transformer 1 Tap Changer configuration 
 
All winding currents, magnetizing current and flux computed of the power transformer 
during the simulation can be monitored on the RunTime Operator’s Console  
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4.3.3 Power system load 
The load of the power system circuit can be modelled with the RSCAD load model. The 
load model can be used to dynamically adjust the load to maintain the Real Power (P) & 
Reactive Power (Q) set points. RL, RC or RX type loads can be modelled. RX is selected 
for the power system simulation circuit. The load type will change to RC type if Q is 
negative, if Q is positive, the load is modelled as an RL type load. 
The load can be modelled as parallel (R//X) or series (R−X). The Real and Reactive 
power is set in the P and Q menu. Real and reactive power as well as phase currents 
can be monitored. The load model parameter configuration is shown in Figure 4.6 below  
 
Figure 4.6 RSCAD Load Model parameters 
 
4.4 Instrument transformers 
Current and Voltage or Potential transformers are modelled and used in the power 
system circuit. CTs and VTs are used to transform system current and voltage quantities 
to lower values that can be used by protection and control IEDs. 
 
4.4.1 Current transformers (CTs) 
The primary system current in the power transformer may be several hundreds or 
thousands of amperes. The CT is required to scale or transduce the primary current of 
thousands of amps down to several amperes. Two sets of CTs are modelled for the 
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power system circuit. One set is on the 132kV side of the power transformer with a turns 
ratio of 200/1 and the other set on the 11kV side has a turns ratio of 2000/1. 
The CT secondary current (I sec) is equal to the primary current (I prim) divided by the 
turns ratio (N). Therefore, I sec = I prim / N. The accurate transducing of the primary side 
current to the secondary side circuit occurs within the linear operating region of the CT 
flux−current plane. In this region between the ankle and knee points the core loss and 
magnetizing losses or magnetising branch do not significantly affect the accuracy of the 
CT. When the CT operates close to the knee point, the magnetising branch draws more 
current and an error is introduced. The CT will operate under abnormal operating 
conditions when a fault occurs on the power system and may exceed the saturation knee 
point. 
The model developed for the RTDS is based on a CT equivalent circuit that includes both 
saturation and core loss effects. CT Core characteristic data can be entered as B−H 
characteristic, or V rms−I rms characteristic, or as physical core data. The V rms−I rms 
characteristic is used for the simulation model of current transformers. The configuration 
window is shown below in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7 RSCAD Current Transformer main data 
 
It is possible to enable the reset of the flux during simulation or set the CT at an initial 
remanence condition. The CT secondary side resistance, inductance and turns ratio can 
be entered under the transformer data tab. The Burden series resistance and inductance 
is entered under the Burden tab. 
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4.4.2 Voltage transformers (VTs) 
Potential transformers (PTs) or VTs are modelled in the power system Test-Bench circuit 
on the 11kV bus bar to give an output of 110V that can be used by protection and control 
IEDs. The configuration window for the VT is shown in Figure 4.8 below. 
 
Figure 4.8 RSCAD Voltage Transformer main data 
 
The primary and secondary side resistance, inductance and turns ratio can be entered 
under the transformer data tab. The Burden series resistance and inductance and 
parallel resistance is entered under the Burden tab. 
 
4.5 Running the Simulation in RSCAD Runtime 
RSCAD/RunTime is used to interact with and control the Draft simulation case being 
performed on the RTDS hardware. Set point adjustment, fault application and breaker 
operation are performed through the RunTime Operator’s Console. Online metering and 
recording functions are done in RunTime. 
The method of running the simulation in RSCAD Runtime is shown in Figure 4.9 flow 
chart. The flow chart continues from modelling of the power system in the RSCAD Draft 
software shown in Figure 4.2. Runtime components such as sliders, dials, push buttons 
and meters are used to build the Runtime page. 
The load is changed using active and reactive power sliders. The system configuration 
is changed by controlling circuit breakers to connect the power transformers in parallel. 
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Figure 4.9 RSCAD/Runtime flow diagram  
 
The RunTime Operator Console window of the simulation Case 1 is shown in Figure 
4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10 Runtime circuit of system of parallel power transformers Case 1 
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A part of the system of 5 parallel power transformers, Single Line Diagram (SLD) for 
RunTime Case 1 is shown in Figure 4.11 below. A Circuit Breaker (CB) is indicated in 
the RSCAD/RunTime SLD with a square symbol. The CB symbols are configured to be 
interactive with the status of the CB status. A green square indicates a CB with an open 
status. A red square indicates a CB with a close status. The CB is operated by open and 
close push buttons. 
A fault is applied with a push button. Two positions are simulated, Fault 1 on the 132kV 
side of Transformer 1, and Fault 2 on the 11kV side. The type of fault e.g. phase A to 
ground (Ia-g), can be selected with a dial switch. 
Meters for Megawatt (MVA), Megavar (MVAr) and kilovolt (kV) are monitoring the 
measurement values for the simulation case 1. 
Sliders are used to change the resistive and inductive values of the load. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 RunTime Case 1  
 
4.6 Simulation results 
A Simulation is done to determine how the fault level and fault current will be influenced 
by having power transformers connected in parallel compared to individual connected 
transformers. It is suspected that the fault level will change on the secondary side of the 
transformers as more transformers are connected in parallel. 
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The method of applying faults to the system during the simulation in RSCAD Runtime is 
shown in Figure 4.12 flow chart. The flow chart continues from Figure 4.9 above. Two 
faults are possible according to the fault position. Fault 1 on the 132kV side of 
Transformer 1, and Fault 2 on the 11kV side of the simulated transformer. The type of 
fault e.g. phase A to ground (Ia-g), can be selected with a dial switch for each position. 
Circuit breakers are opened or closed to connect the transformers in parallel. 
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Apply
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No
No
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Close/Open
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Figure 4.12 RSCAD/Runtime Faults 
 
RSCAD/MultiPlot is used for post processing and analysis of results captured and stored 
during a simulation study. Report can be generated by MultiPlot. 
 
4.6.1 Transformer 1 MV Fault Case 1A 
The magnitude of the fault current is measured flowing through Transformer 1 when fault 
is applied at position 2 (Fault 2). A single phase fault on the B-phase, phase to ground, 
is applied on the MV 11kV side of the transformer. 
The magnitude of 7,5kA for IBRK2ABC currents flowing, on the 11kV side of the 
transformer, is shown in Figure 4.13 when a Fault 2 is applied. The bus section 1 circuit 
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breaker is close therefore the other parallel transformers are also sharing the fault 
current. 
 
Figure 4.13 TRFR 1 MV Fault Case 1A 
 
4.6.2 Transformer 1 MV Fault Case 1B 
The magnitude of the fault current is measured flowing through Transformer 1 when fault 
is applied at position 2 (Fault 2). A single phase fault on the B-phase, phase to ground, 
is applied on the MV 11kV side of the transformer. The Bus Section 1 circuit breaker is 
open in this case shown Figure 4.15 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 RunTime Case 1B with BS1 CB open 
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The magnitude of 2,3kA for IBRK2ABC currents flowing, on the 11kV side of the 
transformer, is shown in Figure 4.17 when a Fault 2 is applied. The Bus Section 1 circuit 
breaker is open therefore the other parallel transformers are not sharing the fault current. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 TRFR1 MV Fault Bus Section1 open 
 
4.6.3 Transformer 1 HV Fault Case 1C 
The magnitudes of the fault currents on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) side of the power 
transformer is measured using a current transformer with a ratio of 200/1. 
A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase to ground, is applied on the HV side of the 
transformer shown in Figure 4.16 . 
IBUR1ABC are Current Transformer (CT) secondary currents measured on the HV side.  
The fault current calculates to 4kA with a secondary CT current of 20A.  
A DC offset can be seen on the AC fault current. This results in CT saturation and the 
CT cannot reproduce the secondary current to be in relation with the primary current. 
This can influence the performance of the protection system. 
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Figure 4.16 Transformer 1 HV CT saturation 
 
4.6.4 Transformer 1 vector group Case 1D 
The magnitudes of the fault currents on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) and 11kV Medium 
Voltage (MV) side of the power transformer with a YNd1 vector group is measured to 
determine the effect that the transformer vector group will have on the fault currents when 
a fault is applied on the 11kV bus bar. The Current Transformers (CT) secondary currents 
are measured. 
 A single phase fault on the B-phase, phase to ground, is applied on the MV side of the 
transformer. It can be seen in Figure 4.17 that a phase to ground fault on the Transformer 
MV side appears as a phase to phase fault on the HV side. 
IBUR1ABC are CT secondary currents measured on the HV side. The current 
transformer has a ratio of 200/1. The fault current for phase A calculates to 540A with a 
secondary CT current of 2.7A on for phase B to 460A with a secondary CT current of 
2.3A.  
IBUR2ABC are CT secondary currents measured on the MV side. Ibg2 is the B-phase, 
phase to ground fault, of Fault 2. The current transformer has a ratio of 2000/1. The fault 
current for Phase B calculates to 7,2kA with a secondary CT current of 3,6A, Phase A 
calculates to 4kA with a secondary CT current of 2A. Phase B calculates to 3kA with a 
secondary CT current of 1,5. 
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Figure 4.17 TRFR1 Fault 2 
 
4.6.5 Transformer 1 Switch on Case 1E 
The magnitudes of the currents on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) of the power transformer 
is measured to determine the effect of energisation of the transformer. The phenomenon 
of magnetising inrush is a transient condition that occurs primarily when a transformer is 
energised. The Current Transformers (CT) secondary currents are measured.  
IBUR1ABC are the CT secondary currents measured on the HV side. The current 
transformer has a ratio of 200/1. The energisation current for phase A calculates to 154A 
with a secondary CT current of 0,76. This is less than the full load current of 175A. The 
energisation current is a high non-sinusoidal magnetising current waveform shown in 
Figure 4.18 and is dependent on the core saturation, the point of the wave where the 
switch on occurs as well as the remanent flux.  
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Figure 4.18 Transformer 1 magnetising inrush 
 
4.7 Discussion. 
A system of five 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers connected in parallel is 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the simulation 
Case 1. 
Faults are applied at two positions in the developed system of parallel power 
transformers, to the 132kV High Voltage (HV) side and 11kV Medium Voltage (MV) side. 
The fault currents are measured and analysed. 
The status of bus sections circuit breakers is altered to change the system configuration. 
The fault currents are analysed for the different system configurations in Case 1A and 
1B. The magnitude of the fault current measured changed for the same type of fault that 
was applied at the same position in the modelled system. This has an influence on the 
protection settings that are applied to the transformer protection and needs to be 
considered when a protection system is designed for a power transformer. 
A fault is applied to the modelled system In Case 1 C on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) 
side of the power transformer. The magnitude of the fault current and the secondary 
Current Transformer (CT) currents are measured. CT saturation is shown, and this can 
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influence the performance of the protection system. The use of merging units can 
eradicate this problem. 
A single phase fault on the B-phase, phase to ground, is applied on the MV side of the 
transformer in Case 1D. It is shown that a phase to ground fault on the Transformer MV 
side appears as a phase to phase fault on the HV side. Current distribution of fault 
currents on the HV and MV side of the transformer is influenced by the transformer vector 
group. This need to be understood when a protection system is designed for a power 
transformer. 
The transient condition of magnetising inrush that occurs primarily when a transformer 
is energised is shown in Case 1E. This need to be considered when the transformer 
protection system is designed for parallel power transformers. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the system of five 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers connected 
in parallel is modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS). 
The system configuration is changed by controlling different circuit breakers. The amount 
of power transformers connected in parallel can be controlled in this way. 
Faults are applied at different points in the system and for different system 
configurations. The fault currents are measured and analysed. 
The configuration of the RTDS power source, power transformer, power system load and 
instrument transformers models are shown. 
The simulation results are discussed. 
The protection design for the system of parallel power transformers is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
PROTECTION DESIGN FOR THE SYSTEM OF PARALLEL POWER 
TRANSFORMERS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A Protection scheme for a system of parallel power transformers is designed and 
discussed in the chapter.  
A system of two parallel 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers is designed, 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS)/RSCAD software for 
the simulation Case 2. 
The system has a source connected to the 132kV bus bar. The 11kV bus bar has one 
Bus Section, one 11kV load and one 11kV source is connected to the 11kV bus bar 
section. The RTDS model of simulation Case 2, the system of parallel power 
transformers is shown in Figure 5.1. in a Single Line Diagram (SLD). 
 
BS 1
132/11kV
TRFR 1
TRFR 2
132kV
BB
11kV
BB
Load 1
T1 
CB1
T1 
CB2
T2 
CB1
T2 
CB2
CT1 CT2
F1 F2
Source 1
Source 2
 
Figure 5.1 Single line diagram system of two parallel transformers Case 2 
 
RSCAD/RunTime software is used to control the simulation case being performed on the 
RTDS hardware. Set point adjustment, fault application, breaker operation is performed 
through the RunTime Operator’s Console. 
The simulations in this chapter includes the following case studies: 
• Faults are applied at different locations of the system of two parallel power 
transformers and fault currents are measured. 
• Differential and Overcurrent Protection of Transformer 1 is tested for correct 
operation. 
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• Different setting groups for over current protection for Transformer 1 are use 
depending on how the power transformers are connected in the system. 
• Sampled Value streams are simulated and measured. 
 
Faults are applied to the 132kV high voltage side (F1) and 11kV medium voltage side 
F2) of the system of power transformers and the fault currents are measured and 
analysed. The faults applied at a position F1 is in the protection zone of the transformer. 
The faults applied at a position F2 are out of the protection zone of the transformer. 
Two different setting groups are automatically selected depending on the status of the 
Bus Section (BS) and Transformer circuit breakers. The operation of the transformer 
protection is tested for different system configurations. 
The IEC 61850 9.2LE implementation is used in the RTDS/ Draft simulation circuit to 
transmit SV data streams for 4 current and 4 voltage channels, sampled at a rate of 80 
samples/cycle. 
 
Transformer protection design with Differential and Overcurrent protection is discussed 
in Section 5.2. Differential protection as main protection and Instantaneous Overcurrent 
as backup protection is selected for the transformer protection scheme simulated in Case 
2. 
The configuration of the RTDS Differential and Overcurrent protection relays is discussed 
in section 5.3. The GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RSCAD software provides IEC 
61850−9−2 Sampled Values communications to transmit or receive SV data streams. 
The configuration is also discussed in this section. 
Running the simulations using the RSCAD/RunTime is discussed in section 5.4. 
The results of the simulations are shown in section 5.5 and discussed in section 5.6. 
The conclusions are made in section 5.7. It is shown that power transformer protection 
operates correctly, and settings can be adapted when the system configuration for 
parallel power transformers is changed. 
 
5.2 Transformer protection design 
The size and the importance of a power transformer is considered when the transformer 
protection is described. Protection schemes must have the following properties: 
selectivity, speed and stability (Alstom, 2002: 2–6). 
• Selectivity is obtained by the protection scheme by tripping only those circuit 
breakers to isolate the fault. A unit protection scheme can be selective to trip 
circuit breakers for a fault in the protective zone, for example in the transformer, 
to isolate the transformer from the rest of the system. 
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• The speed or the fault clearing time is important. A short fault clearing time can 
reduce the effects of thermal stress and electromechanical forces, in a 
transformer, due to a fault. 
• Stability can also be obtained with unit protection schemes. The scheme remains 
stable and do not trip for faults external to the protected zone. The transformer 
unit protection must not trip for faults outside the protective zone. 
The main objectives of transformer protection to provide selectivity, speed and stability 
can be realised by using transformer differential protection (Blackburn & Domin, 2006: 
319). 
The following are categories of transformer faults according to (Alstom, 2002: 16–1): 
• winding and terminal faults 
• core faults 
• tank and transformer accessory faults 
• on–load tap changer faults 
• abnormal operating conditions 
• sustained or uncleared external faults 
Transformer Differential protection can protect the transformers against most of the 
winding and core fault mentioned above.  
Over current protection can effective protect the transformer primary winding against 
phase to phase and phase to earth faults.  
The following types of protection are selected for the Transformer 1 protection scheme: 
• Differential protection is selected for the main protection. 
• Over current protection is selected for the back-up protection. 
 
5.2.1 Main Protection 
The differential protection function compares the primary and secondary currents flowing 
in and out of a power transformer. 
The basic operation of the Differential protection function is as follows. The vector sum 
of the phase currents flowing into the transformer (ICT1) is equal to the vector sum of the 
phase currents flowing out of the transformer (ICT2). The protective zone is between CT1 
and CT2 shown below in Figure 5.2.  
Under normal operation the magnitude of ICT1 equals ICT2. 
 
ICT1 = ICT2    ( 5-1 ) 
 
A small differential current will be present in normal operating conditions or for a fault out 
of the protective zone, at position (F2). It is described by Equation (5-2). 
IDIFF = ICT1 - ICT2    ( 5-2 ) 
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A larger differential current will however be present for a transformer internal fault, in the 
protective or differential zone, at position (F1).  
132/11kV
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CT1 CT2
F1 F2
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Figure 5.2 Transformer Differential protection 
 
Some factors can influence the differential current measured during normal load 
conditions: different taps for voltage control, Magnetising inrush during initial 
energisation and occurrence of over fluxing(Alstom, 2002: 16–7). 
Phase shift correction is required where there is a 30-degree phase shift between the 
primary and secondary side currents of a transformer with star-delta connected windings 
and YNd1 vector group. Star connected windings can pass zero sequence currents to 
faults external to the differential zone, this can operate the differential protection for faults 
out of the protected zone. Zero sequence current filters are required for star connected 
windings. The phase shift correction, zero sequence current filtering and CT ratio 
mismatch correction is done in the software of the digital differential protection IEDs.  
An adaptive protection criterion is proposed in research, which can change the 
percentage differential relay parameters according to the transformer operating 
conditions. The use of negative and zero sequence currents is proposed as a criterion 
(Zhang et al., 2013: 61).  
 
The sensitivity of Differential protection is related to issues with mismatched CTs, CT 
saturation, lead resistance and tap settings. An adaptive differential protection algorithm 
can be investigated by including the transformer winding tap-position information 
available at process level, into the protection IED algorithm. 
The shorter distance from the MU to the instrument transformer decrease the influence 
of the sum of factors such as mismatched CTs, CT saturation, lead resistance on the 
biased low impedance percentage differential protection. 
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5.2.2 Back-up protection 
Over Current (O/C) protection can be used to protect against overloading, high trough 
faults, primary side bushing faults and faults on the primary winding.  
A high-set instantaneous overcurrent relay element is selected as backup protection and 
used to trip for primary side short circuits. This can be measured with the CT1 shown in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 Transformer Over Current protection 
 
 An O/C protection function on the primary side (CT1) of a transformer is not effective for 
faults on the secondary winding due to the low magnitude of fault current transferred to 
the primary side.  
Timed delayed overcurrent protection chosen to discriminate with protection on the 
secondary side of the transformer will increase the trip time to disconnect the faulted 
equipment from the power system and therefore not selected as backup protection.  
The O/C protection can be supplemented with an Earth Fault (E/F) element. The E/F 
element can be connected in the residual circuit of the three phase CTs or on the neutral 
conductor of a star connected winding. 
 
5.2.3 System parameters 
The system of parallel power transformers and the parameters used for building the 
RTDS power system simulation circuit are discussed in this section.  
The network of the system in Figure 5.1 has a source (Source 1) connected to the 132kV 
bus bar, representing the rest of the power system that the substation is connected to. 
The source connected to the 11kV busbar (Source 2) represents the total 11kV 
generation. The load (Load 1) represents the total load connected to the 11kV busbar.  
 
The power transformer parameters considered for Transformer 1 in the system model 
are shown in Table 5-1 below. 
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Table 5-1 Transformer parameters 
Transformer power rating  40 MVA 
Rated Primary voltage rating 132kV 
Rated Secondary voltage rating 11kV 
Vector group YNd1 
Impedance 10% 
 
The current transformer ratios are selected by considering the rated power of the 
transformer.  
The following formula is used. 
Irms = S/(√3 xVrms)    ( 5-3 ) 
 
Where: 
Irms  = the root-mean-square current (A) 
S   = Apparent power (VA) 
Vrms  = the root-mean-square voltage (V) 
 
The calculated full load rated current at the 132kV and 11kV sides of the transformer is 
shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Current calculated for a 40MVA transformer 
kV kA 
132 0,175 
11 2,099 
 
A current transformer ratio of 200/1 is selected on the primary 132kV side and 2000/1 on 
the secondary 11kV side of the power transformer. 
 
5.2.3.1 Circuit impedance values 
The short circuit capacity and the fault level on the High Voltage (HV) 132kV busbar is 
depended on the source short circuit impedance. The fault level on the Medium Voltage 
(MV) 11kV busbar is determined by the short circuit impedance on the HV side of the 
transformer added to the transformer impedance.  
When a source is connected to the 11kV busbar, the source short circuit impedance 
contributes to the fault level. The real and reactive power of a load also has an influence 
on the fault levels. 
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Different units related to the system impedance are used for building the power system 
model. This is shown in Table 5-3 below. 
 
Table 5-3 Power system model parameters 
Power system model Input Parameters related to impedance 
Source Positive and Zero sequence impedance 
Power transformer Per unit leakage inductance 
Load Real and Reactive power 
 
The following formula is used to calculate impedance from apparent power and voltage 
values. 
 
Z = V 2/ S    ( 5-4 ) 
 
Where: 
Z  = Impedance in ohm (Ω) 
S  = Apparent power (VA) 
V  = Nominal voltage (V) 
 
The current can be calculated by: 
I = V / (1.732* Z  )   ( 5-5 ) 
or 
I = S / (1.732* V  )   ( 5-6 ) 
 
Equation 5-4 can also be used to calculate the short circuit impedance (ZSC) from the 
short circuit fault level (SSC ) and nominal busbar voltage (V). 
 
A fault level of 300MVA is used for Source 1 at the 132kV busbar: 
ZSC = 132 2/ 300 
= 58 ohm 
 
A fault level of 200MVA for Source 2 at the 11kV busbar will have a fault impedance of: 
ZSC = 11 2/ 200 
= 0,605 ohm 
 
The impedance values and fault current values in kA is compared for Source 1 and 2 in 
Table 5-4 below. 
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Table 5-4 Source fault impedance and current 
 MVA kV Impedance (ohm) kA 
Source 1 300 132 58  1,312 
Source 2 200 11 0,605 10,497 
 
Equation 5-4 can also be used to calculate the transformer impedance (Z) from the 
transformer rated power (S) and nominal busbar voltage (V). 
 
A 40MVA transformer at a 132kV base voltage with a 10% impedance: 
Z = 132 2/ 40*10/100 
= 43,56 ohm 
 
A 40MVA transformer at a 11kV base voltage with a 10% impedance: 
Z = 11 2/ 40*10/100 
= 0,3025 ohm 
 
The transformer impedance values for the 132kV primary and 11kV secondary sides are 
shown in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5 Transformer impedances 
40MVA 132/11kV Transformer 
kV Impedance (ohm) 
132 43,56  
11 0,3025 
 
The most important types of faults are: 
• single-phase to earth 
• phase to phase 
• phase-phase-earth 
• three-phase (with or without earth) 
The magnitude of the fault current is limited by the Thévenin equivalent impedance of 
the network. The number of transformers connected in parallel, the load and the sources 
connected to the network will therefore have an impact on the fault current values.  
 
5.3 Configuration of RTDS protection relay models 
Transformer Protection models are added to the RTDS power system simulation circuit. 
The Differential (DIFF) and Over Current (O/C) protection models are shown in Figure 
5.4. The Circuit Breaker and fault controls are included in the circuit for the simulation 
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and testing of the transformer DIFF and O/C protection functions when applying faults in 
and out of the protective zone. 
 
Figure 5.4 RTDS Differential and Over Current protection relay models 
 
5.3.1 Differential protection relay 
The fundamental phase currents are fed into the inputs of the differential (87) function. 
It is possible to compensate for ratio mismatch and phase shifts in the 87 function. The 
operating quantity and restraining quantity are calculated for each phase and applied to 
the 2-slope differential current characteristic shown in Figure 5.5. The operating current 
quantity must be above the restraint current and the minimum operating value (IO-min) 
setting for the relay to operate and issue a trip output. 
 
The basic operation of the RTDS Differential protection function is as follows (Proctor, 
2016). The operating quantity is the vector sum of the phase currents. 
IOP = ICT1−ICT2    ( 5-7 ) 
 
The operating current Iop is the vector sum of CT1 on the primary side of the transformer 
and CT2 on the secondary side of the transformer. Under normal operation the 
magnitude of ICT1 equals ICT2, but the phases are 180 degrees apart. 
 
The restraint quantity is calculated using the summation of current magnitudes of every 
connected CT divided by 2. 
IRS = (ICT1 + ICT2)/2  ( 5-8 ) 
 
DIFF 
O/C 
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The amount of restraint current determines the amount of operating current required to 
operate. The operating quantity must be above the minimum operating value setting or 
the relay will not operate. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 RTDS Two slope percentage transformer differential algorithm 
 
The operating current required to operate when it is above the restraint current (IRSMIN) 
will increase using slope 1 (IRSMIN = IOMIN * 1.0 ∕ Slope1). 
When the restraint current increases above the slope1\slope2 breakpoint (IRs), the 
restraint current (IORS) will be calculated using slope 2. (IORS = IRS * 1.0 ∕ Slope2). The 
operating current necessary to operate the relay does not increase above the restraint 
current high set breakpoint setting (HiSet). 
The transformer protection element uses an additional measurement of 2nd harmonic 
over fundamental to prevent mis operation during transformer energization. 
 
5.3.1.1 Differential function considered for changing loads  
The operate and restrain currents calculated for different MVA values are shown in Table 
5-6 below. Current transformer ratios of 200/1 are used on the HV (132kV) side and 
2000/1 on the MV (11kV) side. 
 
Where for Transformer 1: 
IHV = the primary HV current. 
I CT1 = the secondary HV CT1 current 
IMV = the primary MV current. 
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I CT2 = the secondary MV CT2 current 
I OP = Differential operating current 
I RS = Differential restraining current 
 
It is shown below that the operating as well as the restrain current increases as the load 
current is increased. The restrain current stays above the operate current and therefore 
the differential relay will not issue a trip signal. 
Table 5-6 Differential function Operate & Restrain current for load conditions 
MVA 
Load 
I HV I CT1  I MV I CT2 I OP I RS 
10 43.74 0.2186997 524.88 0.26243964 0.0437 0.241 
20 87.48 0.4373994 1049.76 0.52487928 0.0875 0.481 
40 174.96 0.8747988 2099.52 1.04975856 0.175 0.962 
 
5.3.1.2 Differential function considered for transformer tap changers  
An on−load tap changer function is available in the RTDS/RSCAD transformer models. 
A voltage regulating function controls the tap changer. The number of turns for a winding 
is changed with different tap positions. This changes the turns ratio between the 
transformer primary and secondary windings and results in a variance in load current. 
This influences on the differential current measured. 
The following three cases shown in Table 5-7 are considered where the ratio between 
the primary and secondary windings changes. The operating as well as the restrain 
current increases as the tap positions is changed. The restrain current stays above the 
operate current and therefore the differential relay will not issue a trip signal. 
Table 5-7 Differential Operate & Restrain current for different tap positions 
Case 
MVA 
Load 
I HV I CT1 I MV I CT2 I OP I RS 
Tap 
ratio 
1 40 174.96 0.875 2210.02 1.105 0.2302 0.990 0.95 
2 40 174.96 0.875 2099.52 1.050 0.175 0.962 1 
3 40 174.96 0.875 1999.54 1.000 0.125 0.937 1.05 
 
 
5.3.1.3 Differential function considered for different fault currents  
The operate and restrain currents calculated for different fault values are shown in Table 
5-8 below. Fault 1 is for a case where no source is on the MV side and the fault current 
is from the HV side only. Fault 2 is for a case where a source is connected to the MV 
side and the fault current is flowing from both the HV and MV side. 
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It is shown below that the operating increases well above the restrain current for both 
faults. The differential relay will issue a trip signal if the operating current is above the 
minimum operating setting. 
Fault 3 is for a case where CT1 saturates and the secondary output does not correspond 
to the primary current. The relay calculates an operating current above the restrain 
current and will issue a trip. 
 
Table 5-8 Differential function Operate & Restrain current for fault conditions 
Fault  I HV I CT1  I MV I CT2 I OP I RS 
 1 1000.00 5 0.00 0 5 2.500 
 2 1000.00 5 -2000.00 -0.952 5.952 2.024 
 3 875.00 0.5 10000.00 4.761 4.262 2.631 
 
The differential relay is required to be stable for a through fault condition and not issue a 
trip signal. This is for a case where the fault is out of the protection zone on the 11kV 
side of the transformer. This fault can be at the load or at the busbar. The following Table 
5-9 shows the operating as well as the restrain current increases as the fault level 
(MVASC) is increased. The restrain current stays above the operate current and therefore 
the differential relay will not issue a trip signal. 
 
Table 5-9 Differential function Operate & Restrain current for fault levels 
MVA 
SC 
I HV I CT1  I MV I CT2 I OP I RS 
50 218.70 1.093 2624.40 1.3122 0.219 1.203 
100 437.40 2.187 5248.79 2.6244 0.437 2.406 
200 874.80 4.374 10497.59 5.2488 0.875 4.811 
 
 
5.3.1.4 Differential relay configuration  
The transformer winding voltage and connection are configured in the system 
configuration tab of the RTDS/RSCAD 87 protection function. A two winding 132/11kV 
YD transformer with the delta winding lagging the star winding is configured in Figure 5.6  
5-13 
 
Figure 5.6 RTDS Transformer differential protection relay configuration 
 
The CT turns ratios is entered in the tabs for CT parameters. A ratio of 200/1 is used on 
the 132kV winding 1 and 2000/1 is used for the 11kV winding 2. 
 
• The minimum operating current setting. 
A low setting makes the differential relay sensitive for low fault currents. It should be high 
enough for the relay not to operate for normal conditions. 
It was calculated previously that the value of the operating current was 0.175 Amp for a 
40MVA load through the transformer. The minimum operating current is needed 
therefore to be above 0.175 for the differential relay not to trip under load conditions. A 
setting of 0.2 can be used to allow for a 10% overload on the transformer. Provision also 
needs to be made for current transformer measuring errors.  
It was calculated that the operating current will increase to 0.23 amp for the condition 
where the maximum current is reached for a tap position where the transformer turns 
ratio is the lowest.  The minimum operating current setting can be increased to make 
provision for this condition. 
The relay lowest setting for minimum operating current is 0.25. 
 
• The Slope 1 setting 
The slope 1 setting can be used for the case where the currents flowing through the 
transformer are higher than the normal operating conditions, but the differential relay 
should not operate. The operating current required, for the differential relay to operate, 
when it is above the restraint current will increase using slope 1. The restrain current is 
therefore increased by the relay against the slope setting, as the current through the 
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transformer is increasing. This slope 1 setting can be used to prevent a trip for the 
condition described in 5.3.1.2 to make provision for tap changers. The slope 1 setting is 
also used to for a condition described in 5.3.1.3 for through fault conditions where the 
fault is outside the protection zone. The setting range for slope 1 is between 5 and 50%.  
This principle is shown in Figure 5.7 below. When the retrain current is larger than 1 amp 
the operating current to operate the relay increases from the 0,3 A against the slope 
setting. 
I operate
I restrain
I min
0.3A
Operation 
Zone
Non 
opeariton 
zone
Ires
1,0A
 
Figure 5.7 Differential function Slope 1algoritim 
 
• The Slope 2 setting 
Slope 2 is available as part of the differential algorithm to increase the restrain current 
even further. The operating current required for the relay to operate when it is above the 
restraint current will increase using slope 2 shown above in Figure 5.5. The slope 2 
setting can be used for the case where the currents flowing through the transformer is 
much higher than the normal operating conditions, but the differential relay should not 
operate. Current transformers may saturate when high through faults flow through the 
transformers, but the fault is out of the protection zone. The operating current calculated 
may be above the restrain current calculated, but the relay should not operate for this 
condition. The restrain current can be further increased by slope 2 for higher restrain 
currents. 
 
The settings for the 2-slope percentage differential protection function are entered in the 
87 Transformer element tab shown in Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.8 RTDS Transformer differential (87) protection element settings 
 
5.3.2 Over current protection function 
The RTDS Over Current (O/C) protection function includes instantaneous phase (50P), 
instantaneous neutral (50N), time delayed phase (51P) and time delay neutral (51N) 
elements. The time delayed protection that operates against a curve where the tripping 
time depends on the magnitude of the fault current is not used as part of the design.  It 
is slower because it is required to use time grading with other over current protection 
downstream. 
Only the instantaneous 50P elements are configured to provide back-up protection. The 
operation starts as soon as the pickup current is reached. The definite current 
characteristic is shown in Figure 5.9. This is very fast protection to limit the damage in 
the transformer during short circuit currents. The grading with other downstream over 
current protection is done by using the different fault level as a result of different 
impedance values in the system.  
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Figure 5.9 Definite -current characteristic of overcurrent relays 
 
The over current is measured on the 132kV side of the transformer in Figure 5.3. The 
fault level at Fault 1 will be higher compared to this for Fault 2 due to the transformer 
impedance that is added to the source impedance. The relay can be set to only operate 
for faults at Fault 1 position.  The configuration of the over current elements is shown in 
Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10  RTDS instantaneous phase elements configuration 
 
The magnitudes of the fault currents measured on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) of the 
power transformer with a YNd1 vector group is for a fault applied on the MV (11kV) side. 
The Current Transformers (CT) with a ratio of 200/1 is used and secondary currents are 
measured. 
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 A single phase fault on the B-phase, phase to ground, is applied on the MV busbar. It 
can be seen in Figure 5.11 that a phase to ground fault on the Transformer MV side 
appears as a phase to phase fault on the HV side. 
IBUR1ABC are A, B and C phase CT secondary currents measured on the HV side. The 
fault current for phase B is measured.  
The fault is applied for the two cases where the Bus section circuit breaker is close, 
Figure 5.11 and open Figure 5.12. 
  
 
Figure 5.11 MV Fault case with Bus Section closed 
 
Figure 5.12 MV Fault case with Bus Section open 
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The over current instantaneous element must not issue a trip for these fault currents 
because the fault location is on the MV busbar. 
 
The values for the fault and load currents changed for the two conditions where the Bus 
Section circuit breaker is in the closed and open positions. This is shown in Table 5-10.  
Table 5-10 Currents for two cases of bus section open and closed 
Fault current (A) Load current (A) Bus Section CB status 
0,55 0,3 Closed 
0,9 0,6 Open 
 
Provision is made in the configuration for 2 setting groups for the overcurrent elements, 
which allows the function to switch to a new setting group via a control component. 
The start value pickup setting (StrVal50P1) was set to 1,0 Amp for setting group 1. The 
StrVal50P2 was set to 0,7 Amp for setting group 2. The pickup setting for the 
instantaneous overcurrent element of setting group 2 is shown below in Figure 5.13 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Setting group 2, start value pickup setting for the 50P element  
 
5.3.3 Setting group selection 
Power transformers will share the load when two transformers are connected in parallel. 
Considerer the Single Line Diagram of two parallel transformers in Figure 5.1. for the 
following two conditions as described in Table 5-11: 
  
5-19 
 
Table 5-11 System configuration changed for parallel transformers 
Condition  Initial status Changed status  
Condition 1 TRFR1 & 2 in parallel TRFR 2 taken out of operation 
Condition 2 TRFR1 & 2 in parallel TRFR1 & 2 not in parallel, 
BS1 breaker opened 
 
Condition 1, the load current through Transformer 1 (TRFR1) will double when the circuit 
breakers of Transformer 2 (TRFR2), T2 CB1 & CB2 is opened or tripped. The protection 
of Transformer 1 (TRFR1) should be stable and not operate for this condition. 
 
Condition 2, when the Bus Section 1 circuit breaker (BS1) is opened the fault level will 
change because the equivalent system impedance will change. This change is due to 
the impedances connected in parallel and series will be connected in a different way. 
Settings of protection relays is done using fault level values. 
 
The settings of the protection for the transformer can be done using the worst case 
scenario or by having different setting groups. The advantage of different setting groups 
is that the protection settings can be set more sensitive. 
 
The system configuration changes when the Bus Section 1 (BS1) circuit breaker or the 
Transformer 2 (TRFR2) circuit breaker is opened. The Setting group for the protection 
function is controlled with a logic diagram. Setting Group 1 is used if any of the TRFR2 
11kV MV circuit breaker and the BS1 circuit breaker is opened. Setting Group 2 is used 
if both the TRFR2 11kV MV circuit breaker and the BS1 circuit breaker are closed. The 
setting group logic is shown below in Figure 5.14. BRKBS1 is the closed status of the 
bus section circuit breaker, BRK2 is the close status of the Transformer 2 11kV circuit 
breaker. SGR is a word bit control component input into the relay which allows the relay 
to switch to a new setting group. An integer value of 1 on the input will activate setting 
group 1, an integer value of 2 will activate setting group 2. 
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Figure 5.14 Setting group selection logic diagram 
 
5.3.4 Sampled Values 
The GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RSCAD software provides IEC 61850−9−2 
Sampled Values communications to transmit or receive SV data streams. The 
GTNET_SV9−2 component has 2 configurations, the first is the 9.2LE implementation 
and the other is based on IEC 61869−9 Standard for SV merging units. The configuration 
window is shown below in Figure 5.15. 
With the 9.2LE configuration up to two SV data streams for 4 current and 4 voltage 
channels at a rate of 80 samples/cycle, or one stream at 256 samples/cycle can be 
transmitted.  
The GTNET_SV9−2 component can be configured to receive SV data from one Merging 
Unit for 4 currents and 4 voltages at either 80 or 256 samples/cycle. The voltage and 
current inputs to the GTNET−SV9−2_v5 component cannot be individually enabled or 
disabled. When a channel is not required, the input should be set to a value of “0” by 
using a constant. 
The GTNET_SV9−2 component requires a synchronised time source to synchronize the 
SV timestamps to an external 1PPS (pulse−per−second) signal. The time signal is 
provided by the RTDS GTSYNC synchronization card. 
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Figure 5.15 RTDS GTNET SV9-2 Configuration 
 
The 9.2LE implementation used in the Draft simulation circuit to transmit and receive SV 
data streams is shown below in Figure 5.16. GTNET-SV1 is transmitting SV data and 
GTNET-SV is receiving SV data. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 GTNET-SV Components 
 
The sampled value output configuration for configuring the SV data to be transmitted on 
the Ethernet network is shown in Figure 5.17. The configuration is used to create the 
attribute Logical Device name (LDName). The VLAN priority and VLANID, multicast 
address can be configured. 
Transmit 
Receive 
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Figure 5.17 GTNET SV9-2 OUTPUT Configuration 
 
The LDName is configured by adding a user configurable prefix and suffix to the string 
“ppppMUss01” where “pppp” is the parameter “LDpre” and “ss” the parameter “LDsuf”. 
RTDS was set for the LDName. Two SV streams can be configured. Prefix. 01 was set 
for parameter “LDsuf” for the first stream and 02 for the second stream. The string MU 
and 01/02 are fixed and cannot be changed by the user. The value 01 is used for 80 
samples/cycle and 02 is used for 256 samples/cycle. The complete LNName configured 
is RTDSMU0101 for the first SV data stream and RTDSMU0201 for the second stream. 
The sample sync field is configured to be included in the message. 
The output scaling needs to be configured as well. A scaling factor for the voltage and 
current channels is configured for kV and kA unit. 
 
5.4 Running the Simulation in RSCAD Runtime 
A system of two parallel power transformers, Single Line Diagram (SLD) for RunTime 
Case 2 is shown in Figure 5.18 below. A Circuit Breaker (CB) is indicated in the 
RSCAD/RunTime SLD with an interactive square symbol. A green square indicates a CB 
with an open status. A red square indicates a CB with a close status. The CB is operated 
by open and close push buttons. 
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A fault is applied with a push button. Two positions are simulated, Fault 1 on the 132kV 
side of Transformer 1(TRFR1), and Fault 2 on the 11kV side. The type of fault e.g. phase 
A to ground (Ia-g), can be selected with a dial switch. 
Meters for megawatt (MVA) and kiloamp (kA) are monitoring the measurement values 
for the simulation Case 2. 
Sliders are used to change the resistive and inductive values of the load. 
 
Figure 5.18 RTDS/RunTime SLD window for Case 2 
 
The RTDS/RunTime current measurements for Transformer 1 is with a load of 21,11 MW  
connected to the system is shown in Figure 5.19. Only Transformer 1 is connected to 
supply the load. 
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Figure 5.19 RTDS/RunTime Transformer 1 Measurements for Case 2 
 
5.5 Simulation results 
A Simulation is done to determine if the designed protection scheme operates correctly. 
Protection settings are adapted for different system configurations. 
The following simulations are done: 
• The RTDS/RSCAD software differential protection (87) function is tested, 
•  The RTDS/RSCAD software differential protection (87) and instantaneous phase 
over current (50P) functions are tested together, 
• The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current Transformer (CT) 
is compared with the digital Sampled Value (SV) produced by the RTDS. 
 
The following simulations will be done for Simulation Case 2, Table 5-12: 
Table 5-12 Simulation Case 2 
Case 2A   
Aim Test Differential protection (87) relay 
Method 1) Apply faults at positions in the protection zone (FLT1) and out of 
the protection zone (FLT2). 
2) Disconnect TRFR 2 from the parallel system.  
Expected 
result 
1) The 87 Protection relay issues trip for faults in the protective 
zone, stays stable for faults out of the protective zone. 
2) The load current through TRFR 1 increases, 87 protection stays 
stable and does not issue trip when TRFR 2 is disconnected from 
the system. 
Case 2B  
Aim Test Differential protection (87) relay  
and Instantaneous Over Current (50P) relay together 
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Method 1) Apply faults (FLT2) out of the protection zone with Bus Section 
closed 
2) Apply faults (FLT2) out of the protection zone with Bus Section 
opened 
3) Apply faults (FLT1) in the differential and over current protection 
zone. 
Expected 
Result 
Show that: 
1) Different protection settings can be used for different system 
configurations. 
2) Scheme with 87 and 50P protection operates correctly for fault 
in the protection zone. 
Case 2C  
Aim Test the IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values (SV) produced by the 
GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RSCAD software  
Method 1) The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current 
Transformer (CT) is measured. 
2) The digital Sampled Value (SV) message produced by the RTDS 
is measured. 
3) The magnitude of the fault current is measured flowing through 
Transformer 1 (TRFR 1) when a fault is applied at the position 2 
(Fault 2). 
Expected 
Result 
The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current 
Transformer (CT) compares with the digital Sampled Value (SV) 
produced by the RTDS. 
 
The flow chart of testing the 87 function is shown in Figure 5.20. The position of Fault 1 
(FLT1) is inside the protective zone. The protection must issue a trip signal for a fault at 
position 1 (FLT 1) on the 132kV HV side of TRFR1. 
The position of Fault 2 (FLT2) is outside the protective zone. The protection must not 
issue a trip signal for a fault at position 2 (FLT 2) on the 11kV MV side of TRFR1. 
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Figure 5.20 Testing flow chart of RTDS 87 function 
 
5.5.1 Transformer 1 Differential Protection Case 2A 
The RTDS differential protection (87) function of the simulated Case 2 is tested in Case 
2A. The RTDS/RunTime single line diagram (SLD) is shown in Figure 5.21 below. The 
Transformer 1, HV and MV currents, are measured by the Differential (87) function when 
faults are applied at different positions.  
Three simulations are done for the following cases: 
• The first simulation is for a case where a fault (FLT1) is applied in the protective 
zone of Transformer 1 
• The second simulation is for the case where a fault (FLT2) is applied out of the 
protective zone of Transformer 1 
• The third simulation is for a case when initially the two transformers are in parallel 
connected and Transformer 2 is disconnected from the system. 
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Figure 5.21 RTDS/Runtime SLD for Case 2A 
 
5.5.1.1 Simulation case for a fault in the protective zone  
A fault is applied at position 1 (FLT1) in the protection zone of the Differential protection. 
The following A-Phase currents are indicated on the plot for the 87 function shown in 
Figure 5.22 :. 
• Transformer 1 A Phase Operating (T1AOP),  
• Transformer 1 A Phase Restrain (T1ARS), 
•  Transformer 1 Minimum Operating current (IOMINT). 
The closed status of the circuit breakers for the parallel transformers is also shown. BRK1 
is the HV circuit breaker for Transformer 1, T2BKR1 is the HV circuit breaker for 
Transformer 2. This indicates the two transformers are connected in parallel. 
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Figure 5.22 TRFR1 87 Fault 1 Case 2A 
 
The operating quantity must be above the restraint current and minimum operating value 
(IOMIN) setting for the 87 protection function to operate and issue a trip signal.  
The Fault position is in the protection zone and the current flowing into the differential 
zone is more than the current flowing out. It is shown in this simulation case that 
operating quantity is more than the restrain quantity for a fault in the protection zone. 
 
5.5.1.2 Simulation case for a fault out of the protective zone  
In Figure 5.23 below, the Fault 2 is applied outside the protective zone. The fault currents 
flowing into and out of the protective zone are the same and the restrain quantity 
increases as the fault current increases. The operating current is above the minimum 
operating setting but below the restraining quantity and the 87 Function will not issue a 
trip signal. 
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Figure 5.23 TRFR1 87 Fault 2 Case 2A 
 
5.5.1.3 Simulation case for a change in load current  
Transformer 1 and 2 are connected in parallel for the next simulation. The HV Breaker 
for Transformer 2 is opened. The load current will increase through Transformer 1 from 
sharing half of the load to supply the full load. The 87 protection function must not operate 
for this condition.  
The simulation result is shown in Figure 5.24 below. The load currents flowing into and 
out of the protective zone are the same and the restrain quantity increases as the load 
current increases. The operating current is below the minimum operating setting and 
below the restraining quantity and the 87 function will not issue a trip signal. 
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Figure 5.24 TRFR1 & 2 Parallel 
 
5.5.2 Transformer 1 Differential and Over Current Protection Case 2B 
The RTDS differential protection (87) and instantaneous phase over current (50P) 
functions of the simulated Case 2 is tested in Case 2B. The RTDS/RunTime single line 
diagram (SLD) is shown in Figure 5.25 below. The Transformer 1, HV and MV fault 
currents, are measured by the 87 and 50P functions. 
Simulations are done for the following cases: 
• Position 1 (Fault 1) is on the 132kV HV side of TRFR1 inside the protective zone. 
• Position 2 (Fault 2) is on the 11kV MV side of TRFR1 outside the protective zone. 
• Transformer 1 and 2 are connected in parallel. The system configuration is 
changed when the Bus Section 1 circuit breaker is opened and closed. 
 
The magnitudes of the fault currents on the 132kV High Voltage (HV) side of the power 
transformer is measured using a current transformer with a ratio of 200/1. 
Output 1 is a trip signal issued by the 87 protection function. Output 2 is a trip signal 
issued by the 50P function. 
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Figure 5.25 RTDS/Runtime SLD for Case 2B 
 
5.5.2.1 Protection on-off logic  
A Protection on-off logic is built in the RTDS/Draft and is shown below in Figure 5.26. 
This is to enable the measurement of the fault currents for a longer period. The protection 
is switched off and will not issue a trip to open the breaker that interrupts the fault.  
The protection can be switched on (SWPROTON) to enable the issue of a trip signal. 
The trip signal will be blocked if the switch is off. OUT1 is a trip signal issued by the 
differential protection relay. OUT2 is a trip signal issued by the over current protection 
relay. TRIP is the output that trips the transformer circuit breakers. The TRIP can be 
reset by a push button. 
 
Figure 5.26 Protection switch logic to block protection functions issuing a trip 
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5.5.2.2 Simulation case for a fault out the protection zone, Bus Section Closed 
A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase to ground fault, is applied at fault position 2 
(ApplyGrFlt2) with Transformers 1 and 2 connected in parallel and the Bus Section 1 
closed. The resulted fault current is shown below in Figure 5.27. IBUR1A, B and C are 
Current Transformer (CT) secondary currents measured on the Transformer 1 HV side. 
None of the 87 and 50P protection relays issue a trip signal because the fault is out of 
the protective zone. The protection is switched off (SWPROTON) to deactivate the issue 
of a trip signal. 
 
Figure 5.27 Fault currents for the case of TRFR1, BS1 Closed, Fault2 
 
5.5.2.3 Simulation case for a fault out the protective zone, Bus Section open 
A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase to ground fault, is applied at fault position 2 
(ApplyGrFlt2) with Transformers 1 and 2 connected in parallel and the Bus Section 1 
open. The resulted fault current is shown below in Figure 5.28. IBUR1ABC are Current 
Transformer (CT) secondary currents measured on the Transformer 1 HV side.  
The magnitude of the fault currents is different for the different system configurations 
when the bus section circuit breaker is opened and closed with the same fault applied. 
Different settings are applied for the protection function when the system configuration 
changes. 
None of the 87 and 50P protection relays issue a trip signal because the fault is out of 
the protective zone. 
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The protection is switched off (SWPROTON) to deactivate the issue of a trip signal. 
 
Figure 5.28 Fault currents for the case TRFR1, BS1 Opened, Fault2 
 
5.5.2.4 Simulation case for a fault in the Differential & Over Current protective zone 
A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase to ground, is applied at fault position 1 
(ApplyGrFlt1) on the HV side of the transformer shown in Figure 5.29. 
 
 
Figure 5.29 Fault current for the case TRFR1 with 87 & 50P functions, Fault 1 
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IBUR1A, B and C are Current Transformer (CT) secondary currents measured on the 
HV side. The protection is not switched on and the trip output is blocked to operate the 
Transformer 1 HV & MV circuit breakers. It is shown that the 50P function trip (OUT2) is 
faster than the 87 function trip (OUT1). 
 
5.5.2.5 Simulation case for a fault in the Differential & Over Current protective zone 
with protection switched on 
A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase to ground, is applied on the HV side of the 
transformer with the Protection switched on (SWPROTON) in Figure 5.30. The 50P 
function issue a trip before the 87 function for an in zone fault at fault postion1 
(ApplyGrFlt1). The trip output from the protection scheme operates the Transformer 1 
circuit breakers to clear the fault. 
 
Figure 5.30 Fault currents for the case of TRFR1 with 87 & 50P functions, Fault 1, Protection on 
 
5.5.3 Transformer 1 Sampled Value and Current Transformer Case 2C 
The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current Transformer (CT) is 
compared with the digital Sampled Value (SV) produced by the RTDS in Case 2. 
The SV current is sampled at 80 sampled per cycle according to IEC 61850-9-2 standard. 
The magnitude of the fault current is measured flowing through Transformer 1 (TRFR 1) 
when fault is applied at position 2 (Fault 2). A single phase fault on the A-phase, phase 
to ground, is applied on the MV 11kV side of the transformer. 
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The current IBUR2A is the A-Phase secondary side output current from the MV Side 
TRFR1 current transformer. SVIA is the A-Phase digitised Sampled Value (SV) current 
value for current for the MV side TRFR1 current. The MV side currents of the transformer 
1, is shown in Figure 5.31 when a Fault 2 is applied, the analogue CT current is compared 
to the digitised SV current. 
 
Figure 5.31 TRFR 1 Fault, CT compared with SV 
 
5.6 Discussion 
A Protection scheme for a system of parallel 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers 
is designed, modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the 
simulation Case 2. 
Differential protection as main protection and instantaneous overcurrent as backup 
protection is used for the transformer protection scheme. 
The following results are obtained and shown in Table 5-13.  
Table 5-13 Results for Simulation Case 2 
Case 2A   
Aim Test Differential protection (87) relay 
Method 1) Apply faults for cases of fault positions in the protection zone 
(FLT1), and out of the protection zone (FLT2), 
2) Disconnect TRFR 2 from parallel system.  
Results 1) The 87 Protection relay issues a trip correctly for faults in the 
protective zone, stays stable for faults out of the protective zone. 
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2) The 87 protection stays stable and does not issue trip when 
TRFR 2 is disconnected from the system. 
  
Case 2B  
Aim Test Differential protection (87) relay  
and Instantaneous Over Current (50P) relay together 
Results Show that: 
1) Different protection settings are used for different system 
configurations. The protection scheme operates correctly. 
2) Scheme with 87 and 50P protection operates correctly for fault 
in the protection zone. 
Case 2C  
Aim Test the IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values (SV) produced by the 
GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RSCAD software  
Result The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current 
Transformer (CT) is the same as the digital Sampled Value (SV) 
produced by the RTDS. 
 
Faults are applied to the 132kV high voltage side and 11kV medium voltage side of the 
system of power transformers. The differential and instantaneous over current protection 
functions operate correctly for faults in the protection zone. 
The 11kV bus bar has one Bus Section that is opened and closed to simulate a system 
configuration change. Two different setting groups are automatically selected depending 
on the status of the Bus Section (BS) and Transformer circuit breakers. The protection 
functions correctly operate and does not operate for the case where the Transformer 2 
is disconnected from the system of parallel power transformers. 
The analogue secondary output current produced by a Current Transformer (CT) is the 
same as the digital Sampled Value (SV) produced by the RTDS. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the power system for two 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 paralleled power 
transformers is modelled, simulated and tested in the Real-Time Digital Simulator 
(RTDS). 
The configuration of the RTDS RSCAD software differential protection function, 
overcurrent protection function and IEC 61850 -9-2 LE sampled values are shown. 
The protection system simulation results show that: 
• The designed protection scheme operates correctly as required. 
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• The power transformer protection settings can successfully be adapted when the 
system configuration for parallel power transformers is changed. 
• Digital Sampled Value (SV) were successfully produced by the RTDS. 
 
The tap change controller design for the system of parallel power transformers is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX 
CONTROLER DESIGN OF THE TAP CHANGERS FOR THE SYSTEM OF 
PARALLEL POWER TRANSFORMERS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
An automatic tap changer controller for a system of parallel power transformers is 
designed, simulated, tested and discussed in the chapter.  
A Master-Follower scheme for parallel tap changer controllers is designed and built with 
a logic circuit in the RTDS/RSCAD software. The one tap changer controller is the Master 
and the other tap changer controller will follow the master’s operations when two 
transformers are parallelly connected. Each controller will control its own tap changer 
when the transformers are not connected in parallel.  
A system of two parallel 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers is designed, 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the simulation 
Case 3. The system has a source connected to the 132kV bus bar. The 11kV bus bar 
has one Bus Section and two 11kV loads connected to the 11kV bus bar sections. The 
RTDS/RunTime model of the simulation Case 3, the system of parallel power 
transformers is shown in Figure 6.1 in a Single Line Diagram (SLD). 
 
Figure 6.1 RTDS/Runtime Tap Changer Control Case 3 
 
The RTDS/RSCAD tap changer model is used to control the transformer on load tap 
changer. The model can be selected to operate in a manual or automatic mode. The 
controller changes the transformer tap positions to regulate the bus bar voltage. The 
algorithm of the tap changer model is explained in 6.2.1. The configuration of the RTDS 
tap changer control is discussed in section 6.3. 
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The Master-Follower tap changer controller scheme design and logic circuit is 
considered in section 6.2.2. The scheme is automatic and depends on the status of the 
Bus Section (BS) and Transformer MV circuit breakers.  
RSCAD/RunTime is used to control the simulation case being performed on the RTDS 
hardware. The Simulations are discussed in section 6.4. Circuit breaker operation and 
the tap changer control for the power circuit are performed through the RunTime 
Operator’s Console. The simulation results are shown in section 6.5 and discussed in 
section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Transformer tap changer controller design 
An automatic tap changer controller for a system of parallel power transformers is 
designed. The controller can operate in the following modes: 
• Manual or Automatic 
• Master or Follower 
The controller is designed and modelled in the RTDS/RSCAD software. 
 
6.2.1 RTDS/RSCAD Transformer tap changer controller 
The RTDS/RSCAD tap changer control model is shown in Figure 6.2. 
The tap changer controller regulates the measured voltage and automatically adjusts the 
tap position of the transformer On Load Tap Changer (OLTC) to keep the measured 
voltage at the specified setpoint. The measured voltage (Va) as input is compared to the 
voltage setpoint parameter. The controller operates the OLTC when the voltage deviation 
between the measured and setpoint is greater than the deviation parameter. The tap 
changer controller raises the measured voltage with output (up) and lowers the voltage 
with output (dn) by selecting the different taps in the transformer model. The tap changer 
controller uses tap position indication input (pos) from the transformer model.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 RTDS/RSCAD Tap Changer control model 
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Automatic or Manual mode selection is done with an input to the controller. The controller 
operates the OLTC when an automatic mode selected considering the measured voltage 
and the set point parameter. Push buttons inputs are used to control the OLTC when 
manual mode is selected. The flow chart to describe the algorithm is shown in Figure 
6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 Auto/Manual Tap changer controller flow chart 
 
6.2.2 RTDS/RSCAD Transformer tap changer controller for parallel transformers 
A tap changer controller scheme is required for transformers operating parallelly. The 
RTDS/RSCAD scheme discussed in section 6.2.1 is modified to make provision for two 
transformers operating parallelly. A flow chart is shown in Figure 6.4 for the designed 
parallel transformer tap changer controller.  
Each transformer Tap Change (TC) controller can be selected to operate in a manual or 
an automatic mode. 
The Transformer 1 (T1) tap changer control is the Master and the Transformer 2 (T2) tap 
changer control will follow the master’s operations when two transformers are parallel 
connected. 
Each controller will control its own tap changer when the transformers are individually 
connected and in automatic mode. 
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Figure 6.4 Master-Follower Tap changer controller flow chart 
 
6.3 Configuration of RTDS control models 
The RTDS/RSCAD simulation circuit that includes the Tap Changer control model is 
shown in Figure 6.5. The standard model is discussed above in section 6.2.1. The tap 
changer controller raises the busbar voltage with output (T2TCUP) and lowers the 
voltage with output (T2TCDN) by selecting the different taps in the transformer model. 
The tap changer controller uses tap position indications input from the transformer model 
and voltage value input from the 11 kV bus (N14).  
The transformer OLTC raise action is realised with an Up input (T2UP) and the lower 
action with a Down input (T2DN). 
The block (i) T2 TC CONTROL in the figure contains the logic circuit for the Master-
Follower tap changer controller scheme that determine if the transformers are connected 
parallely or individually by monitoring the status of circuit breakers. This is discussed in 
6.3.2. 
The control blocks (ii and iii) T2_BREAKER_HV and T2_BREAKER_MV in the figure 
contains the logic circuits to control the High Voltage (HV) and Medium Voltage (MV) 
circuit breakers of Transformer 2 (T2). 
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Figure 6.5 RTDS Tap Changer Controller for Transformer 2 
 
The logic circuit of T2_BREAKER_MV is shown in Figure 6.6 . Control push buttons are 
used to open and close the breaker T2BKR2 which is the MV circuit breaker of 
Transformer 2.  
 
Figure 6.6 Circuit breaker control logic for T2_BREAKER_MV. 
 
6.3.1 Tap change controller 
The RTDS/RSCAD software tap changer controller provides control of the 40MVA power 
transformer with On Load Tap Changers (OLTC).  
Load current compensation is configurable. A compensation voltage is added to the 
voltage setpoint before the voltage deviation is calculated. The compensation voltage is 
calculated by multiplying a compensated constant with the per unit load current. 
 Under and over voltage, and over current blocking functions are available but not used 
in this simulation. The tap change controller model configuration is shown in Figure 6.7. 
(i) 
(ii) (iii) 
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Figure 6.7 RTDS/RSCAD Tap Changer controller configuration  
 
The Current Transformer (CT) ratio is configured to be 2000/1 for the 11kV CT and the 
Voltage Transformer (VT) ratio was configured to be 100/1 for the 11kV VT in the CT/VT 
configuration Tab. 
17 tap positions, upper limit, lower limits and starting position parameters are configured 
in the tap changer controller model setting tabs, Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8 RTDS/RSCAD On Load Tap Changer settings 
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6.3.2 RTDS Tap Changer Controller Logic 
Logic functions are used to build a logic control circuit to adapt the tap changer controller 
to the system configuration. The logic circuit contains two parts. 
The first part of the circuit is explained first. The status of the Transformer 1 11kV side 
circuit breaker (T1BRK2), Transformer 2 11kV side circuit breaker (T2BRK2) and the 
11kV Bus Section circuit breaker (BRKBS1) are used to determine if the transformers 
are connected in parallel in the logic diagram shown below in Figure 6.9.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 RTDS Transformer 2 Tap Changer Control Logic 
 
The transformers are connected in parallel if the status of all monitored circuit breakers 
is closed. The transformers are operating in individual mode if the status of any of the 
circuit breakers is open this is explained in the matrix shown in Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1 Matrix to determine if the transformers are in Parallel or Individually connected. 
T1BRK2 T2BRK2 BRKBS1 Individual Parallel 
Close Close Close No Yes 
Open Close Close Yes No 
Close Open Close Yes No 
Close Close Open Yes No 
 
Part 1 
Part 2 
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The part 2 of the logic circuit controls the On Load Tap Changer (OLTC) of Transformer 
2 in Figure 6.9 is discussed next. 
The tap changer controller of Transformer 2 (TRFR2) will follow the tap changer 
operation of Transformer 1 (TRFR1), who will act as the Master, when the transformers 
are connected in parallel. The status of input T2PAR will be high if TRFR2 is parallelly 
connected to TRFR1. The status of input T2IND will be high if TRFR2 is individually 
connected. The tap changer controller of TRFR2 will individually control the tap changer 
of Transformer 2 with T2TCDN and T2TCUP when the transformers are individually 
connected. 
 
6.4 Running the Simulation in RSCAD Runtime 
The system of two parallel power transformers, Single Line Diagram (SLD) for RunTime 
Case 3 is shown in Figure 6.1 RTDS/Runtime Tap Changer Control Case 3 above. 
A Circuit Breaker (CB) is indicated in the RSCAD/RunTime SLD with an interactive 
square symbol. A green square indicates a CB with an open status. A red square 
indicates a CB with a closed status. The CB is operated by open and close push buttons. 
The RTDS/Runtime tap changer operator console for Transformer 2 is shown in Figure 
6.10 below. The controller is selected with a switch (T2SW1) to be in on (Automatic) or 
off (Manual) operation mode.  
Push buttons (UP & DOWN) in the figure are used to operate the tap changer to move 
tap positions up or down, when the controller is in Manual mode operation.  
The controller does the tap changer up and down operations, according to the voltage 
set point, when in Automatic mode. Lights indicated these operations with (T2TCDN & 
T2TCUP)  
Counters indicates the tap operations count (T2opCnt) and tap position value 
(T2posVal). Lights indicate the status for parallel (T2PAR) and individual (T2IND) 
operation. A light Block indicates if the tap changer is in a blocked mode. The blocked 
mode is resettable with a push button (RESET). 
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Figure 6.10 RTDS/Runtime Transformer 2 Tap Changer Controller operating console 
 
A Simulation is done with the RTDS to determine if the tap changer controller operates 
correctly for different system configurations. Two system configurations are simulated: 
when the transformers are connected in parallel and when they are operating 
individually. 
The following simulations are done: 
Case 3A:  
The bus section and transformer circuit breakers are used to connect Transformer 
1 (TRFR1) and Transformer 2 (TRFR2) in parallel, 
Case 3B:  
• Transformer 2 is parallel connected to Transformer 1, 
• Transformer 2 is operating in individual and automatic modes, 
• Transformer 2 is operating in individual and manual modes. 
 
The summary of simulation for Case 3 are shown in the Table 6-2 below.: 
Table 6-2 Summary of Simulations for Case 3 
Case 3A   
Aim Test the Parallel / Individual mode selection 
Method 1) Open and Close Transformer 1 (TRFR1) & Transformer 2 (TRFR 2) 
and Bus Section (BS) circuit breakers.  
2) Use the logic to determine if the transformers are connected in 
parallel or individual mode. Asses if the logic is working correctly.  
Expected 
result 
The logic circuit uses the status of the circuit breakers and correctly 
determine if the transformers are operated in parallel or individual 
mode. 
Case 3B  
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Aim Test Master-Follower scheme for the tap changer controllers.  
Method 1) Connect TRFR 1 and 2 in parallel by closing the circuit breakers. 
2) Disconnect TRFR 2 from TRFR 1 by opening circuit breakers. 
3) For the case when TRFR 2 is parallelly connected to TRFR 1. TRFR 
1 is the Master and TRFR 2 is the Follower. Assess that TRFR 2 is 
following the tap changer operations of TRFR 1.  
4) For the case when the Transformers operates in an individual mode. 
Switch TRFR 2 in Automatic mode and accesses if the controller of 
TRFR 2 is controlling its own tap changer correctly.  
5) When TRFR 2 is operating in an individual mode, switch TRFR 2 to 
manual mode. Operates the TRFR 2 tap changer manually with 
push buttons. 
 
Expected 
Result 
Show that: 
1) TRFR 2 follows the controller operations of TRFR1 when they are 
connected in parallel. 
2) TRFR 2 is individually controlled by its own controller when it is in 
automatic mode.  
3) TRFR 2 is individually controlled by push buttons when it is in 
manual mode. 
 
6.5 Simulation results 
The simulations are done to determine if the designed controller of the automatic tap 
changers for a system of parallel power transformers is operating correctly. 
 
6.5.1 Parallel tap changer controller mode 
The automated determination of parallel or individual status, of the two transformers, 
using a logic control circuit, is simulated in the simulation Case 3A. 
The statuses of the Transformer 1 11kV side circuit breaker (T1BRK2), Transformer 2 
11kV side circuit breaker (T2BRK2) and the 11kV Bus Section circuit breaker (BRKBS1) 
are used to determine if the transformers are connected in parallel, Figure 6.11. 
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Figure 6.11 RTDS/Runtime Tap Changer Control Case 3A 
 
The correct operation of the logic circuit is tested by controlling the circuit breakers and 
monitoring if parallel or individual status is correctly determined.  
The case is shown for operating the Transformer 2 circuit breaker (T2BRK2) in the 
captured RDTS/Runtime plot, Figure 6.12. The initial status of the three circuit breakers 
T1BRK2, T2BRK2 and BRKBS1 is closed, shown with the inputs high. Transformer 2 is 
connected in parallel with the Transformer 1 and this is shown with the input (T2PAR) 
high. The status of the Transformer 2 changes to an individual mode (T2IND), when 
Transformer 2 11kV side circuit breaker (T2BRK2) is opened. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Transformer 2 tap change controller, Parallel / Individual 
 
The Bus Section circuit breaker is controlled for the next simulation case, shown in the 
captured plot in Figure 6.13 below. The status for Transformer 2 changes from parallel 
(T2PAR) to individual mode (T2IND), when Bus Section 1 11kV circuit breaker (BRKBS1) 
is opened. Both Transformers 1 and 2 11kV side circuit breakers are closed. 
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Figure 6.13 Transformer 2 tap change controller, Bus Section open 
 
The logic circuit is correctly determining that the Transformer 2 is not connected in 
parallel when any of the three circuit breakers is opened. 
 
6.5.2 Master-Follower tap changer controller mode 
The Master–Follower operation of parallelly connected transformers is simulated in 
simulation Case 3B.  
The following interpretation is used for Case 3B in the plots below. 
T1SW1 and T2SW1 are switches to change the operations between Manual and 
Automatic mode for Transformer 1 and 2 respectively. When the input SW1 is high the 
switch is in Automatic mode. Up or Down commands can be issued to the tap change 
controller with push buttons when Manual is selected. The tap change controller controls 
the transformer tap changer to regulate the measured voltage when Automatic is 
selected. The controller change tap positions to get the measured voltage to the voltage 
set point.  
The input (T2PAR) is high when TRFR 2 is parallelly connected and low when individually 
connected.  
Transformer (TRFR) 1 and 2 are in parallel connected for the case below in Figure 6.14. 
When TRFR 2 is parallelly connected to TRFR 1, TRFR 1 will act as the Master and 
TRFR 2 will follow the controller operation of TRFR 1.  
The TRFR 1 controller is switched with T1SW1 in manual operation. The tap changer is 
controlled with bush buttons to manually change the transformer tap positions. 
TRFR 1 controller issues a “T1UP” output command to advance the tap position upwards 
and TRFR2 follows with a “T2UP” output command. 
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Figure 6.14 Transformer 1 Master, Transformer 2 Follower 
 
The plot below shows in Figure 6.15, when the TRFR 2 is not parallel (T2PAR) connected 
to TRFR 1, TRFR 2 controller will individually control its tap changer. The TRFR 2 
controller in a manual mode and a DOWN push button is operated, the controller issues 
a “T2DN” command to advance the tap position downwards. 
 
Figure 6.15 Transformer 2, Individual, Manual mode 
 
The plot below shows in Figure 6.16, that when the TRFR 2 is Individually connected, 
and in Automatic mode, TRFR 2 controller will individually control its tap changer. The 
measured voltage deviates with the set point voltages and the TRFR 2 controller issue 
a “T2UP” command to advance the tap position upwards to raise the bus bar voltage. 
 
Figure 6.16 Transformer 2, Individual, Automatic mode. 
 
6.6 Discussion 
Manual 
6-14 
A Master-Follower scheme was designed in RTDS. 
A system of two parallel 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers is designed, 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the simulation 
Case 3 
A tap changer controller for a system of parallel power transformers is designed, 
simulated and tested. 
The 11kV bus bar has one Bus Section with a circuit breaker that is opened and closed 
to simulate a system configuration change. The status of the transformers circuit 
breakers and the bus section circuit breaker are used as inputs to a logic control circuit 
to determine if the transformers are parallelly connected. 
The following results are obtained and shown in Table 6-3 .  
Table 6-3 Results for simulation Case 3 
Case 3A   
Aim Test the logic circuit for Parallel / Individual selection 
Result The logic circuit uses the status of the circuit breakers and correctly 
determines if the transformers are operated in a parallel or an individual 
mode. 
Case 3B  
Aim Test Master-Follower scheme for the tap changer controllers.  
Result It is shown that: 
1) Transformer 2 follows the controller operations of Transformer 1 
when they are connected in parallel. 
2) Transformer 2 is individually controlled by its own controller when it 
is in an automatic mode.  
3) Transformer 2 is individually controlled by push buttons when it is in 
a manual mode. 
 
The results show that: 
• The logic circuit built in the RSCAD software uses the status of the monitored 
circuit breakers and correctly determines if the two transformers are operated in 
a parallel or in an individual mode. 
• Transformer 2 follows the controller operations of the Transformer 1 when they 
are connected in parallel. Transformer 1 acts as the Master and Transformer 2 is 
the Follower. 
• Transformer 2 is individually controlled by its own controller when it is in an 
automatic mode and not connected in parallel to the Transformer 1.  
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• Transformer 2 is individually controlled by push buttons when it is in a manual 
mode and it is not parallelly connected to the Transformer 1. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the tap changers controller for a system of two 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 
paralleled power transformers is designed, modelled, simulated and tested in the Real-
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS). 
The configuration of the RTDS RSCAD tap changer controller model is shown. 
The tap changer controller simulation results are discussed. It is shown that the power 
transformer tap changer controller operates successfully as was expected. 
• The developed logic circuit is correctly determining when the transformers is 
connected in parallel according to the open/close status of the circuit breakers. 
• The Master-Follower mode operates correctly when the transformers are 
connected in parallel. 
• The separate Manual and Automatic modes operate correctly. 
The implementation of the developed protection scheme and tap change controller in the 
RTDS hardware in the loop real-time simulation is discussed in the next chapter. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEVELOPED PROTECTION SCHEME IN A RTDS 
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP REAL-TIME SIMULATION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems for Power Utility 
Automation is used to implement IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values for a typical substation 
system with parallel power transformers.  
Power-system protection is required to protect the electrical power system by removing 
a faulted part as fast as possible from the rest of the electrical network to keep the power 
system stable and to limit the damage to equipment such as transformers. Power 
transformer protection can be achieved by using protection Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) to detect faults e.g. winding, core and tap changer faults.   
Fault currents in the transformer can be due to three phases, phase to phase or phase 
to earth faults. The magnitude will depend on the transformer impedance, winding 
connections, positions of the fault on the winding and on the type of earthing for star 
connected windings (Alstom, 2002: 272).  
Instrument transformers at the high voltage yard measure power system currents and 
voltages which are used by the protection IEDs to determine abnormal system 
conditions. The conventional instrument transformers can be copper hardwired to the 
protection IEDs in the control room or Merging Units (MUs) in the HV yard. The distance 
between the Current Transformers (CTs) and the IED and the cross section of the copper 
wires influence the burden on the CT. 
Current Transformers and Voltage Transformers (VTs) are modelled in the Real-Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS) RSCAD software to provide analogue signals that are 
proportional to the real-time system currents and voltages. IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled 
Values (SV) streams are converted from the instrument transformer AC currents and 
voltages. The produced SV streams are measured and analysed in this chapter. SV 
streams are produced in the RTDS or by using standalone MUs external to the RTDS 
It is shown in previous Chapter Five that power transformer protection settings can be 
adapted when the system configuration for the parallel power transformers is changed. 
In Chapter Six it was shown that the power transformer tap changer controller can be 
adapted to the system configuration of the parallel power transformers. 
In this chapter, test-benches are developed for experimentation in section 7.2. 
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The test-bench components are described in section 7.3. The real-time implementation 
and testing of the developed protection scheme are by means of a RTDS, MUs, 
transformer protection and control IEDs and Ethernet equipment. 
The configuration of the MU is shown in section 7.4 , protection and control IED in section 
7.5 and network switches in section 7.6. 
The arrangement of time synchronization equipment is shown in section 7.7. 
The experimental results are shown in section 7.8 for different cases using different test-
benches. 
The conclusion is made in section 7.9 
 
7.2 Development of a laboratory test-bench 
Different test-benches are required to do practical experiments and test the developed 
system to determine in what way the IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values can be implemented 
for protection, monitoring and control of the power transformers. 
 
7.2.1 Test-bench A 
The first test-bench is used where the power system with the power transformers is 
simulated in the RTDS. The test-bench is shown in Figure 7.1. The RTDS simulated 
instrument transformers analogue signals are sent to an Omicron CMS 156 amplifier 
outside the RTDS. These analogue signals, proportional to the real-time secondary 
voltage and current signals are sent to an Analogue Merging Units (AMU). The AMU 
converts the CT and VT signals to one IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) stream and 
publishes it on the Process Bus Ethernet network. Two Omicron amplifiers and two 
AMUs are used, one set for the CT and VT analogue signals on the High Voltage (HV) 
132kV side of the power transformer and the second is used for the Medium Voltage 
(MV) 11kV side.  
The AMUs are connected to a network switch which is connected to the fibre optic LAN. 
Another switch is connected to the LAN and the protection IED. The MiCOM P645 IED 
subscribes to both SV streams. A laptop computer connected to the Ethernet network is 
used to configure the RTDS, the IED and the network switches. The AMUs cannot be 
configured over the network, the laptop is connected directly to an AMU to configuration 
it. 
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Figure 7.1 Test-bench A 
 
The following configuration is done on this test-bench: 
• Configuring the RTDS to produce analogue VT & CT signals out of the RTDS. 
• Configurate the AMUs to receive analogue VT & CT signals and produce SV 
streams. 
• Configure the network switches. 
• Configure the P645 IED 
 
The following investigations are done on this test-bench: 
• Measure SV streams on the Ethernet network using software tools and the 
computer. 
• Measure SV streams with the IED. 
• Determine if SV values are consistent with the power system current and voltage 
values.  
 
7.2.2 Test-bench B 
In the second test-bench shown in Figure 7.2, the RTDS GTNET_SV-9−2 component is 
replacing the Merging Unit of the first test-bench. The GTNET SV-9-2 component 
produces IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values which are sent to the Ethernet network. The 
developed power system is simulated in the RTDS. The RTDS simulated instrument 
transformers analogue signals are converted to IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) 
streams. One GTNET_SV9-2 component can produce 2 SV streams at 80 
samples/cycle. 
The Sampled value streams are measured and captured to analyse. The MiCOM P645 
IED subscribes to the SV streams. Different current transformer burdens can be 
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simulated to compare the use conventional current transformers, analogue signals and 
copper wiring with AMU, SV and Fibre Optic (FO) networks. 
 
Figure 7.2 Test-bench B 
 
The following configuration is done on this test-bench: 
• Configuring the RTDS to produce analogue VT & CT signals internal to the 
RTDS. 
• Configurate the RTDS SV9-2 component to receive analogue VT & CT signals 
and produce SV streams. 
• Configure the network switch. 
• Configure the P645 IED 
 
The following investigations is done on this test-bench: 
• Measure SV streams on the Ethernet network using software tools and the 
computer. 
• Measure SV streams with the IED. 
• Determine if SV values are consistent with the power system current and voltage 
values.  
 
7.2.3 Test-bench C 
The third test-bench has the structure shown in Figure 7.3. The RTDS developed system 
in Test-bench B is expanded to include transformer differential and over current 
protection relay components. The RTDS/RUNTIME case is shown in Figure 7.40. The 
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RTDS simulated instrument transformers analogue signals are converted to IEC 61850-
9-2 sampled value (SV) streams. 
The following configurations are done on this test-bench: 
• Configure the RTDS RSCAD transformer differential and over current protection 
components, 
• Configure the RTDS RSCAD SV9-2 component to produce SV streams. 
 
The following investigations are done on this test-bench: 
• Measure SV streams on the Ethernet network using software tools and the 
computer. 
• Apply different type of faults at different positions in the system with parallel 
power transformers and measure the fault currents. 
• Test the RTDS RSCAD software transformer protection components. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Test-Bench C 
The RTDS and computer are connected using Fibre Optic (FO) cables to the network 
switch. 
7.2.4 Test-bench D 
The fourth test-bench shown in Figure 7.4 is the same as Test-bench C but the modelling 
inside the RTDS is different. The power system is simulated in the RTDS. The RTDS 
developed system includes transformer differential and over current protection relay 
components. The RTDS simulated instrument transformers analogue signals are 
converted to IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value (SV) streams. The SV streams are used 
inside the RTDS/RSCAD software for experimentation. 
The LAN is used to connect the computer to the RTDS hardware with the RSCAD 
software to configuration, execution, and analysis the real-time simulations  
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This test-bench compares a system using SV streams to a system that only uses 
conventional instrument transformers. Copper wires are modelled and are used in both 
cases, but the length of copper wires is different. The copper wires from the instrument 
transformers (IT) to the IED, in the control room, measuring analogue signals are much 
longer compared to the wires from the IT to the merging units in the yard. 
The burden on the IT is much less when using MU. The burden effect on the IT when 
using merging units was simulated in the RTDS. The IT burden when merging units are 
used is discussed in 2.3.1.1 Current transformers. 
The following configuration is done on this test-bench: 
• Configure the RTDS RSCAD transformer differential and over current protection 
components, 
• Configure the RTDS RSCAD current transformer component 
• Configure the RTDS RSCAD SV9-2 component to produce SV streams. 
 
The following investigations are done on this test-bench: 
• Measure SV streams in the RTDS/RSCAD software. 
• Compare the burden on current transformers when a system using AMUs is 
compared to a system not using AMUs. 
 
Figure 7.4 Test-bench D 
 
7.3 Test-bench components 
The Laboratory test-benches consists of the following components: 
• Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) 
• Two Alstom IEC61850 Agile AMUs (Analogue Merging Unit), 
• Moxa PowerTrans PT-7728-PTP Ethernet switch, 
• Ruggedcom RSG2288 Ethernet switch, 
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• Schneider Electric Easergy MiCOM P645 Power Transformer IED, 
• Acer Aspire ES 15 personal laptop computer. 
 
The following software were used on the laptop computer: 
• RSCAD Power system simulation software by RTDS Technologies, 
• MiCOM S1 Agile IED Engineering suite of tools by GE Grid solutions 
• MU Agile configurator 
• Schneider Electric Easergy Studio V7.1.0 
• Wireshark network protocol analyser 
• Omicron SVScout 
• Telnet console 
• Hyperterminal 
 
7.3.1 Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) 
The RTDS Simulator is used to run the developed real-time power system model. This 
offers a means to test protection systems by connecting the RTDS to physical protection 
equipment in a closed-loop with the power system model. 
Instrument transformers (CTs and VTs) are modelled in the RTDS/RSCAD software to 
provide analogue signals. These analogue signals are proportional to the real-time 
secondary voltage and current signals making it possible to evaluate their effect on the 
performance of the protection system. 
 
7.3.1.1 Hardware 
RTDS processor cards are mounted in racks which together with input/output cards are 
housed in cubicles. Each RTDS rack includes a GTWIF card which provides 
communication between the RTDS rack and the computer workstation running the 
RSCAD software. 
The processor cards are used to solve the equations representing the power system 
components modelled within the RTDS. Two types of processor cards are used, Giga 
processor card (GPC) and PB5 cards. An RTDS rack typically contains between 2 and 
6 processor cards. 
The I/O cards permit the RTDS hardware to be interfaced with external equipment such 
as a protective IEDs. The Gigabit Transceiver Analogue Output Card (GTAO) and the 
Gigabit Transceiver Analogue Input Card (GTAI) are used to interface analogue signals 
to and from an external device and the RTDS. The Gigabit Transceiver Digital Input Card 
(GTDI) is used to interface digital signals from an external device to the RTDS. 
The GTFPI card forms the interface between the processor card, the digital I/O panel 
and the High Voltage interface panel on the front of the rack. The digital I/O panel is used 
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to interface up to 16 digital input and 16 digital output signals between the RTDS and the 
external equipment. i.e. to interface trip and close signals from a protective relay to the 
RTDS. The HV panel may be used to provide digital status signals of up to 250 volts and 
includes solid state switches which are able to switch an external supply’s voltage. 
The GTNET network interface card is used to interface the RTDS to external equipment 
over a LAN connection using various standard network protocols. IEC−61850 GOOSE 
and IEC−61850−9−2 (sampled values) are supported and used for the test-bench 
building. 
The GTSYNC card is used to ensure that the RTDS clock remains locked to the 
time−reference signal provided as input to the GTSYNC. The GTSYNC uses either IEEE 
1588 PTP, 1 PPS, or IRIG−B unmodulated signals as synchronization source. The 
GTSYNC is used to synchronize IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values output with a GPS 
time source via a 1 PPS signal. 
 
7.3.1.2 Software 
RSCAD is a software package providing a graphical interface to the RTDS. RSCAD 
includes several modules that allow real-time simulations to be created, executed, 
controlled and analysed. The RSCAD/FileManager (Fileman) module is the home page 
and is used for project and case management. All other RSCAD programs are launched 
from the Fileman module. 
RSCAD/Draft is used for circuit assembly and parameter entry of components. The Draft 
screen is divided into the library section and the circuit assembly section. Individual 
component icons are selected from the library and placed in the circuit assembly section. 
Power System and Protection and Automation models from the library are 
interconnected to build a simulation circuitry. 
RSCAD/RunTime is used to control the simulation case being performed on the RTDS 
hardware. Simulation can be controlled (start / stop commands) as well as other controls 
e.g. set point adjustment, fault application, breaker operation are performed through the 
RunTime Operator’s Console. On-line metering and recording functions are available in 
RunTime. 
RSCAD/MultiPlot is used for post processing and analysis of results captured and stored 
during a simulation study. Report can be generated by MultiPlot. 
 
7.3.2 Merging Unit 
The Alstom Merging Unit, type: MU Agile AMU takes analogue inputs from current 
transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs) and outputs time-stamped digital 
sampled values streams according to IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus. This provides safer 
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and more economical communication using fibre optics and allows the primary and 
secondary plant to be decoupled. 
 
7.3.2.1 Hardware 
The rear panel consists of: 
• Terminal blocks for 4 x CT connections, 4 x VT connections, watch dog outputs and 
power supply unit connection, 
• 1 PPS time synchronisation fibre optic ST connector, 
• Ethernet fibre optic 100BaseFX LC connector for connecting to the Ethernet network 
and transmitting the Sampled Value message streams, 
• The front panel provides a USB port and four LEDs. The USB port is used to 
communicate with a locally connected PC to transfer settings, upload firmware updates 
and extract events. 
• The LEDs show the Time Sync, Alarm, Out of service and Healthy conditions. 
 
7.3.2.2 The MU Agile Configurator 
The MU Agile Configurator is a software tool used to configure MU Agile AMU IEDs. 
AMU Configuration Language and IEC 61850 Substation Configuration Language (SCL) 
are used. 
The AMU is a proprietary language file which contains configuration information and is 
used for transferring data to or from the IED. 
The XML-based standard SCL file is used to configure the AMU by using the IED 
Capability Description (ICD) Template file. 
The Editor allows general configuration, configuration of the communication Subnetwork, 
Sampled Values configuration, client/server SNTP time synchronisation configuration,1 
PPS configuration, network frequency configuration, CT and VT Configuration, setting of 
simulated magnitudes and angles of phase currents and voltages and to set password 
restrictions. 
 
7.3.3 Moxa PowerTrans PT-7728-PTP Ethernet switch 
The PowerTrans PT-7728 series Ethernet switch is designed and IEC 61850-3 certified 
to be used in substation automation systems. The PT-7728 has a modular design where 
4 slots support modules with different port configurations are used to cater for 1 slot 
Gigabit and 3 slots Fast Ethernet. The switch has dual isolated redundant power supply 
units to increase the communications reliability. 
Module and system status LED indicators are provided on the front panel. 
The configuration settings can be accessed using the serial console, Telnet console, and 
web console. 
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The switch provides two levels of configuration access, admin and user accounts. The 
admin account has read/write access and the user account has read access only. 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is supported by this switch. SNMP is 
used for configuring network devices such as switches and routers on an Internet 
Protocol (IP) network. 
It supports Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE-802.1w), Turbo Ring and Turbo Ring 
V2 protocols for communication network redundancy. Turbo Ring and Turbo Ring V2 are 
Moxa proprietary protocols for managed switches. 
The PT-7728 has Virtual LAN (VLAN) and traffic prioritization capability to recognise 
802.1Q VLAN packets which are used to carry VLAN identification as well as IEEE 
802.1p priority information. VLAN configuration is achieved by using trunk or access 
ports settings. 
Multicast filtering is achieved by using Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) 
Snooping, GARP Multicast Registration Protocol (GMRP), and adding a static multicast 
MAC manually. 
 
7.3.4 Ruggedcom RSG2288 Ethernet switch 
The RUGGEDCOM is a fully managed, modular Ethernet switch designed to operate 
reliably in electrically harsh utility substation environments. The RSG2288 includes the 
IEEE 1588 v2 protocol with hardware time stamping, allowing high precision time 
synchronization over the Ethernet network with accuracies of 1 μs or better and support 
GPS and IRIG-B time synchronization as well. 
The switch is embedded with the Rugged Operating System (ROS). A workstation can 
be connected directly to the RS232 console port to access the device. The configuration 
is done by using a web interface. 
The RSG2288’s modular flexibility offers 5 slots with 1000BaseX multi-mode optic fiber 
LC and RJ45 1000BaseTX copper port combinations. Each communication port is 
equipped with an LED that indicates the link/activity state of the port 
IEEE 802.1D-2004 Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) is supported. 
Tagged frames with 802.1Q (VLAN) tags that specify a valid VLAN identifier (VID), 
Untagged frames without tags, or frames that carry 802.1p priority-tagged frames are 
supported.  
Each communication port can be configured to be an Edge or Trunk type. Classes of 
service (CoS) and multicast filtering can be configured on the RSG2288. 
 
7.3.5 MiCOM P645 Power Transformer protection IED 
The Easergy MiCOM P645 from Schneider Electric is a power transformer protection 
and control IED. The Easergy MiCOM P645 incorporates differential, Restricted Earth 
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Fault, thermal, overfluxing, overcurrent and earth fault protection. The P645 Model 
variant covers two or three winding and autotransformers with up to 5 sets of three-phase 
CT inputs.  
 
7.3.5.1 Hardware 
The P645 has a front port Serial PC interface EIA(RS)-232 DCE, 9 pin D-type female 
connector with Courier protocol for interface to Easergy Studio software. The front panel 
also has a 16-character by 3-line alphanumeric Liquid Crystal Display (LCD). There is a 
19-key keypad with 4 arrow keys, an enter key, a clear key, a read key, 2 hot keys and 
10 programmable function keys. 22 LEDs, 4 fixed function LEDs, 8 tri-colour 
programmable function LEDs and 10 tri-colour programmable function LEDs associated 
with the function keys are available on the front panel. 
The rear has different slots for communication modules and general Input/Output (IO) 
terminals for power supply, opto inputs and output contacts. 
IEC 61850 is implemented in the P645 IED by use of a separate Ethernet card with a 
RJ45 copper connector and two ST optical fibre connectors. The P645 can be configured 
from a configuration file using an IEC61850 IED Configurator tool. The preconfigured 
IEC 61850 SCD or CID configuration files can be transferred to the IED. The 
configuration files for the P645 can also be created manually based on their original IED 
Capability Description (ICD) file. Time synchronization is supported using SNTP (Simple 
Network Time Protocol) over the Ethernet link. An IRIG-B input with BNC connector is 
also available on the IED. 
The P645 has an additional 9-2 Ethernet board that allows an alternative path with 
IEC61850-9.2LE Ethernet link. The board has an RJ45 connector and two 1300 nm 
multi-mode 100BaseFx ST optical fibre connectors. 
A Ports Redundant Ethernet Board is optional but not installed on the P645. The 
redundant Ethernet board allows an alternative communication path by using Parallel 
Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) 
protocols. 
 
7.3.5.2 Easergy Studio software 
The Software includes features to: 
• Send settings to a device and extracting settings from a device 
• Extract event and fault records from the device  
• Real-time measurement visualisation  
• Edit the Programmable Scheme Logic (PSL) with a PSL Editor  
• Configure the device with an IEC61850 configuration tool. 
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• Create a system to mimic a real-world system. Systems can be sub-divided using 
substations, voltage levels and bays. 
 
7.3.6 Wireshark network protocol analyser 
Wireshark is a network packet analyser that can be used to capture Ethernet network 
packets and display the detailed packet data. It supports IEC61850 Sampled Values 
protocol. The live packets can be captured and be saved to a file. Offline analysis can 
be done on the packets. 
 
7.3.7 Omicron SVScout 
SVScout is a tool for visualizing Sampled Values (SV) according to IEC 61850-9-2LE 
sampled at 80 or 256 samples per cycle. It subscribes to the SV streams from multiple 
merging units and displays the waveforms of the primary voltages and currents in an 
oscilloscope view. A report can be generated to summarise the SV measurement 
information. SVScout supports IEEE 1588 (PTP). 
 
7.4 Configuration of Alstom Agile Merging unit 
The MU Agile Configurator software tool is used to configure the Alstom MU Agile AMU 
IED. 
The MiCOM S1 Agile software Version V1.3.1 by Alstom Grid has different tools to 
manage the MiCOM devices. The tools are grouped in folders on the start page shown 
in Figure 7.5 below. The folder “Smart Grid” contains the MU Agile Configurator. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 MiCOM S1 Agile Start page 
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The MU Agile configurator allows the user to create and edit IED configurations. 
Configuration files can be sent to an IED or retrieved from and IED. The configuration 
can be done offline or online. The IED configuration file is a proprietary language file 
which contains an Analog Merging Unit (AMU)'s IEC 61850 configuration information and 
has an .amu file extension. 
A new MiCOM configuration can be created when in an offline mode from a template or 
an IED Capability Description (ICD) file. The IED model number is used to choose the 
ICD file. The selecting of the ICD file is shown below in Figure 7.6. 
The ICD file is selected and opened in the Configuration tool. The main area is shown 
on the left side window. The detail of the selected category will show on the right-hand 
side. 
The IED configuration can also be extracted from the IED online. A password is required 
to manage the IED. The default password is “AAAA”. 
The edited configuration file must be validated before it is sent to the device. The right-
hand lower pane shows lists of Errors, Warnings and Messages. 
 
Figure 7.6 AMU configuration from .ICD file 
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The configurable items are categorised into groups in the Editor window. The Groups 
are IED details, communications, sampled values, SNTP, 1 PPS, Acquisition, CT and 
VT Configuration, Simulation and Cybersecurity. The groups are shown in the left 
window of Figure 7.7 
 
7.4.1 IED Details  
The first group is IED Details. Most of the data is not user configurable and is factory set. 
General configuration and data about the IED and the selected ICD template file are 
displayed on the right side of Figure 7.7. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 AMU IED Details 
 
7.4.2 Communications 
Configuration of the communications Subnetwork is shown in Figure 7.8. The IED name, 
IP address and Subnet Mask can be configured. The IED MAC Address is factory pre-
set. 
 
Figure 7.8 AMU Communications configuration 
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Two Analog Merging Units (AMU) were set up for the test-bench. The IED name of the 
first AMU is AMU0001 with IP Address 192.168.1.39 and the second AMU name is 
AMU0002 with IP Address 192.168.1.40. 
 
7.4.3 Sampled Values 
In the Sampled Values (SV) group shown in Figure 7.9, the details are set for the AMU 
IED to transmit IEC 61850-9-2LE sampled values. These samples are taken at a 
resolution of 80 times per cycle, which is 4000 samples/sec at 50 Hz 
 
Figure 7.9 AMU Sampled Values configuration 
 
A multicast destination MAC Address is set for subscribing IED to identify SV data 
streams. 
Table 7-1 MAC Addresses for AMUs 
IED MAC Address 
AMU 1 01-0C-CD-04-00-02 
AMU 2 01-0C-CD-04-00-03 
 
The Application ID is not set able. 
VLAN ID and priority can be set. The priority of sampled value data frames can be set 
from 1-7. Lowest priority = 0, highest priority = 7. 
The VLAN ID was set to 1 and the priority to 4 for both AMUs. 
 
7.4.4 SNTP 
The SNTP group allows the configuration of SNTP time synchronisation. SNTP can be 
used to synchronise the internal clock of the IED using IEC 61850 over internet with the 
clock of the SNTP server. The IP address of the main SNTP server and a second IP 
address for the backup server. The Poll rate is set to define how often the IED attempts 
to contact the SNTP server. 
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7.4.5 1PPS 
1 PPS setting allows to set the delay caused by the length of the 1 PPS fibre optic cable 
from the source to the IED input. The following equation is used to calculate the delay. 
Fibre optic delay (µsec) = Fibre cabling length (meters) / 300 according to the AMU 
configurator help file. 
 
7.4.6 Acquisition 
Acquisition allows to set the network frequency to 50 Hz. 
 
7.4.7 CT and VT Configuration 
CT and VT Configuration allows to set the CT and VT parameters. The phase and neutral 
CTs can be configured. The phase CT parameters are shown below in Figure 7.10. 
 
Figure 7.10 AMU SV CT configuration 
 
The primary and secondary currents of the CT can be set. The CT polarity can be set 
between standard and inverted. Two merging units were set for the test-bench. AMU 1 
is set with a primary current of 200A to be used on the 132kV side and AMU 2 is set with 
a primary current of 2000A to be used on the 11kV side of the power transformer. 
The neutral CT parameters are shown below in Figure 7.11. 
 
Figure 7.11 AMU SV Neutral CT configuration 
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The neutral CT can be set to Derived / Measured / Disabled. The Neutral CT sampled 
values are measured from the AMU Neutral CT input when it is set to Measured. The 
Neutral CT sampled values are not measured but calculated from the phase CT values 
when it is set to Derived. The primary current and the polarity can be set for the neutral 
CT. 
The phase and neutral VT parameters are set similar like for the CTs and are shown in 
Figure 7.12. The AMU 2 set on the 11kV side of the power transformer is shown. The 
neutral VT primary and secondary voltage can be set. The neutral VT can be set to 
Derived / Measured / Disabled like for the neutral CT. 
AMU 1 set for the 132kV side is done in a similar way but with a primary voltage set to 
132kV. 
 
Figure 7.12 AMU SV VT configuration 
 
7.4.8 Simulation 
The AMU can simulate sampled values with simulated magnitudes and angles of phase 
currents and voltages. This can be configured at the Simulation tab. The simulation 
values of the currents are shown below in Figure 7.13. The VT simulation is set in the 
similar way as for the CT simulation. 
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Figure 7.13 AMU SV CT Simulation 
 
7.4.9 Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity settings allow to set password parameters. The “Attempts limit” parameter 
set the number of attempts allowed to enter a valid password. The time limit to enter a 
valid password can be set with the Attempts timer parameter (in minutes). The “blocking 
timer” parameter set the time the password is barred. 
 
7.5 Configuration of Transformer protection and control IED 
The power transformer protection and control Easergy MiCOM P645 IED from Schneider 
Electric is used as a component in the test-bench setup. The P645 IED is set up for a 
two winding power transformer. 
Easergy Studio software provides support for MiCOM IEDs from Schneider Electric. The 
software lets the user manage the MiCOM IED. Easergy Studio has different tools 
available to send settings to an IED, extract settings from an IED, manage event and 
fault records, IEC 61850 configuration and edit Programmable Scheme Logic (PSL). 
In MiCOM S1 Studio, a system can be created in the Studio Explorer. Substations, bays, 
voltage levels and devices is added to the system. 
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7.5.1 System in Easergy Studio 
A new system, Test-bench 1, is created and shown in Figure 7.14. 
 
Figure 7.14 Easergy Studio-new system 
 
An example is shown where a substation, Substation 1, is created with a 11kV and 132kV 
voltage level. A Feeder bay is added to the 11kV Voltage level and a Transformer bay is 
added to the 132kV voltage level, shown in Figure 7.15. 
 
Figure 7.15 S1 Studio Explorer 
 
One of the Tools of Easergy Studio is a data model manager that can be used to 
download the data models for the devices that can be added to the system. The device 
type and full model number must be selected when a new device is added to the system. 
A P645 device is added to the TRFR1 bay, shown below in Figure 7.16. 
Different folders for settings, PSL, 61850 configurations, measurements, events and 
disturbance recordings are available for the device. 
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Figure 7.16 Easergy Studio Explorer - device 
 
A connection to the device must be configured before file transfer to and from the device 
can happen. A connection can be configured to either the front serial port of the device 
or a rear Ethernet port. The Device IP address is required for an Ethernet connection. 
The device used for the test-bench setup has an IP address of 192.168.1.17. 
 
7.5.2 Settings 
A new settings file can be created from the data model or an existing settings file can be 
extracted from the device. The settings file can be changed and sent to the device. All 
the folders are shown in a default settings file that was created for the P645 device in 
Figure 7.17. 
 
Figure 7.17 P645 Settings file 
7-21 
 
7.5.3 Configuration 
The P645 can have 4 different setting groups. Each of the groups can be enabled or 
disabled. The active settings group must be set. The active settings group can be 
switched by using the setting menu on the IED front display or programmable scheme 
logic (PSL), E.g. the settings group can be changed when an input to the device is 
received. Different protection functions can be enabled or disabled. This is shown in 
Figure 7.18. 
 
Figure 7.18 Settings file configuration 
 
7.5.4 Group System configuration 
Each off the four settings groups has individual settings. Each group comprises out of 
setting folders for the system configuration and different protection functions (e.g. 
Differential, REF and over current). Group 1 Settings as shown in Figure 7.19. 
 
Figure 7.19 Group 1 Settings 
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The transformer parameters are set in the system configuration settings folder for each 
settings group. The system configuration for Group 1 settings is shown below in Figure 
7.20. The configuration can be set for a two or three winding power transformer. The 
nominal voltage, winding connection, winding type and MVA rating can be set for each 
winding. The group 1 configuration was set for a two winding, 40MVA, 132/11kV, YNd1 
power transformer. A winding can be set to be grounded or ungrounded. 
 
Figure 7.20 Group 1 system configuration 
 
One or two CT terminals for each winding can be set. One CT terminal is set for each of 
the HV and LV windings 
 
7.5.5 Current and Voltage transformer ratios 
The polarity, primary and secondary current values for each of the 5 terminals for phase 
CTs, HV and LV E/F CT terminals for neutral CTs are set. The location of E/F CTs can 
be set to Starpoint, residual or none. 
Primary and secondary voltage setting are set for a VT. 
 
7.5.6 IEC 61850 9-2 SV 
The configuration of sampled values is set under sub menu “Ethernet NCIT” shown 
below in Figure 7.21. 
The physical link for the proses bus Ethernet communication is set to either copper or 
Fibre optic (FO). It is recommended by the manufacturer to set the physical link to FO 
for a permanent connection and use the copper link only during testing and 
commissioning.  
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The communication link connected to the RJ45 connector is used when copper is 
selected. The fibre optic links connected to the RX / TX connectors is used for a FO 
selection. 
The Anti-Aliasing filter prevents high frequency noise from being sampled by the 9-2 
Ethernet board. It is recommended by the manufacturer to enable the Anti-Alias filter 
except where high-speed processing is needed. 
Merging unit delay setting is used when Sampled Values (SV) from several Merging 
Units (MU) is not received at the same time due to transmission delays. The transmission 
delay from the MU to the IED depends on the topology of the Ethernet network as well 
as the network traffic. The IED will wait for the merging unit delay time setting and delay 
the signal processing of the different SV from the different MUs. 
The logical node names are set to match each MU Logical Node name that is broadcast. 
Synchronised SV from more than one MU is needed for differential protection. SVs are 
synchronized to a local or global 1 PPS signal. 
A GPS signal is used when “Global 1PPS” is selected for synchronization. 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Ethernet NCIT Settings 
 
7.6 Configuration of Network equipment 
Different Ethernet switches are used to set up the substation automation test-bench and 
connect the different components to the process bus network. This network is shown in 
Figure 7.22. 
A MOXA PowerTrans PT-7728 series Ethernet switch is used to connect the Alstom 
Agile Merging Units (AMU) to the process bus. 
A RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 managed Ethernet switch is used to connect the MiCOM 
P645 Transformer protection and control devices to the process bus. The PT-7728 and 
RSG2288 are connected to each other. The Acer Aspire ES 15 personal laptop computer 
is connected to the RSG2288 but can be connected to the PT-7728 as well. 
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Figure 7.22 Test-bench Network Diagram 
 
The configuration of the network switches is described in APPENDIX I. 
 
7.7 Arrangement of Time synchronisation equipment. 
The devices connected in a process bus network need an internal clock that are 
synchronized with a substation GPS clock. The synchronization is performed through 
IRIG-B or indirectly over a network using SNTP or IEEE 1588 PTP. PTP has better 
accuracy and is more suitable for Process Bus application. 
PTP use the same Ethernet medium as the data communications for the time 
synchronization information communication. PTP reduces the cabling infrastructure 
requirements as there is no need of dedicated network for time synchronization 
information when compared to IRIG-B. 
A SEL2407 Satellite-Synchronized Clock is used for the test-bench setup. This is shown 
in Figure 7.23. The synchronization is done with ±100 ns average timing accuracy. The 
SEL 2407 use one modulated and six demodulated IRIG-B outputs to synchronize 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). Three of the six demodulated outputs can be set to 
1 PPS. The SEL2407 provided time synchronization signals for the RTDS and RSG2288 
network switch. 
The RTDS GTSYNC card uses either IEEE 1588 PTP, 1 PPS, or IRIG−B unmodulated 
signals as the synchronization source. The GTSYNC is used to synchronize IEC 
61850−9−2 Sampled Values output with a GPS time source via a 1 PPS signal. A 1 PPS 
or IRIG−B Copper BNC Output Port as well as 4 times 1 PPS or IRIG−B Fibre Output 
Ports. 
The Merging Units allowed for SNTP as well is 1 PPS time synchronization. A 1 PPS 
time synchronisation source from the RTDS was used via fibre for the synchronization 
of the MUs. 
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The P645 IED has an IRIG-B input with BNC connector available for time 
synchronization. The IRIG-B signal is supplied from the network switch. 
The RSG2288 network switch supports 1 PPS or IRIG-B copper BNC input and output 
ports. It has a GPS antenna input port. It also supports PTP and SNTP over the network. 
The PT-7728 network switch supports PTP and SNTP over the network 
 
 
Figure 7.23 Time synchronisation network 
 
7.8 Practical experiment results 
Three test-benches are used to do different experiments. The following table show the 
aim and expected results for these practical experiments. 
 
Table 7-2 Summary of test-bench aims and expected results 
Test-bench A  
Aim Publish Sampled Value (SV) streams on the Ethernet network and 
measure it. 
Method 1) Use the RTDS and Omicron amplifier to produce power system 
Current Transformer (CT) and Voltage transformer (VT) analogue 
signals. 
2) Use the Analogue Merging Units (AMUs) to convert the analogue 
CT and VT signals to IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) 
streams. 
7-26 
3) Measure the SV streams using software tools. (Wireshark and 
SVScout). 
4) Measure the SV streams with a MiCOM P645 protection IED 
Expected 
result 
1) The SV streams are successfully measured on the Ethernet 
network. 
2) The SV data values are consistent and compare well with the 
analogue CT and VT signals.  
Test-bench B 
Aim Publish and test the IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values (SV) produced 
by the GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RTDS/ RSCAD software 
Method 1) Use the RTDS to convert the power system analogue CT and VT 
signals to IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) streams. 
2) Measure the SV streams using software tools. (Wireshark and 
SVScout). 
3) Measure the SV streams with a MiCOM P645 protection IED. 
Expected 
Result 
1) The SV streams are successfully measured on the Ethernet 
network. 
2) The SV data values are consistent and compare well with the 
analogue CT and VT signals. 
Test-bench C 
Aim 1) Use IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values (SV) produced by the 
GTNET_SV9−2 component of the RTDS/ RSCAD software. 
2) Measure the magnitude of fault currents for different system 
configurations. 
3) Test the developed transformer protection scheme using the 
RTDS/ RSCAD software. 
Method 1) Apply different types of faults and analyse the fault currents. 
2) Apply faults (FLT2) out of the protection zone with Bus Section 
closed, 
3) Apply faults (FLT2) out of the protection zone with Bus Section 
opened, 
4) Apply faults (FLT1) in the protection zone and test the differential 
and over current protection. 
 
Expected 
Result 
Show that: 
1) Different types of faults have different fault current values. 
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2) Different protection settings can be used for different system 
configurations. 
3) The scheme with differential and over current protection does not 
operate for faults out of the protection zone. 
4) The scheme with differential and over current protection operates 
correctly for fault in the protection zone. 
 
Test-bench D 
Aim 1) Compare a system that uses AMUs with a system that does not 
use AMUs 
Method 1) Apply different types of faults and analyse the current transformer 
burden. 
2) Apply faults (FLT2) out of the protection zone. 
3) Apply faults (FLT1) in the protection zone 
4) Compare the burden on the CTs for a system that uses AMUs 
with a system that does not use AMUs. 
Expected 
Result 
Show that: 
1) The burden on current transformers is reduced when AMUs 
is used. 
 
7.8.1 Test-bench A 
The setup for Test-bench A is shown in Figure 7.1. A power system with source, power 
transformer and load models were developed and simulated in the RTDS. The RTDS 
simulated current and voltage instrument transformers were configured. The instrument 
transformers produce analogue signals. These analogue signals are sent out of the 
RTDS using the RTDS Gigabit Transceiver Analogue Output Card (GTAO) to interface 
analogue signals from the RTDS to the external devices. The GTAO card has analogue 
output channels with an output range of +/− 10 volts. The analogue signals from the 
RTDS GTAO cards are amplified using an Omicron CMS 156, 3 Phase Voltage and 
Current Amplifier. These analogue signals, proportional to the real-time secondary 
voltage and current signals, are sent to Analogue Merging Units (AMUs). The AMU 
converts the signals to IEC 61850-9-2 sampled value (SV) streams and publishes them 
on the network. Two AMUs are used, one for the CT and VT analogue signals on the 
primary 132kV side of the power transformer and the second is used for the 11kV side. 
The AMUs are connected to a network switch.  
The MiCOM P645 subscribes to the SV streams. The 5 terminal Transformer differential 
IED requires 5 SV streams to be configured in the IED. Only two SV streams were 
available, the absence of the other SV streams caused a logical node (LN) and non-
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conventional instrument transformer (NCIT) alarm resulting in the IED not functioning 
correctly. It was therefore not possible to determine if the IED will measure the current 
and voltage values correctly. 
The SV streams are captured using the Wireshark network protocol analyser and 
Omicron SVScout software to verify that the SV streams are published on the process 
bus network. The tools can be used to determine if network is correctly configured and 
the SV streams are transmitted through a switch port, blocked or filtered by a network 
switch. 
 
7.8.1.1 Wireshark network protocol analyser 
The live packets were captured and saved to a file. Offline analysis is done on the 
packets. The frame information of an AMU SV 122-bit packet is shown in Figure 7.24. 
 
 
Figure 7.24 Wireshark AMU SV packet 
 
SV packet format is shown in Figure 7.25. The name and values of each field are shown. 
The Header MAC address at the start of the frame shows the destination and source 
addresses. The field Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) can be expanded to show 
the Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). The svID AlstomMU02 indicates the LNName 
of the SV multi cast message sent from the AMU. The measured values are saved in the 
data set field at the end of the ASDU in SV Ethernet frame. 
 
7-29 
 
Figure 7.25 Wireshark AMU SV Ethernet frame 
 
7.8.1.2 SVScout 
SVScout was used as a tool for visualizing Sampled Values (SV) according to IEC 
61850-9-2LE sampled at 80 samples per cycle and 4000Hz. It subscribes to the SV 
streams from multiple merging units and displays the waveforms of the primary voltages 
and currents in an oscilloscope view. A report can be generated to summarise the SV 
measurement information. 
A part of the test report is shown in Figure 7.26. The information included the sampling 
frequency, SV Stream ID, Source and destination MAC addresses. 
 
Figure 7.26 SVScout AMU report SV information 
 
The Test report also shows the current and voltage values and phasors of the SV 
Streams shown in Figure 7.27. 
7-30 
 
 
 
Figure 7.27 SVScout AMU Test Report SV Phasor values 
 
With this tool it is possible to subscribe to the SV message and measure it on the process 
bus network. It is also possible to produce a report on the current and voltage values of 
the phasors. 
The Sampled Value measured current and voltages values are consistent with the 
system current and voltage values measured in the RTDS. The RTDS measurements 
on the HV 132kV side is shown below in Figure 7.28 and the MV 11kV side is shown in 
Figure 7.29. 
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Figure 7.28 RTDS Runtime HV current and voltage measurements 
 
Figure 7.29 RTDS Runtime MV current and voltage measurements 
 
7.8.2 Test-bench B 
The setup for Test-bench B shown in Figure 7.2 is used. A power system model with a 
source, power transformer and load were developed and simulated in the RTDS. The 
RTDS simulated current and voltage instrument transformers were configured.  
The instrument transformers produced analogue signals proportional to the real-time 
secondary voltage and current signals. These signals are taken to a RTDS 
GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component that provides IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values 
messages using the GTNET hardware. The GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component has a 9.2LE 
configuration to convert 4 current and 4 voltage signals to one IEC 61850-9-2 sampled 
value (SV) stream and publish it on the communication network. Two SV streams are 
used, one for the CT and VT analogue signals on the primary 132kV side of the power 
transformer and the second is used for the 11kV side. The RTDS is connected to a 
network switch. The MiCOM P645 subscribes to the SV streams and measures the 
power system currents and voltages.  
The SV streams were captured using the Wireshark network protocol analyser and 
Omicron SVScout software to verify that the SV streams are published on the process 
bus network. 
The tools can be used to determine if network is correctly configured and the SV streams 
are transmitted through a switch port, blocked or filtered by a network switch. 
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7.8.2.1 Wireshark network protocol analyser 
The live packets were captured and saved to a file. Offline analysis is done on the 
packets. The Ethernet frame information of an RTDS SV 122-bit packet is shown in 
Figure 7.30. 
 
 
Figure 7.30 Wireshark RTDS SV Ethernet frame 
 
The name and values of each field are shown. The Header MAC address at the start of 
the frame shows the destination and source addresses. The field Application Protocol 
Data Unit (APDU) can be expanded to show the Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). 
The svID RTDSMU0101 indicates the LNName of the SV multi cast message sent from 
the RTDS. The measured values are saved in the data set field at the end of the frame. 
 
7.8.2.2 SVScout 
The SVScout software tool was used to visualize the Sampled Values (SV) according to 
IEC 61850-9-2LE sampled at 80 samples per cycle and 4000Hz. SVScout subscribes to 
the SV streams from the RTDS and displays the waveforms of the primary voltages and 
currents in an oscilloscope view. A report was generated to summarise the SV 
measurement information. 
A part of the test report is shown in Figure 7.31. The information includes the sampling 
frequency, SV Stream ID, Source and destination MAC addresses of both SV streams. 
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Figure 7.31 SVScout RTDS MU report SV information 
 
The phasors and oscilloscope view of the two SV streams sent from the RTDS are shown 
below in Figure 7.32 and Figure 7.33. The one is of current and voltage values on the 
132kV Side of the power transformer and the second is on the 11kV side. 
 
Figure 7.32 SVScout RTDS MU Report- Phasors 
 
a) Stream 1 b) Stream 2 
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Figure 7.33 SVScout RTDS MU Report oscilloscope 
 
The Sampled Value measured current and voltages values are the same as the system 
current and voltage values measured in the RTDS Runtime software. The RTDS 
measurements on the HV 132kV side is shown below in  
Figure 7.34 and the MV 11kV side is shown in  
Figure 7.35. 
 
 
Figure 7.34 RTDS Runtime HV current and voltage measurements 
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Figure 7.35 RTDS Runtime MV current and voltage measurements 
 
7.8.2.3 P645 IED 
The MiCOM P645 Five terminal Transformer differential IED requires five Logical Nodes 
for the SV streams to be configured in the IED. Only two AMUs were available to produce 
SV streams. 
Three SV streams produced by the RTDS GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component and sent to 
the Ethernet network from the RTDS and the two SV produced from the AMU were used 
for the test-bench setup to test the Micom P645 IED. This is shown in Figure 7.36 below. 
RTDS 1,2 & 3 represent the three SV streams from the RTDS. AMU1 and AMU2 SV 
represents the SV streams from the two analogue Merging Units. The IED requires to 
measure all five SV streams. The absence of an SV stream caused a logical node (LN) 
and non-conventional instrument transformer (NCIT) alarm on the IED resulting in the 
IED not functioning correctly. 
 
Figure 7.36 Setup for 5 SV streams sent to the P645 IED 
 
The following terminals were configured to subscribe to the Sampled Value streams (SV) 
streams: 
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Terminal 1 was configured to use the SV stream from RTDSMU0101, 
Terminal 2 SV from AlstomMU02, 
Terminal 3 SV from AlstomMU01, 
Terminal 4 SV from RTDSMU0301, 
Terminal 5 SV from RTDSMU0201. 
 
The 5 SV streams is measured on the Ethernet network using SVScout. This is shown 
below in Figure 7.37. 
 
Figure 7.37 The 5 Sampled values measured by SVScout 
 
RTDSMU0101 produced SV streams for the HV 132kV Side of the transformer and 
RTDSMU0201 for the MV 11kV side. The currents and voltages measured on the IED 
are shown in Table 7-3. It is shown that the A Phase voltage (Phase to neutral) is the 
reference voltage. The other two (B and C Phases) voltage vectors have a 120 ° phase 
angle difference to the A Phase voltage. 
A 30° angle difference is shown for the current vectors between the 132kV and 11kV 
sides of the transformer due to the vector group connection of YNd1. 
Table 7-3 IED P645 Measured current & voltage values 
HV Side 
(132kV)  
A rms Angle MV Side 
(11kV) 
kA rms Angle 
IA-1 177,7 -154° IA-5 2,002 3,583 
IB-1 177,6 85,95 IB-5 2,002 -123,8 
IC-1 177,7 -34,03 IC-5 2,002 116,1 
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MV Side 
(11kV)  
kV rms Angle MV Side 
(11kV) 
kV rms Angle 
VAN 6,622 0 VAB 11,47 30 
VBN 6,622 -120 VBC 11,47 -90 
VCN 6,622 120 VCA 11,47 150 
 
The three phase currents (IBUR1 ABC) measured by the current transformer on the 
132kV side are shown below in Figure 7.38. It is a balanced three phase system. 
The peak value for the measured current is 1.25 amp and changed to a RMS value. The 
RMS value is 1.25 x 0.707 = 0.884 Amp. A ratio of 200/1 is used for the current 
transformer resulting in a primary line current of 200 x 0.884 = 176,8 Amp. This is the 
same as the currents (IABC-1) measured by the IED. 
 
Figure 7.38 3-Phase currents measure by the 132kV CT 
 
The three phase currents (IBUR2 ABC) measured by the current transformer on the 11kV 
side are shown below in Figure 7.39.  
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Figure 7.39 3-Phase currents measure by the 11kV CT 
 
The peak value for the measured current is 1.4 amp and converted to RMS it is 1.41 x 
0.707 = 0.997 Amp. A ratio of 2000/1 is used for the current transformer resulting in a 
primary line current of 2000 x 0.997 = 1994 Amp. This is the same as the currents (IABC-
5) measured by the IED. 
 
The P645 measured values are the same as the line currents and voltages measured in 
the RTDS runtime for the power system model. 
 
7.8.3 Test-bench C 
A system of two 40MVA 132/11kV YNd1 power transformers connected in parallel is 
modelled and simulated in the Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) for the Test-bench C 
setup. 
The system has a source connected to the 132kV (SRC1) bus bar. The 11kV bus bar 
has 2 x Bus Sections, 1 x 11kV load and 1 x 11kV Source (SRC2) are connected to the 
11kV bus bar sections. A Bus Section circuit breaker (BS1) connects the two bus 
sections. 
The RTDS RSCAD Runtime model of the simulation Case C, the system of parallel 
power transformers using SV, is shown in Figure 7.40 below. 
Primary substation equipment such as instrument transformers and circuit breakers are 
modelled. Differential and Over Current protection relays are modelled in the RSCAD 
Draft software. 
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Figure 7.40 RTDS RUNTIME Case C for Test-bench C with TRFR 1 & 2 with SV  
 
The instrument transformers produce analogue signals proportional to the real-time 
primary system voltage and current signals. These signals represented by the SV1 and 
SV2 in the figure above are taken to a RTDS GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component. The 
GTNET SV components provide IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Values messages using the 
GTNET hardware. The GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component has a 9.2LE configuration to 
convert 4 current and 4 voltage signals to one IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) 
stream and to publish it on the communication network. Two SV streams are used, one 
for the CT and VT analogue signals on the primary 132kV side of the power transformer 
and the second is used for the 11kV side. The RTDS is connected to a network switch. 
A Laptop computer is connected to the Ethernet network and software is used to 
measure the sampled value messages.  
The Over Current and Differential protection relays in the RTDS/RSCAD software do not 
use the Sampled Values directly. The Sampled Values streams are again taken to a 
GTNET_SV9-2_v5 component that produces analogue CT an VT signals for the 
protection relays to use. This is shown in Figure 7.41 below. The GTNET-SV1 
component on the left converts the CT currents (IBUR2A, B & C) to Sampled Values. 
The GTNET_SV component on the right converts the SV stream to analogue currents 
(SVA, B and C). 
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Figure 7.41 RTDS GTNET Sampled Values 
 
7.8.3.1 Test-bench C setup 
Different type of faults at different positions are applied in the system with parallel power 
transformers. The results were monitored in RTDS Runtime. 
The following type of faults are applied: 
• Single phase to ground faults 
• Phase to Phase faults 
• Three phase faults 
It is expected that the results will show that different types of faults will result in different 
magnitudes of fault currents. 
 
The system is configured in different ways by operating different circuit breakers as 
follows: 
• All circuit breakers are closed with the transformers 1 and 2 connected in parallel 
and the Source 2 connected. The two parallel transformers and Source 2 are 
sharing the load. Source 2 is contributing to increasing the system fault level. 
• The circuit breaker CB2 of Transformer 2 is opened. Transformer 1 is connected 
to the Source 2. 
• The circuit breaker BS1 of the Bus Section is opened. Transformer 1 is supplying 
the full load. 
It is expected that the results will show that the current flowing through Transformer 1 
will change as the system configuration is changed. One power transformer in a system 
of parallel transformers is therefore impacted by the system configuration.  
 
Faults are applied at the following positions: 
• Fault 1 is applied in the transformer differential protection zone for which the 
protection should operate.  
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• Fault 2 is applied out of the transformer differential protection zone for which the 
protection should not operate and must remain stable. 
The results are expected to show that the protection system for the tested power 
transformer is operating correctly in a system of parallel power transformers.  
 
7.8.3.2 The behaviour of the system during different conditions. 
The output currents produced by Current Transformers (CTs) are measured and 
analysed during normal load conditions and when different types of faults are applied to 
the 11kV busbar. The A-Phase current of the Transformer 1 CT on the 132kV side is 
measured. 
 
7.8.3.2.1 The behaviour of the system during normal loading conditions. 
The system supplies a load of 40MVA. The system configuration is changed while 
keeping the load constant. The following three system configurations are considered for 
the experiment: 
• Transformer 1, Transformer 2 and Source 2 are connected in the system to 
supply the load together. Source1 supplies 28.6MVA of the total load through the 
two parallel transformers with Source 2 supplying the rest of the load. 
• Transformer 1 and Source 2 are connected. Source1 supplies 26.1MVA through 
Transformer 1 with Source 2 supplying the rest of the load. 
• Source1 supplies 40MVA through Transformer 1 for the case when only 
Transformer 1 is connected. 
 
The A-Phase secondary output peak currents for Transformer 1, 132kV Current 
Transformer (CT) are measured for the three different system configurations. This is 
shown in Figure 7.42. 
 
7-42 
 
Figure 7.42 Transformer 1, 132kV CT A-Phase currents for different system configurations 
 
A summary is shown in Table 7-4 below of how the current flowing through Transformer 
1 is changing as the system configuration is changed. The Source MVA and CT 1 
measurements are presented. 
 
Table 7-4 Summary of system behaviour for different system configurations 
Connected in system Source 1 MVA T1 CT1 
Transformer 1, 2 and Source 2 28.6 0,52 
Transformer 1 and Source 2 26.1 0.84 
Transformer 1 40 1.34 
 
 
It is shown with the results of this experiment that: 
• The parallelly connected transformers share the load. 
• Sources connected influence the currents flowing through the system of parallel 
power transformer 
• The load current flowing through Transformer 1 is changing for the same load 
condition and for different system configurations. 
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7.8.3.2.2 The behaviour of the system during a single phase to ground fault  
The single phase to ground fault level depends on the system zero sequence impedance.  
The zero sequence impedance does not influence balanced faults like a three phase 
fault. The single phase to ground faults can be of a lower value compared to three phase 
faults and phase to phase faults. 
A single phase to ground type of fault is applied to the A-Phase in the system with parallel 
power transformers. The Fault is applied to the 11kV bus bar in the system. 
The system configuration is changed by opening different circuit breakers. 
The following three configurations are considered for the experiment: 
• Transformer 1, Transformer 2 and Source 2 are connected in the system, 
• Transformer 1 and Source 2 are connected, 
• Transformer 1 is connected. 
The results are monitored in RTDS Runtime. 
The A-Phase secondary output peak currents for Transformer 1, 132kV CT are 
measured for the three different system configurations. This is shown in Figure 7.43. The 
three measurements are not time synchronised. 
 
 
Figure 7.43 Transformer 1, 132kV CT A-Phase current for Phase to Ground faults and different 
system configurations. 
 
A summary is shown in Table 7-5 below. Fault currents flowing through Transformer 1 
are different as the system configuration is changed. 
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Table 7-5 Summary of system behaviour for a phase to ground fault and different system 
configurations 
Connected in system T1 CT1 A-Phase 
Transformer 1, 2 and Source 2 0,72 
Transformer 1 and Source 2 1,2 
Transformer 1 2 
 
It is shown with the results of this experiment that: 
• The parallelly connected transformers influence the fault levels and current 
magnitude.  
• Power Sources connected influence the fault levels and the current magnitude. 
• The fault current flowing through Transformer 1 is changing for the same phase 
to ground fault in the cases for different system configurations. 
 
7.8.3.2.3 The behaviour of the system during a phase to phase fault  
A phase to phase type of fault is applied between the A and B-Phases in the system with 
parallel power transformers. The Fault is applied to the 11kV bus bar in the system. The 
system configuration is that only Transformer 1 is connected.  
The results are monitored in RTDS Runtime. 
 
Figure 7.44 Transformer 1, 132kV CT for Phase to Phase fault. 
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The A, B and C-Phases (IBUR1A, B and C) are secondary output peak currents for 
Transformer 1, High Voltage 132kV current transformer. The currents are measured for 
the case where only Transformer 1 is connected. This is shown in Figure 7.44. 
 
The A-Phase current measures over 5 amp for the first cycle and the rest of the cycles 
have a lower value of 3,64 Amp. This is much higher compared to the Phase to Ground 
fault current measurement of 2 Amp in the previous section. 
 
7.8.3.2.4 The behaviour of the system during a three phase fault 
A three phase type of fault is applied between the A, B and C-Phases in the system with 
parallel power transformers. The Fault is applied to the 11kV bus bar in the system. The 
system configuration is changed by opening different circuit breakers.  
The following three configurations are considered for the experiment: 
• Transformer 1, Transformer 2 and Source 2 are connected in the system, 
• Transformer 1 and Source 2 are connected, 
• Transformer 1 is connected. 
The results are monitored in RTDS Runtime. 
The A-Phase secondary output peak currents for Transformer 1, (132kV current 
transformer) are measured for the three different system configurations. This is shown 
in Figure 7.45. The current measurements are not time synchronised. 
 
Figure 7.45 Transformer 1, 132kV CT A-Phase currents for a Three Phase fault and different 
system conditions 
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A summary is shown in Table 7-6 below. The fault currents flowing through Transformer 
1 are different as the system configuration is changed. The 132kV CT A-Phase output 
currents for Transformer 1 are shown. 
 
Table 7-6 Summary of system behaviour for a 3-phase fault and different system 
configurations. 
Connected in system T1 CT1 A-Phase 
Transformer 1, 2 and Source 2 3,3 
Transformer 1 and Source 2 5,1 
Transformer 1 5,4 
 
The highest fault current is measured when transformer 1 is connected. The three phase 
and phase-to-phase faults produce the highest fault currents. The results also show that 
the highest current will flow through Transformer 1 when it is not parallelly connected. 
The fault currents for the different types of faults will be lower for the case where 
Transformer 1 is parallelly connected.  
 
7.8.3.3 Differential protection relay 
The RTDS/RSCAD Differential protection relay model used in this simulation case, is 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 5.3.1.  
The system phase currents are fed into the inputs of the differential (87) function. 
Ratio mismatch and phase shifts in the 87 function are compensated for in the model. 
The operating quantity and restraining quantity are calculated for each phase and applied 
to the 2-slope differential current characteristic.  
A Two winding 132/11kV YD transformer is configured in RTDS Draft. A ratio of 200/1 is 
used on the transformer 132kV winding 1 and 2000/1 is used for the 11kV winding 2. 
The Current transformer output currents are monitored and compared for a protection 
system using Merging Units and a protection system without Merging Units. The Merging 
Units are simulated by using the RTDS/RSCAD GTNET_SV9−2_v5 component to 
produce IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Value (SV) streams. 
The basic operation of the RTDS Differential protection function is as follows. The 
operating quantity is the vector sum of the phase currents. 
IOP = ICT1−ICT2    ( 7-1 ) 
 
The operating current Iop is the vector sum of the currents of CT1 on the primary side of 
the transformer and CT2 on the secondary side of the transformer. Under normal 
operation the magnitude of ICT1 equals ICT2, but the phases are 180 degrees apart. 
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The restraint quantity is calculated using the summation of current magnitudes of every 
connected CT divided by 2. 
IRS = (ICT1 + ICT2)/2  ( 7-2 ) 
 
The amount of restraint current determines the amount of operating current required to 
operate. The operating quantity must be above the minimum operating value setting or 
the relay will not operate. 
 
7.8.3.4 The behaviour of the Differential relay during normal conditions. 
The system supplies a load of 40MVA. For the experiment the system configuration is 
changed while keeping the load constant. The following three system configurations are 
considered: 
• Transformer 1, Transformer 2 and Source 2 are connected in the system to 
supply the load together.  
• Transformer 1 and Source 2 are connected.  
• Transformer 1 is connected. 
 
RTDS Runtime results measured are shown in Table 7-7. The Differential protection 
function stays stable when the load current increases with I operate is increasing but 
stay lower as the restrain current.  
Table 7-7 Differential operating / restrain currents 
Connected in system I operate I restrain 
Transformers 1, 2 and Source 2 0,12 0,3543 
Transformer 1 and Source 2 0,1964 0,5784 
Transformer 1 0,314 0,9218 
 
The amount of restraint current determines the amount of operating current required to 
operate.  
 
• The minimum operating current setting. 
A low setting makes the differential relay sensitive for low fault currents. It should be high 
enough for the relay not to operate for normal conditions. 
It was measured above that the highest value of the operating current is 0,314 Amp for 
a 40MVA load through the transformer. The minimum operating current need therefore 
to be above 0,314 Amp for the differential relay not to trip under load conditions.  
The operating quantity must be above the minimum operating value setting or the relay 
will not operate. The minimum operating current setting of 0,4 is selected for the 
Differential relay.  
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7.8.3.5 The behaviour of the Differential relay during faults applied outside the 
protection zone. 
Different types of faults are applied to the system at the 11kV Busbar. The faults are 
applied outside the protection zone (FLT2) shown in the Figure 7.40 above, for the Case 
C. The following type of faults are applied: 
• Single phase to ground faults 
• Phase to Phase faults 
• Three phase faults 
The secondary output current of the 11kV current transformers (CT2) is measured for 
three phases (A, B and C). 
It is expected that the results for this section will show that the Differential protection 
operating and restrain currents will change for different types of faults. The protection 
should stay stable during the faults and will not issue trips during the different types of 
faults due to the fault being outside the protection zone. 
The worst case for which the protection should not operate can be determined by 
measuring the different fault currents for different types of faults. The protection settings 
for the protection relays are optimised using these results. 
 
7.8.3.5.1 The behaviour of the Differential relay during a single phase to ground fault 
applied out of the protection zone 
A fault is applied to the A-Phase in the system with parallel power transformers to the 
11kV bus bar in the system (position Fault 2). It is shown above in section 7.8.3.2.2 that 
the highest fault current occurs when a single phase to ground type of fault is applied 
when only Transformer 1 is connected. 
The result of the experiment is monitored in RTDS Runtime where the operating and 
restrain currents are shown. 
The graphs of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are shown 
in Figure 7.46. The three different operating currents, for each of the three phases are 
measured for Transformer 1 with A-Phase Operating current (T1AOP), B-Phase 
Operating current (T1BOP) and C- Phase Operating current (T1COP). Transformer 
Minimum Restrain current (IRSMINT) and Transformer Minimum Operating current 
(IOMINT) are also shown, Figure 7.46. 
The operating current for the A-Phase increases correctly above the minimum operating 
current during the fault on the A-Phase. The operating currents for the other two non-
faulted B and C phases decreased slightly. 
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Figure 7.46 TRFR1 87 Differential currents for Fault 2 
 
The next graphs of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are 
shown in Figure 7.47 where only the Transformer 1 A Phase Operating current (T1AOP), 
A Phase restrain current (T1ARS), Transformer Min Restrain current (IRSMINT) and 
Transformer Minimum Operating current (IOMINT) are shown. 
The operating current as well as the restrain currents for the A-Phase increas correctly 
above the minimum operating current during the fault on the A-Phase. The restrain 
current is larger than the operating current. It is also shown that the fault current is not 
cleared by the protection. 
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Figure 7.47 Operating and restrain currents for a Phase to ground fault at a position of Fault 2 
 
The secondary output currents of the 11kV current transformers (CT2) are shown for the 
three phases (IBUR2A, B and C) in Figure 7.48 below. 
The status of the protection switch (SWPROTON) is shown. A digital high level indicates 
the protection switch is in the on position and a low level indicates the protection is 
switched off.  
The position where the fault is applied is shown with digital inputs ApplyGrFlt1 and 
ApplyGrFlt2. The digital input ApplyGrFlt2 is high indicating the fault is applied at a 
position of Fault 2. A single phase fault on the A-Phase is applied. 
Output 1 (OUT1) is a trip signal issued by the 87 differential protection function. Output 
2 (OUT2) is a trip signal issued by the instantaneous over current 50P function. TRIP is 
the signal to open the circuit breaker, and a high signal is indicating a trip signal is issued. 
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Figure 7.48 TRFR1 currents during A-Phase to ground fault 
No trip signal is issued from both differential and over current protection due to the fault 
being out of the protection zone. This is the correct operation that is expected. 
 
7.8.3.5.2 The behaviour of the Differential relay during a phase to phase fault applied 
out of the protection zone 
A fault is applied between the A and B Phases in the system with parallel power 
transformers. The fault is applied to the 11kV bus bar (position Fault 2). It is shown above 
in section 7.8.3.2.4 that the highest fault current occurs for a phase to phase type fault 
when only Transformer 1 connected. 
The result of the experiment is monitored in RTDS Runtime to show the operating and 
restrain currents. 
The next graph of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are 
shown in Figure 7.49 with the Transformer 1 A Phase Operating current (T1AOP), A 
Phase restrain current (T1ARS), Transformer Min Restrain current (IRSMINT) 
Transformer slope 1 and slope 2 breakpoint setting (S1S2T), Transformer 1 slope 1 
origin setting (IORGS2T) and Transformer Minimum Operating current setting (IOMINT) 
shown. 
The operating current as well as the restrain current for the A-Phase increase correctly 
above the minimum operating current during the fault. The operating and restrain current 
are much higher as for the case of a single phase to ground fault. It is also shown that 
the fault current is not cleared by the protection. 
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Figure 7.49 Operating and restrain currents for a phase to phase fault at a position of Fault 2 
 
The secondary output current of the 11kV current transformers (CT2) is shown for three 
phases (IBUR2A, B and C) in Figure 7.50 below. 
The status of the protection switch (SWPROTON) is shown in an off position.  
The digital input ApplyGrFlt2 is high indicating the fault is applied at a position of Fault 2. 
A phase to phase fault is applied between the A and B-Phases. 
No trip signal issued by the 87 differential protection function (OUT1) or the 
instantaneous over current 50P function (OUT2).  
No signal to open the circuit breakers are issued as the digital signal is low for the trip 
output (TRIP). The protection must stay stable for this position of the fault and not issue 
a trip. This result for the experiment is therefore correct due to the fault being outside the 
protection zone. 
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Figure 7.50 TRFR1 fault currents during a phase to phase fault at a position 2 
 
7.8.3.5.3 The behaviour of the Differential relay during a three phase fault applied out 
of the protection zone 
A fault is applied to all three phases in the system with parallel power transformers. The 
fault is applied to the 11kV bus bar (position Fault 2). It is shown above in section 
7.8.3.2.4 that the highest fault current occurs for a three phase type fault when only 
Transformer 1 is connected. 
The results of the experiment are monitored in RTDS Runtime to show the operating and 
restrain currents. 
The next graphs of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are 
shown in Figure 7.51 with the Transformer 1 A Phase Operating current (T1AOP), A 
Phase restrain current (T1ARS), Transformer Min Restrain current (IRSMINT) 
Transformer slope1 and slope 2 breakpoint setting (S1S2T), Transformer 1 slope 1 origin 
setting (IORGS2T) and Transformer Minimum Operating current setting (IOMINT) 
shown. 
The operating current as well as the restrain current for the A-Phase increase correctly 
above the minimum operating current during the fault. The operating and restrain 
currents are much bigger than for the case of a single phase to ground fault. It is also 
shown that the fault current is not cleared by the protection. 
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Figure 7.51 Operating and restrain currents for a three phase fault at a position of Fault 2 
 
The secondary output currents of the 11kV current transformers (CT2) are shown for 
three phases (IBUR2A, B and C) in Figure 7.52 below. 
The status of the protection switch (SWPROTON) is shown in an off position.  
The digital input ApplyGrFlt2 is high indicating the fault is applied at a position of Fault 2. 
A three phase fault is applied. 
No trip signal issued by the 87 differential protection function (OUT1) or the 
instantaneous over current 50P function (OUT2).  
No signals to open the circuit breakers are issued as the digital signal is low for the trip 
output (TRIP). The protection must stay stable for this position of the fault and a trip will 
not issued. This result for the experiment is therefore correct due to the fault being 
outside the protection zone. 
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Figure 7.52 TRFR1 currents during a three phase fault at a position 2 
 
RTDS Runtime results for the Differential relay measured for different types of faults are 
shown in Table 7-8 below. The operating current is higher than the minimum operating 
current setting of 0,4 Amp. The Differential protection function stays stable when the fault 
current increases. I operate increases but stays lower as the restrain current.  
Table 7-8 Differential operating / restrain currents for different types of faults outside the 
protection zone 
Type of fault I operate I restrain 
Single phase to ground fault applied to the A-Phase 0,52 1,48 
Phase to Phase fault applied between the A and B-
Phases 
0,778 2,76 
Three phase faults 1,28 4,13 
 
RTDS Runtime results for the fault currents measured for different types of faults are 
shown in Table 7-9 below. The highest peak current during the first cycle is measured at 
the secondary side of the CT. The CT has a ratio of 2000/1. The Differential protection 
function stays stable when the fault is applied outside the protection zone.  
Table 7-9 Faults currents measured at Transformer 1 11kV CT for different types of faults at the 
11kV Busbar. 
Type of fault Fault Current (Amp) 
Single phase to ground fault applied to the A-Phase 3,04 
Phase to Phase fault applied between the A and B-Phases 5,16 
Three phase faults 7,89 
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7.8.3.6 The behaviour of the Differential relay during faults applied inside the 
protection zone. 
A single phase to ground type of fault is applied to the system at the 132kV Busbar. The 
fault is inside the protection zone (FLT1) shown in the Figure 7.40 above, for the Case 
C. The following two cases are evaluated: 
• The protection is switch off; the circuit breakers are not tripped when the 
protection relays issue a trip signal. 
• The protection is switched on; the circuit breakers are tripped when the protection 
issues a trip signal. 
 
The secondary output currents of the 132kV current transformer (CT1) are measured for 
the three phases (A, B and C). 
It is expected that the results for this section will show that the protection should operate 
during the faults and issue a trip during the faults due to the fault being inside the 
protection zone. 
The protection settings for the protection relay are verified and optimised using these 
results. 
 
7.8.3.6.1 The behaviour of the Differential relay during a single phase to ground fault 
applied in the protection zone with the protection switched off. 
A fault is applied to the A-Phase in the system with parallel power transformers to the 
132kV bus bar in the system (position of Fault 1).  
The results of the experiment are monitored in RTDS Runtime for the operating and 
restrain currents. 
The graph of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are shown in 
Figure 7.53 with the Transformer 1 A Phase Operating current (T1AOP), A Phase 
restrain current (T1ARS), Transformer Min Restrain current (IRSMINT) and Transformer 
Minimum Operating current (IOMINT) shown. 
The operating current as well as the restrain current for the A-Phase increase correctly 
above the minimum operating current during the fault on the A-Phase. The operating 
current is now larger than the restrain current. This is expected due to the fault being in 
the protection zone. It is also shown that the fault current is not cleared by the protection. 
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Figure 7.53 TRFR1 87 operating and restrain currents for a Phase to ground fault at position Fault 
1 
 
The secondary output currents of the 132kV current transformer (CT1) are shown for the 
three phases (IBUR1A, B and C) in Figure 7.54 below. 
The status of the protection switch (SWPROTON) is shown. The digital low level 
indicates the protection switch is in the off position.  
The digital input ApplyGrFlt1 is high indicating the fault is applied at a position of Fault 1. 
A single phase fault on the A-Phase is applied. 
A trip signal is issued by the 87 differential protection function (OUT1) and a trip signal 
is issued by the instantaneous over current 50P function (OUT2). TRIP is the signal to 
open the circuit breaker, and a low signal is indicating a trip signal is not issued due to 
the protection switch being in the off position. The fault current is sustained because the 
fault is not removed by opening the circuit breakers to clear it. 
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Figure 7.54 TRFR1 currents during A-Phase to ground fault at a position of Fault 1 
 
Both the differential and over current protection issue a trip signal due to the fault being 
in the protection zone. This is the correct operation that is expected. 
 
7.8.3.6.2 The behaviour of the Differential relay during a single phase to ground fault 
applied in the protection zone with the protection switched on. 
The two transformers are connected in parallel and both sources are connected. A fault 
is applied to the A-Phase in the system with parallel power transformers to the 132kV 
bus bar in the system (a position of Fault 1).  
The result of the experiment is monitored in RTDS Runtime to show the operating and 
restrain currents. 
The graphs of the Differential ( 87 ) function, operating and restrain currents are shown 
in Figure 7.55 with the Transformer 1 A Phase Operating current (T1AOP), A Phase 
restrain current (T1ARS), Transformer Min Restrain current (IRSMINT) and Transformer 
Minimum Operating current (IOMINT) shown. 
The operating current as well as the restrain currents for the A-Phase increases correctly 
above the minimum operating current during the fault on the A-Phase. The operating 
current is larger than the restrain current. This is expected due to the fault being in the 
protection zone. It is also shown that the fault current is cleared by the protection. 
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Figure 7.55 TRFR1 87 operating and restrain currents for a Phase to ground fault at a position of 
Fault 1 
 
The secondary output currents of the 132kV current transformer (CT1) are shown for the 
three phases (IBUR1A, B and C) in Figure 7.56 below. 
The status of the protection switch (SWPROTON) is shown. The digital high level 
indicates the protection switch is in the on position.  
The digital input ApplyGrFlt1 is high indicating the fault is applied at a position of Fault 1. 
A single phase fault on the A-Phase is applied. 
A trip signal is issued by the 87 differential protection function (OUT1) and a trip signal 
is issued by the instantaneous over current 50P function (OUT2). TRIP is the signal to 
open the circuit breaker, and a high signal is indicating a trip signal is issued due to the 
protection switch being in the on position. The fault current is by opening the circuit 
breakers to clear the fault. 
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Figure 7.56 TRFR1 currents during A-Phase to ground fault at apposition of Fault 1 
 
Both the differential and over current protection issues a trip signal due to the fault being 
in the protection zone. This is the correct operation that is expected. 
 
7.8.4 Test-bench D 
The system has a source connected to the 132kV (SRC1) bus bar. The 11kV bus bar 
has 2 x Bus Sections, 1 x 11kV load and 1 x 11kV Source (SRC2) are connected to the 
11kV bus bar sections. A Bus Section circuit breaker (BS1) connects the two bus 
sections. 
Two cases are considered: 
• The first is for the Case D1 with Sampled Values (SV) to simulate a system using 
Merging Units. A lower burden on the current transformer is used. 
• The second is for the Case D2 where no SV is used. A higher burden on the 
current transformer is used. 
 
Experiments are done for: 
• Normal load conditions 
• Fault applied at a position FLT2 
• Fault applied at a position FLT1 
 
The RTDS RSCAD Runtime model of the simulation Case D, for the cases of parallel 
power transformers without using SV, is shown in Figure 7.57 below. The system is the 
same as for Case C with the exception that Sampled Values are not used. The instrument 
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transformers produced analogue signals proportional to the real-time primary system 
voltage and current signals. These signals are taken to the RTDS/RSCAD Differential 
and Over Current protection relays. This setup is used for experiments to compare 
results of a system where SVs are used (Case C) with a system where SV is not used 
(Case D).  
 
Figure 7.57 RTDS RUNTIME Case D for Test-bench D with TRFR 1 & 2 without SV 
 
7.8.4.1 Current transformer burden 
The Current Transformers (CTs) are used for protection systems when currents several 
times higher than the rated current are measured during system fault conditions. 
The knee-point voltage and exciting current are important specifications for protection 
class CTs. 
The CT knee-point voltage requirement is a function of the total circuit resistance. 
VK = f (RCT, RL, RRP)                   ( 2-1)  
Where: 
VK = Required CT knee-point voltage (volts) 
RCT = Resistance of the current transformer secondary winding (ohms) 
RL = Resistance of a single lead from the relay to current transformer (ohms) 
RRP = Impedance of a relay phase current input 
 
The resistance of the CT secondary winding is specified and determined at the design 
stage of the CT. The 132kV HV CT with 200/1 ratio modelled in the RSCAD software 
has an internal resistance of 0,8 ohm and the MV CT with 2000/1 ratio has an internal 
resistance of 8 ohm.  
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The impedance of the relay inputs is fixed. 
The lead resistance depends on the wire cross sectional area and distance of the IED 
from the CT. 2.5mm2 and 4 mm2 annealed copper wire is normally used in power system 
protection application. 
The electrical resistance of the copper wire can be calculated by using the equation  ( 
7-3) below.  
 
R = ρ (L/A) in ohm (Ω)  ( 7-3) 
 
Where:  
R is the resistance in ohms (Ω), 
L is the length in metres (m), 
A is the cross sectional area in square metres (m2), 
ρ is the resistivity constant (rho) = 1,72x10-8 for annealed copper wire at 20°C. 
 
The resistance of 100m 2.5mm2 annealed copper wire is calculated to be 0.688 ohm and 
100m 4mm2 to be 0.43 ohm using the equation. Note that this is at 20°C. The resistance 
is temperature-dependent thus when the temperature rises, the resistance will increase. 
A typical rule applies to a 3-phase (4-wire) connection between the CTs and the IED by 
multiplying the distance by a factor of 1.2. 
 
The Burden of the IEDs are very low.  
The Merging Unit used on the test-bench has a rated burden of < 0.05 VA at nominal 
current (In). 
The P645 Transformer protection and control IED has a rated burden of <0.2 VA at 
nominal rated current (In). 
 
Case D1 is where Sampled Values are used. The Merging Unit is installed close to the 
CT and the length off the copper wire lead used is 50m. 
Case D2 is where conventional copper wires are used from the CT to the protection relay 
in the control room. A length of 500m is used for calculating the copper wire burden on 
the CT. 
The following burden values used in the experiments for the two cases are shown in 
Table 7-10  below.   
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Table 7-10 Current Transformer burden 
Case Burden series resistance 
in ohm 
Burden series inductance 
in Henry (H) 
Case D1 (50m) 0,335 0,11e-3 
Case D2 (500m) 3,35 1.1e-3 
 
7.8.4.2 The behaviour of the current transformer during normal conditions. 
The system is under normal load condition. The 132kV Transformer 1 Current 
Transformer (CT1) is monitored. A CT ratio of 200/1 is used. 
The CT burden current and voltage are shown in Figure 7.58. CT1 is shown for the Case 
D2 with a high burden and CT11 for the Case D1 with a low burden. 
IBUR1A and IBUR11A are the A-Phase secondary currents monitored. It is shown that 
the currents are the same and only IBUR11A is visible. 
The burden voltages CTBUR1A and CTBUR11A are not the same as a result of the 
different circuit resistance. 
 
Figure 7.58 Current Transformers 1 under load condition 
 
The CT knee-point voltage is a function of the total circuit resistance thus a 1,75V knee-
point voltage is produced with a total burden of 3,35 ohm and a current of 0,523. 
 
CaseD2 
CaseD1 
7-64 
Table 7-11 CT Burden voltage under load conditions 
Case Wire 
length 
CT Secondary current 
(Amp) 
Burden Voltage 
(Volt) 
Case D1  50m CT11 0,523 0,176 
Case D2  500m CT1 0,523 1,76 
 
7.8.4.3 The behaviour of the current transformer during fault (FLT2) conditions. 
The system is under normal load condition when a fault is applied to the A Phase at a 
position of FLT2. 
The 132kV Transformer 1 Current Transformer (CT1) is monitored. 
The CT burden voltages are shown in Figure 7.59. CT1 is shown for the Case  
D2 with a high burden and CT11 for the Case D1 with a low burden. 
IBUR1A and IBUR11A are the A-Phase secondary currents monitored. It is shown that 
the currents are the same and only IBUR11A is visible. 
The burden voltages CTBUR1A and CTBUR11A are not the same as a result of the 
different circuit resistances. The higher circuit resistance results in a much higher burden 
voltage. 
 
Figure 7.59 Current Transformers currents and voltages under a fault condition at FLT2 
 
The CT knee-point voltage is a function of the total circuit resistance thus a 15 V knee-
point voltage is produced with a total burden of 3,35 ohm and a current of 4,477. 
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Table 7-12 CT Burden voltage under fault FLT2 condition 
Case Wire 
length 
CT Secondary current 
(Amp) 
Burden Voltage 
(Volt) 
Case D1  50m CT11 4,477 1,53 
Case D2  500m CT1 4,477 15,1 
 
7.8.4.4 The behaviour of the current transformer during fault (FLT1) conditions. 
The system is under normal load condition when a fault is applied to the A Phase at 
position FLT1. 
The 132kV Transformer 1 Current Transformer (CT1) is monitored. 
The CT burden voltage is monitored in Figure 7.60. CT1 is shown for the Case D2 with 
a high burden and CT11 for the Case D1 with a low burden. 
IBUR1A and IBUR11A are the A-Phase secondary currents monitored. It is shown that 
the currents are not the same. They are the same during the first cycle. IBUR1A saturates 
during the second cycle, the sinusoidal wave from is distorted and the secondary current 
produced is less than IBUR11A. IBUR1A is not reflecting the real power system current. 
The burden voltages CTBUR1A and CTBUR11A are not the same as a result of the 
different circuit resistances. The CT1 saturates during the high burden voltage. 
 
Figure 7.60 Current Transformers currents and voltage under a fault condition at FLT1 
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The CT knee-point voltage is a function of the total circuit resistance thus a 74,47 V knee-
point voltage is produced with a total burden of 3,35 ohm and a current of 22,23. 
 
Table 7-13 CT Burden voltage under fault FLT2 condition 
Case Wire 
length 
CT Secondary current 
(Amp) 
Burden Voltage 
(Volt) 
Case D1  50m CT11 22,23 7,56 
Case D2  500m CT1 22,23 74,85 
 
Merging Units can be installed closer to the current transformers in the yard compared 
to the distance between the protection IED in the relay room and the current transformers 
in the yard. These different distances have an influence on the lead resistance, total 
burden and thus knee point voltages.  
 
The result show that using merging units is influencing the total circuit resistance and a 
lower circuit resistance results in a lower current transformer burden voltage. The 
specifications and class for current transformers can therefore be different when Merging 
Units are used. 
A 10 VA class 5P20 protection current transformer with a nominal output current of 1 
amp must be accurate at 20 times rated current when connected to a 10 VA burden. The 
CT burden voltage will therefore be 200V. 
A 5 VA class 5P10 protection current transformer with a nominal output current of 1 amp 
must be accurate at 10 times rated current connected to a 5 VA burden. The CT burden 
voltage will therefore be 50V. 
A more economical current transformer can be specified when a Merging Unit is used. 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
The IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems is used to implement 
IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values for a typical substation system with parallel power 
transformers. 
In this chapter, different test-benches are setup and discussed. The configurations of 
Merging Units (MUs), a transformer protection Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) and 
Ethernet equipment are shown. Experimental results of the developed protection 
scheme are discussed.  
The Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) is used to run the real-time power system model 
and do simulations. IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Values (SV) streams are published from 
the RTDS as well as using stand-alone MUs, external to the RTDS. 
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It is shown that Analogue Merging Units (AMUs) publish successfully IEC 61850-9-2 
Sampled Value (SV) streams on the Ethernet network. 
A Micom P645 transformer differential protection IED as well as a differential protection 
function configured in the RTDS RSCAD are used for experimentation. The P645 is used 
to measure the SV streams but is was not possible to use it to test the protection function. 
The RTDS GTNET_SV9−2 component published IEC 61850−9−2 Sampled Value (SV) 
streams successfully on the Ethernet network. The MiCOM P645 IED subscribes to the 
SV streams and measured the analogue signal correctly. 
The RTDS RSCAD developed transformer protection component is tested successfully. 
The RTDS IEC 61850-9-2 SV streams are used to show that the burden on the 
Instrument Transformers is less when using MU and SV streams compared to copper 
wired instrument transformers. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems for Power Utility 
Automation (PUA) is used by many Utilities in substations since the standard was 
published. The abstract data models defined in IEC 61850 can be mapped to mostly 
three protocols: 
• Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS), 
• Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and 
• Sampled Measured Values (SMV). 
Most Utilities implemented the standard by mappings data models to MMS and GOOSE 
protocols (Semjan & Ji, 2019). The SMV protocol is not used to implement sampled 
values using part 9-2 of the standard. 
This research is to determine what aspects are important and need to be considered for 
implementing SMV for a typical substation with parallelly connected power transformers. 
The problems solved in this thesis is discussed in section 8.2. 
The deliverables are discussed in section 8.3 under sub sections of literature review, 
theoretical background, strategy, Real-Time RSCAD, power transformer protection, tap 
changer voltage control and the different test-benches. 
Recommendations are made in section 8.4 under sub sections discussing Ethernet 
networks for substations, time synchronisation, protection and control schemes, digital 
and analogue process interface, IEDs, auxiliary supplies, logical nodes, protection 
settings and application philosophies, instrument transformer requirements, transient 
power system conditions and tools required. 
Future work is discussed under section 0 and the application of the thesis deliverables 
under section 8.6 
  
8.2 Problems solved in this Thesis 
The main research problem is to investigate the IEC 61850-9-2 standard related to 
Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) in the Substation Automation System 
(SAS). The IEC 61850-9-2 process bus is implemented using merging units and sampled 
values in a substation where the IEC 61850 standard is used. 
 
8.2.1 Design based problems 
This research work developed a complete monitoring, protection, and voltage control 
system for parallel power transformers based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. Sampled 
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values are used together with the status of high voltage equipment for the protection and 
control of parallel power transformers. To complete this, the following design based sub-
problems are solved: 
 
8.2.1.1 Merging Units 
Merging Units (MUs) are configured to produce Sampled Values (SV) according to the 
IEC 61850-9-2 standard and publish the messages on a process bus network. The MUs 
are connected to the communication network via Ethernet fibre optic cables using 
100BaseFX LC connectors. 
1 PPS time synchronisation is realised via a separate fibre optic ST connector for each 
MU. 
 
8.2.1.2 Transformer protection 
A transformer protection scheme is designed that uses sampled value message streams 
for current measurement inputs. The protection relays are simulated in the Real-Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS). The transformer scheme protection settings automatically 
change according to the power system network arrangement. The scheme monitors the 
status of the circuit breakers and uses the open/close status of the circuit breakers to 
determine the network arrangement. 
 
8.2.1.3 Tap changer controller 
A tap changer controller is simulated in the RTDS using the RSCAD software. The 
simulation is done for a system with parallel transformers. The controller uses the 
open/close status of circuit breakers to determine if the transformers are connected in 
parallel. A Master-Follower controller scheme is tested successfully. 
 
8.2.2 Implementation based problems 
 
8.2.2.1 Communication network 
The substation communication network is extended to the yard for process bus 
application. The process bus network can be a separate new network, or it can be 
connected to an existing station bus network. When an existing substation is upgraded 
to implement a new process bus, the new MUs are connected to existing communication 
network or to a new network. New network switches are required, or spare 
communication ports is required on existing switches.  
The MUs and the transformer protection IED used for the test-bench have fibre optic 
100BaseFX connectors. A network switch is required that have the same 100BaseFX 
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connectors to connect the optic fibre cables from the MUs and IED to the communication 
network. 
The same communication network is used in the test-bench for sampled values and other 
communication traffic. The Virtual LANs (VLANs) method is used for the test-bench. 
VLANs are used to separate different types of traffic that share the same bandwidth on 
physical medium at the data link layer. 
The Quality of Service (QoS) technique, specifies a priority value, that can be used by 
QoS to priorities the traffic. IEC 61850 prescribes that GOOSE and SV frames are 
priority-tagged. The priority 4 is used for the SV messages in the test-bench 
communication network. 
The data bandwidth required for the sampled values is much more than the traditional 
substation communication network. The network switch ports are configured to allow for 
filtering, that reduce the traffic to end devices, by letting through only those messages 
with the correct VLAN identifiers and priority tags. 
A Star network topology is used for the test-bench communication network. 
 
8.2.2.2 Redundancy 
Different redundancy protocols are available in the market. The IEDs and MUs must be 
ordered with the correct communication ports to be able to implement the protocol 
selected. The IED and MUs used for the test-bench had single ports for connection to 
the process bus network. The Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) could therefore not 
be used. 
Main and backup protection relays use separate current transformer cores for each of 
the protection devices, with conventual protection scheme designs. The designer has 
the choice to use the same sampled value stream for both main and back up protection 
relays. Separate Merging Units can be used for the main and back up protection relays. 
The same sampled value data is us for both differential and overcurrent protection relays 
in the test-bench. 
 
8.2.2.3 IEDs 
There is not many IED manufacturers that use sampled values for a tap change 
controller. The tap changer controller function can be built with scheme logic inside a 
transformer protection IED. The Logical nodes associated with automatic tap changer 
controller (ATCC) will not be available. Generic process I/O LN Name: GGIO can be 
used if the specific LNs are not available.  
The RTDS RSCAD software is used for the test-bench setup, to build a tap changer 
controller, for parallel transformers. The LNs related to an automatic tap changer 
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controller is not available in the RSCAD software and the LN GGIO is used for GOOSE 
messages.   
The control circuit for controlling the transformer cooling fan motors can be included in 
the control circuit at the process bus level. Sensors or transducers are required to 
transmit temperature analogue signals using the proper LNs for the GOOSE messages. 
This data can be used as an input into a programmable automation controller in the IED 
used for controlling the transformer cooling fans. This was not implemented for the test-
bench as these types of devices are not available in the laboratory and sampled values 
is the focus for the research. 
 
8.2.2.4 Synchronisation 
PTP is preferred over SNTP to be used for process bus networks time synchronization 
using the communication network as medium. 
The Merging Units allowed for SNTP as well as 1 PPS time synchronization. A 1 PPS 
time synchronisation source was used via a separate fibre for the synchronization. 
The P645 IED has an IRIG-B input with BNC connector available for time 
synchronization. The IRIG-B signal is supplied from the network switch. 
The network switches support 1 PPS or IRIG-B. It also supports PTP and SNTP over the 
network. 
 
8.3 Deliverables 
The aim of the research project is to develop and implement a strategy, methods and 
algorithms for monitoring, protection and voltage control of parallel power transformers 
based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
To realise the above aim, the following objectives are satisfied: 
 
8.3.1 Literature Review 
A literature review of primary and secondary substation equipment is provided in Chapter 
2. 
The secondary substation equipment is reviewed under sub sections of section 2.2 for 
substation control systems, substation communication networks, network protocols, time 
synchronization, equipment, merging units and power transformer protection and control. 
Magnetising inrush, over current, restricted earth fault and differential protection is 
reviewed under the section 2.2.7 for transformer protection. Automatic voltage control 
and tap changer control is reviewed for transformer control. 
Primary substation equipment is reviewed under section 2.3 with sub sections for 
instrument transformers and earthing transformers. 
The review of a real-time digital simulation is done under section 2.4. 
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8.3.2 Theoretical Background 
Theoretical background of the IEC 61850 functions and communication interfaces, data 
modelling, the SCL language, the SCL file types, the communication services and Digital 
substation Ethernet technology is provided in Chapter 3. 
 
8.3.3 Strategy 
A plan of action is developed as a strategy for the design of a monitoring, protection and 
voltage control scheme of power transformers. The strategy is shown in Figure 8.1. 
A Single Line Diagram (SLD) of the substation to be modelled is required to identify the 
bays and other primary substation equipment that will be protected and controlled. A fault 
level is required to choose Current Transformer (CT) ratios. The source, power 
transformer size and impedance influence the fault level. 
The next step was to determine the protection and control requirements. This influences 
the Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and Merging Units (MUs) required. 
The Ethernet network design was determined by deciding on the type of time 
synchronisation, the network topology and the network redundancy required. The 
network design influences the requirements for the IEDs, MUs and network switches. 
Lastly, the equipment was configured and tested  
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Figure 8.1 Strategy for protection and control scheme design 
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8.3.4 Real-Time RSCAD 
The RSCAD® software allows the configuration, execution, and analysis of real-time 
simulations. A Real-Time RSCAD simulation was performed for the parallel power 
transformer system. Power source models, power transformer models, load models and 
instrument transformer models are configured for the power system model. 
Differential protection, instantaneous over current protection, tap changer controller and 
sampled value models are configured to simulate a protection and control scheme for 
the system of power transformers. 
 
8.3.5 Power Transformer Protection 
Design and implementation of the protection scheme for parallel power transformers 
based on IEC 61850-9-2 process bus is implemented in Chapter 5. 
The RSCAD software differential protection function, overcurrent protection function and 
IEC 61850 -9-2 LE sampled values were implemented and tested. 
The protection system simulation results show that: 
• The designed protection scheme operates correctly as required. 
• The power transformer protection settings can successfully be adapted when the 
system configuration for parallel power transformers is changed. 
• Digital Sampled Values were successfully produced by the RTDS GTNET card. 
They were published and measured on the Ethernet network. 
 
8.3.6 Tap Changer Voltage control 
Design and implement the IEC 61850 standard based voltage regulating IEDs to control 
on load tap changers of parallelly connected power transformers is discussed in Chapter 
6. It is shown that the power transformer tap changer controller operates successfully as 
was expected: 
• The developed logic circuit is correctly determining when the transformers is 
connected in parallel according to the open/close status of circuit breakers. 
• The Master-Follower mode operates correctly when the transformers are 
connected in parallel. 
• The Manual and Automatic modes operate correctly. 
 
8.3.7 Test-bench 
The development of the test-bench for real-time implementation and testing of the 
developed system using tests with a Real-Time Digital Simulator, Merging Units and a 
transformer protection IED was done. 
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Physical Merging Unit devices as well as the RTDS GTNET SV components were used 
to publish sampled values. 
 
8.3.8 Software used for the Test-bench setup 
Different software is used to configure the test-bench components and measure the 
sampled values on the process bus. The software is used to develop models of the 
considered power system, controllers and logic algorithms as part of the investigations 
and building of the test-bench. The developed software is described in Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1 Software used 
Software Chapters Developed models and functions 
RSCAD® 
Draft and 
Runtime 
4 Develop power system model and configure 
power system components, 
Configure instrument transformer components, 
Run and control the simulation case, 
Measure and capture simulation results. 
RSCAD® 
Draft and 
Runtime 
5 Configure protection relay components, 
Develop setting group selection logic, 
Configure GTNET SV component to produce 
sampled values, 
Run and control the simulation case, 
Measure and capture simulation results. 
RSCAD® 
Draft and 
Runtime 
6 Configure RSCAD tap changer controller 
component, 
Develop master-follower tap changer controller 
logic, 
Run and control the simulation case, 
Measure and capture simulation results. 
MiCOM S1 Agile, 
Alstom Agile MU 
configurator 
7 Configure the standalone Alstom Analogue 
Merging Unit IEDs 
Easergy Studio 7 Configure the Schneider Electric MiCOM P645 
transformer protection IED 
Moxa web console 7 Configuration of the Moxa PT-7728 PTP Ethernet 
switch 
Rugged telnet 
session 
7 Configuration of the Ruggedcom RSG2288 
Ethernet Switch 
8-8 
Wireshark 
network packet 
analyser 
7 Capture sampled values Ethernet network packets 
and display the detailed packet data 
Omicron SVScout 7 Visualizing Sampled Values (SV) streams, 
Subscribes to the SV streams, 
Displays the waveforms of the primary voltages 
and currents in an oscilloscope view. 
Generate a report to summarise the SV 
measurement information. 
 
8.3.9 Experiments 
Experiments with the test-bench were conducted for various scenarios using the RTDS 
simulated Merging Units (MUs) and conventional instrument transformers signals. The 
MUs sampled values were measured and evaluated using the RTDS simulated current 
and voltage signals. 
The experimental results do not show that the protection relay is performing better when 
sampled values is used. The A/D conversion is done in the MU before the data is 
multicast to all the IED subscribers. In the absence of MUs, the IED will do the A/D 
conversion in the control room. 
The results show that using Merging Units does have a lower burden on instrument 
transformers and this can have an influence on the performance of the protection 
systems. 
 
8.4 Recommendations 
The experiment results are analysed and used to make recommendations on the 
proposed system for protection and control of parallel power transformers according to 
the IEC 61850 standard 
 
8.4.1 The substation communication network 
The following different aspects are considered for the design of the network: 
• the physical network, 
• network topology, 
• redundancy.  
The Process bus and station bus can use two separate Ethernet networks or the same 
physical layer network but with separate data link layers for different VLANs. 
The proposed system has separate networks for the process and station bus. This allows 
to have different network topologies for the different communication busses. The 
backbone network can for example have a ring connected network switches while the 
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bay switches can be star connected to the end node devices. The IEDs connecting to 
both networks have to have enough network communication ports. The P645 IED used 
in the test-bench has separate network ports to be able to connect to the separate station 
bus and process bus networks.  
The SV messages of the process bus require more data to be transferred. The process 
bus can be designed to cater for 1 Gbit/s physical layer while the station bus network 
only requires 100Mbit/s network. The different types of fibre optic cables, single or 
multimode, as well as the bit rate required used different types of communication ports. 
The physical network therefore needs to be carefully planned as the communication 
ports of the devices such as switches and IEDs need to be specified when they are 
procured.  
The network topology depends on the type of network redundancy used. Rapid Spanning 
Tree Protocol (RSTP), Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High Availability 
Seamless Redundancy (HSR) are bus redundancy architecture that can be 
implemented. The IEDs, Merging Units (MUs) and other devices connecting to the 
networks need to be able to use these technologies. The P645 IED and MUs used in the 
test-bench setup did not support these redundancy architectures. Redundancy can be 
obtained by duplicating the networks and the devices. Main 1 and 2 devices can be 
connected to separate communication networks. The PT-7728 network switch supports 
RSTP and propriety Turbo Ring protocols for communication network redundancy. Using 
the propriety protocols, brings restriction to work only with certain manufactures. 
A process bus implementation is not recommended where point to point fibre optic 
connections between the merging unit and the IED is used as it will require additional 
communications ports on the devices. It may also limit future expansion. In the example 
of a bus zone protection scheme, when a new bay is added the protection IED will need 
to connect to a new merging unit. Another example is where the IED of a new bay 
requires to subscribe to receive a bus bar voltage from an existing merging unit. 
 
8.4.2 Time Synchronization 
The devices connected in a process bus network need an internal clock to be 
synchronized with a substation GPS clock. The synchronization is performed through 
IRIG-B or indirectly over a network using SNTP or PTP protocols. PTP has better 
accuracy and is considered more suitable for Process Bus applications. 
PTP uses the same Ethernet medium as the data communications for the time 
synchronization information communication. PTP reduces the cabling infrastructure 
requirements when compared to IRIG-B, as there is no need of dedicated time 
synchronization network. IRIG-B has limitations on the amount of the devices to be 
connected and the distance from the clock to the end devices in the yard. 
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It is recommended to use PTP where available on devices. IRIG-B should be used if PTP 
is not available for process bus time synchronization. 
 
8.4.3 Protection, Monitoring and Control. 
The complete transformer protection and tap changer voltage control are included in the 
system of parallel power transformers based on IEC 61850 and using part 9-2 for the 
process bus. 
The process bus is not limited to the analogue process interface where analogue current 
and voltages are converted to digital communication using IEC61850-9-2 Sampled 
Values. The binary process interface where circuit breaker status and control, tap 
position indication and tap drive control, winding and oil temperature indication all need 
to be included in the complete IEC 61850 application on the process bus level. 
It is therefore recommended to use not only Sampled Values (SV) but to use GOOSE 
and analogue GOOSE messages to implement IEC61850 at the process level. 
 
8.4.4 Digital Process Interface 
The digital process interface (digital GOOSE) needs to be included on the process bus 
level. Switchgear is an example of primary plant in the yard that must be included. IEDs 
that can monitor a circuit breaker are available on the market. The Logical Nodes 
available in the IEDs are very important when selecting these IEDs for the process 
interface. The IED may have the appropriate LNs for the breaker open and close 
statuses. Other statuses for example the SF6 gas pressure, trip circuit status, spring 
status are important for the protection system. Therefore, it is necessary for the IED to 
have these LNs too. It is also important that these devices can control the switchgear 
using GOOSE messages and not only to monitor and send status information. 
The digital process interface is also important for the control of the other plants in the 
substation. The tap changer control is a good example where it can be utilised. The 
changer information is shared between parallel transformers in a system and GOOSE 
messages are used to control the transformer tap changers. 
 
8.4.5 Analogue Process Interface 
The analogue process interface (Analog GOOSE) uses Sampled Values for the power 
system current and voltage values, but Analog GOOSE can for example be used to send 
transformer oil temperature or winding temperature values to the protection and control 
system. The temperature values can be used for condition monitoring but also for fan 
control of the cooling system. 
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8.4.6 IEDs 
The Test-bench Transformer P645 IED is connected to the process bus. The IED 
receives SV for the power system current and voltage levels from the Merging Units in 
the yard, reducing copper wiring in the yard. 
Different type IEDs can be connected to the process bus. 
 
8.4.6.1 Protection IED 
The test-bench transformer IED has Resistor Temperature Device (RTD) inputs that 
connect PT100 RTD probes to measure temperatures and Current Loop Inputs and 
Outputs (CLIO) analogue inputs and outputs (e.g. 4 to 20 mA) that can be used for 
various transducers such as pressure and temperature transducers. 
These RTD and CLIO inputs require wiring from the yard equipment such as a 
transformer to the IED in the control room. This IED must be installed close to the 
equipment to replace or reduce copper wiring in the yard. 
It is recommended to rather place Process Interface Units (PIUs) that converts the 
analogue signals to digital messages, close to the yard equipment. The Protection IED 
subscribes to this Analogue GOOSE messages published by the PIUs. 
 
8.4.6.2 Voltage regulating IED 
The voltage regulating IED that controls the On Load Tap Changer (OLTC) of the power 
transformer needs to be included when the IEC 61850 standard is implemented on the 
process bus level. It is recommended that the IED is installed close to the transformer 
tap change drive or transformer marshalling kiosk to limit the length of copper wiring. 
The voltage regulating IED measures the system voltages and currents depending on 
functions required. These inputs can be received from a Merging Unit using sampled 
values or from another IED using analogue GOOSE messages.  
A system current measurement is required for load compensation and Over Current 
(O/C) blocking functions. A Protection IED can send the blocking signal to the regulating 
IED using GOOSE messages. 
Information must be shared between parallel operating transformers. The transformers 
can operate in master-follower mode. Parallelly connected transformers can also operate 
in circulating current mode. Voltage control with the circulating current method aims to 
minimize this circulating current. Current measurements and transformer reactance 
information is shared between the transformers (Gajić et al., 2010). The regulating IED 
also needs system information e.g. switch status to determine if the transformer is 
connected in parallel or single operating. This information can be shared between the 
transformers with digital GOOSE and analogue GOOSE messages. 
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The position of the transformer tap changers is required for the regulating IED, but the 
information is also required for the SCADA system. GOOSE or MMS messages can be 
used to share this information. 
 
8.4.6.3 Merging unit  
Sampled values can be sent from the MU in two modes per IEC 61850-9-2, depending 
on the application. 80 samples per cycle (or 4000 samples/s) is used for protection 
application and 256 samples per cycle is used for waveform recording, power quality and 
metering. 
Unique protection may require higher sampling rates. Traveling wave line protection 
requires high-resolution voltage and current recording with a 1 MHz sampling rate to 
record and analyse high-frequency transients, such as traveling waves from faults, 
switching events, etc. 
 
8.4.7 Auxiliary supply 
The auxiliary power for the IEDs in the substation panels is normally provided from a 
secure supply realised with a changeover between a main and backup auxiliary voltage 
supply. Some IEDs and network switches have option for dual power supplies. 
It is recommended that the power supply for the process interface devices and merging 
units in the yard must also be done from a secure auxiliary DC voltage. 
 
8.4.8 Logical Nodes 
Detailed information regarding the IEC61850 implementation of the IED is described 
inside the conformance documents. The Modelling Information Conformance Statement 
(MICS) is one document that contains the declaration of the used Logical Node (LN) 
types. The logical nodes and all data attributes contained are named according to a 
standardised semantic. 
A GOOSE Control Block (GoCB) must be defined, a data set is needed that contains the 
data objects and data attributes to be sent, in order to publish GOOSE messages  
The On Load Tap Changer (OLTC) control functionality is not implemented in 
accordance with IEC 61850 Standard in the test-bench IED. The two logical nodes 
representing the OLTC mechanism and regulator, namely YLTC and ATCC, are not 
available in the IED. The LN representing the cooling group control, namely CCGR is 
also not implemented. It is possible to build these functions inside the IED with 
Programmable Scheme Logic (PSL) but it will not be possible to send GOOSE messages 
with these data specific to the YLTC, ATCC and CCGR LNs. 
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Logical nodes (LGOS & LSVS) to supervise GOOSE and SV messages are not available 
in the test-bench IED (Munos et al., 2018). Generic process input and output LNs namely 
GGIO, can be used if the specific LNs are not available but this is not preferred. 
 
8.4.9 Protection settings philosophy 
Differential protection IEDs must be highly sensitive on internal faults and at the same 
time stable and reliable for external fault conditions. The sensitivity of Differential 
protection is related to issues with mismatched CTs, CT saturation, lead resistance and 
tap settings. 
The whole tap range of the transformer is normally considered when applying protection 
settings. The transformer operates at specific tap settings for long periods. An adaptive 
differential protection algorithm can include the transformer winding tap-position 
information into the protection IED algorithm. 
The shorter distance from the MU to the instrument transformer decreases the influence 
of the sum of factors such as CT saturation and lead resistance on the biased low 
impedance percentage differential protection. 
High fault levels need to be considered when a CT ratio is selected to ensure that CTs 
do not saturate during fault conditions. This may result in greater mismatched CTs 
between primary and secondary side of the power transformer. MUs with lower burdens 
on the CT allows that better CT ratios is selected, and this eliminate the mismatch. 
 
8.4.10 Protection application philosophy 
Two protection devices using the same CT core increase the burden on that core when 
long copper wire cable runs is used from the CT in the yard to the IED in the control 
room. 
Different protection and control devices for example differential, back up over current, 
tap changer and bus zone may use the same sample value measurement without 
increasing the burden on the CT core. 
 
8.4.11 Instrument transformer requirements 
Class X type of CTs with high knee-point voltages is preferred by protection engineers 
for Differential, REF and Bus Bar protection to ensure CTs do not saturate and keep the 
protection stable for out of zone faults.  
Normal class 10P protection CTs with a lower Volt-Ampere (VA) specification can be 
adequate when used together with the Merging Units. 
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8.4.12 Transient power system conditions 
Electrical transients occur for many different reasons, but some examples are when the 
circuit breakers are switched, transformers are energised, during system faults and 
lightning. Power generators and now also the distributed energy sources have an impact 
on the transient response of power systems. Power system protection normally needs to 
operate during this transient period. The instrument transformer needs to accurately 
reproduce the power system voltages and currents to measured quantities to be sent to 
the IEDs. The Merging Unit is thus required to sample the voltage and currents and 
produce the correct digitized output for the protection IEDs to operate correctly 
(Blumschein et al., 2018). 
Further studies are required to determine the performance of the Merging Units when 
they are subjected to electrical power system transients. 
 
8.4.13 Substation yard 
The environmental conditions impact the decisions on the design of the substation 
automation system and can increase the cost of the project. 
The ambient temperature can have an impact on were to install the IED, MUs and 
communication equipment like network switches. This equipment can be installed in 
specific designed yard junction boxes or small buildings were the temperature effect can 
be controlled. 
The requirements towards the fibre optic trenches may be different from those for the 
normal cable trenches. The amount of fibres, and if redundant communication networks 
can share the same route or trench, are important to consider. The fibre optic may need 
special protection against rodents or other animals that can damage the fibres. 
 
8.4.14 Tools 
Software tools are important to monitor and setup a communication network for a 
process bus (Pereda & Amezaga, 2019). It is helpful not to only monitor the sampled 
value messages on the network but to visualise the sample value messages as well. 
Part 6 of IEC 61850 standard specifies a System Configuration description Language 
(SCL) file format for describing system, substation automation, IED and communication 
system configurations. Engineering configuration tools shall be interoperable between 
different manufacturers (Jinshan et al., 2017). Different tools were used for GOOSE and 
SV configuration, protection settings and programmable scheme logics in the IEDs. 
The software engineering tools are important criteria in selecting product for the 
substation automation system when different IED manufacturers are involved. 
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8.5 Future work 
IEDs to be installed on high voltage equipment such as switchgear and power 
transformers need more development and research in order to fully utilise the IEC 61850 
standard on the process bus level. The Logical Nodes (LNs) implemented in the IEDs 
are an important element in the successful implementation of a digital substation and an 
IEC 61850 process bus network. The LNs for transformer oil temperature or winding 
temperature data and other process interface data can be used for the protection and 
control systems. The temperature data can be used for condition monitoring but also for 
fan control of the cooling system. 
The use of the Merging Units and the sampled values will influence past protection 
application and settings philosophies but also will provide new opportunities in the future. 
The performance of Merging Units to transient system conditions need to be studied 
further. 
The differences between the data sampling in an IED and the MU is the control on the 
sampling rate. The IED generally uses frequency tracking and the MU uses a fixed 
number of samples per cycle at the nominal frequency. Research is required to 
determine if these differences have an influence on the protection system. 
This research work was on Merging Units and conventional instrument transformers. 
Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCITs) have other advantages over the 
conventional instrument transformers that need to be researched (Kumar et al., 2016). 
NCIT and sensors deployment is important for future implementations of digital high 
voltage substations.  
 
8.6 Application of the thesis deliverables 
The deliverables of the research work can be applied in: 
• The Centre for Substation Automation and Energy Management systems of the 
Department of Electrical Engineering, 
• Power Utilities and other establishments using power systems and digital sub 
stations in the Electrical Supply Industry. 
The research work on the thesis leaded to development of a laboratory test-bench where 
students can learn and understand the basics of the IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values 
principles. The test-bench components such as the IEDs, RTDS, standalone Merging 
Units and Ethernet equipment can be used for future research applications. 
The test-bench can be used to demonstrate during course work for students at the 
University, the basics of digital substations using a process buss network with IEDs, 
Merging Units and Ethernet equipment.  
The research work indicated where equipment is getting outdated and future equipment 
will be required for research work in IEC 61850-9-2 process bus. 
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The research work showed the importance and benefits of a RTDS and Hardware-in-
the-loop testing. It provides an environment for the testing of digital substation 
components connected to a simulation of a power system. Individually components or a 
whole system can be tested, prior to deployment in a utility network. The RTDS provide 
a way to examine the effects that the process bus communication network has on the 
protection system operation. 
 
 
8.7 Publication 
Pieters W.D, R. Tzoneva (2019) Investigation of an IEC 61850 standard-based process 
bus implementation of a protection and control scheme for parallelly connected 
transformers, Sent to Journal of Engineering, Design and Technology (JEDT), January 
2020. 
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APPENDIX A  
The IEC 61850 SCL Language & File types 
 
A.1 IEC 61850 SCL language 
Part 6 of IEC 61850 specifies a file format, of the System Configuration description 
Language (SCL). The SCL is used for describing IED, substation automation and 
communication system configurations. The SCL is also used to describe the substation 
equipment and power system functions through logical nodes. The SCL is used to exchange 
IED capability descriptions, and substation automation system descriptions using IED and 
system engineering tools. This data exchange shall be interoperable between an IED 
configuration tool and a system configuration tool from different manufacturers. The 
configuration language is based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML). 
The SCL object model has three basic parts, a substation structure part, a product or IED 
structure part and a communication structure part. The substation part and the product part 
form hierarchies. The overview of the SCL object model is shown in Figure A.1.1 (IEC, 2009: 
20) by using UML notation. 
 
 
Figure A.1.1 SCL object model IEC 61850-6 (IEC, 2009: 20) 
 
A.1.1 Substation model 
The substation part describes the functions of the switch yard equipment. The substation 
equipment on a single line level is shown with the connections between the equipment. 
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Functions in the substation represented by LNs can be attached as functional objects at 
each substation function level. 
The following substation objects of the functional structure are used in the SCL model: 
Substation, Voltage Level, Bay, Equipment, Sub Equipment, Connectivity Node, Terminal, 
Function, Subfunction. 
Circuit breaker, disconnector, current and voltage transformer are examples of equipment. 
A Power Transformer is a special equipment that can be associated with a Substation, 
Voltage Level or Bay. A Power Transformer can have Transformer windings as equipment. 
Different primary devices are connected to a Connectivity Node. Examples are: equipment 
connecting nodes within a bay or bus bars connecting several bays. 
 
A.1.2 Product model 
The product structure represents all substation automation related objects such as IEDs, 
logical devices and logical nodes. 
The product model consists out of an IED, Server, Logical Devices (or LDevice), Logical 
Nodes (or LNode), and Data Objects (or DO). 
The IED performs SA functions by means of logical nodes (LNs) and communicates via a 
communication system with other IEDs in the SA system. 
A Server is the communication entity within an IED and the communication access point to 
the Data of the logical devices (LD) and logical nodes (LN) contained in the server. 
A LN may receive data as a client and provide data as a server. 
 
A.1.3 Communication system model 
The communication structure contains communication-related object types such as access 
points and subnetworks. The communication model is not a hierarchical model like the 
substation and product models. 
A Subnetwork is the connecting node for direct communication between access points. All 
access points connected to a subnetwork can communicate with all others on the same 
subnetwork. A client connected to a subnetwork only have access to servers connected to 
that subnetwork. 
An IED with a router function can connect to two different subnetworks by using two access 
points. A router provides access to services which use a networking layer. Services such 
as GSE and sampled value messages are not allowed to cross from one subnetwork to 
another. 
An IED with master clock function is used to synchronize the internal clocks of all IEDs 
connected to a subnetwork. 
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A.2 SCL file types 
There are different purposes for SCL data exchange and Part 6 of the standard defines six 
types of SCL files each having a different file extension. The data exchange using these 
files between a system configuration tool and an IED configuration tool is also defined. 
A sender creates or produces a SCL instance for processing or to be consumed by a 
receiver.  
The System Configurator is a system level engineering tool that is used to import or export 
configuration files.  
• The fist type of file that a system tool receives is a System Specification Description 
(SSD) file. This file contains complete specification of a substation automation 
system including single line diagram for the substation and its functionalities. The 
SSD file will have a substation part where voltage levels, bays and equipment like 
transformers, circuit breakers, disconnectors and instrument transformers are 
specified. The functionality like protection, measurement and control is specified by 
the logical nodes. No association to IEDs is defined. 
• The second type of SCL file that a system configurator tool can receive is an IED 
Capability Description (ICD) file: This file defines the complete capability of an IED 
and needs to be supplied by each manufacturer. The file contains an IED section, 
an optional communication section and an optional substation part.  
• The system configurator can also generate a Substation Configuration Description 
(SCD) file by using the SSD file and the different ICD files to make the complete 
system configuration. The system configurator is not IED dependent. The System 
configurator is responsible for the communication addressing and the data flow 
between IEDs. 
A secondary system can be split into different parts. (e.g. a substation can be split into a 
high-voltage level and medium-voltage level), Such a system part is called a project. The 
engineering of communication data flow between projects is allowed and some interfacing 
data must be exchanged between the projects.  
• The file used to exchange data between system configurators of different projects is 
a System Exchange Description (SED) file. The system configurator can send and 
receive SED files. 
The IED Configurator is an engineering tool that is used to import files from an IED to the 
engineering tool. Specific settings or configurations files can be generated with the 
engineering tool and exported to the IED. The IED Configurator can be manufacturer-
specific.  
• The SCL file describing the IED project specific configuration and capabilities is 
called an Instantiated IED Description (IID) file. The IED configurator can be used 
to modify the data model, parameter and configuration values of the ICD file for a 
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new ICD file, or a project specific IED instance by means of an IID file. The ICD and 
IID files may contain preconfigured data sets and control blocks. The data sets and 
control blocks for an IID file produced from an SCD file, shall remain unchanged 
against the SCD file.  
• The IED configurator can also create a Configured IED Description (CID) file: The 
CID file contains a mandatory communication section of the addressed IED.  
The IED configurator is responsible for binding incoming data from other IEDs as defined 
within an imported SCD file to internal signals, e.g. by means of the SCL Input section, and 
for generating and loading the IED instance specific configuration data, which a CID file 
could be a part of. 
The IED configurator is responsible for the IEDs configuration and data model. It is not 
allowed to change any data flow- and communication-related definitions. It is therefore not 
allowed to directly modify a system description (SCD) file. 
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APPENDIX B  
The IEC 61850 Communication services 
B  
B.1 Abstract communication service interface (ACSI) 
Model Driven Engineering (MDE) is according to Overbeek ( 2006: 3) the new trend in 
software engineering. MDE uses models as core principle for software engineering. The 
Object Management Group (OMG) develops modelling languages and provides Model 
Object Facility (MOF) as a core element for the Model Driven Architecture (MDA)(Overbeek, 
2006: 3). 
The OMG meta-model hierarchy has four levels (M0-M3), At the M3 top level the meta-meta 
model defines a language for specifying a metamodel. The meta model is at level M2 and 
defines a language for specifying models at level M1. M1 models define a language that 
describes semantic. M0 level models contains run-time instances of the model elements 
(Object Management Group, 2017: 2). 
The OMG meta model hierarchy is used for the ACSI model in the conceptual model of IEC 
61850. The top level meta-meta model definitions is a list of base types and rules how to 
build the meta model and hierarchical structures. The meta model defines generic model 
classes for logical nodes, data objects and common data classes including their 
services(IEC, 2010b; Ozansoy et al., 2009). The ACSI model also provides domain type 
models at level M1 and instance models at level M0 in part 7-2 of the IEC 61850 
standard(IEC, 2010a)  
 
B.1.1 The meta model 
The meta model comprises classes for the description of data models and information 
exchange models. 
a. Information modelling classes  
The following overall classes are defined: Server, Logical device, Logical node and data 
objects. 
All other ACSI models are part of the server. A server communicates with a client and sends 
information to peer devices. 
Each of these models is defined as a class and the classes comprise attributes and 
services. 
Examples models are GenLogicalNodeClass model and GenDataObjectClass model 
Services for the GenLogicalNodeClass model are: GetLogicalNodeDirectory and 
GetAllDataValues 
Services for the GenDataObjectClass model are: GetDataValues, SetDataValues, 
GetDataDirectory and GetDataDefinition 
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b. Information exchange modelling classes 
The ACSI includes the following models for data objects and data attributes services: Data 
set, Substitution, Setting group control, Report control and logging, Control blocks for 
generic substation events, Control blocks for transmission of sampled values, Time and 
time synchronization, File system and Tracking. 
• A Data Set is the grouping of data objects and data attributes. A data set can be 
used to directly access information for reporting, logging, GOOSE messaging and 
sampled value exchange. 
• Setting group control model defines switching between setting groups and how to 
edit setting groups. 
• Report control and logging describe the conditions for generating reports and logs. 
Two types off classes are defined for the report control block, buffered and 
unbuffered. Each class has associated services. The Buffered Report Control Block 
(BRCB) has for example the following services: Report, GetBRCBValues and 
SetBRCBValues.  
• The Generic Substation Event (GSE) model provides the distribution of the same 
substation data to more than one device by using multicast or broadcast services. 
The information exchange is based on a publisher to subscriber mechanism. Two 
control classes are defined, Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) 
and Generic Substation State Event (GSSE). GOOSE supports the exchange of 
common data organized by a data-set and GSSE provides state change information 
in bit pairs. The model provides for a GOOSE Control Block (GoCB) with attributes 
and services. The following are examples of attributes: GoCBName, GoCBRef, 
GoEna, GoID,DatSet,ConfRev, NdsCom and DstAddress. The attribute GoEna can 
be set to TRUE or FALSE to indicate that the GoCB is enabled to send GOOSE 
messages. The following services are defined for the GOCB: 
SendGOOSEMessage, GetGoReference, GetGOOSEElementNumber, 
GetGoCBValues and SetGoCBValues. 
• The transmission of sampled values model and the Control blocks for transmission 
of sampled values (SVCB) provide for the information exchange of data set values 
based on a publisher/subscriber mechanism. The publisher at the sending side 
writes the values in a local buffer and the subscriber read the values from the buffer. 
It is important that the values are time stamped. Two methods to exchange sampled 
values between a publisher and one or more subscribers is possible, muticast and 
unicast. The multicast-application-association method uses a multicast sampled 
value control block (MSVCB) and the two-party-application- association method 
uses a unicast sampled value control block (USVCB) The following services are 
possible SendMSVMessage, GetMSVCBValues and SetMSVCBValues  
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B.1.2 ACSI mappings to Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) 
Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) is a standardised procedure which 
provides the mapping of ACSI services and objects onto a particular protocol stack or 
communication profile. (IEC, 2003b: 22). Part 8-1 of the IEC 61850 standard specifies the 
SCSM of the objects and services of the ACSI, IEC 61850-7-2) to Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS), ISO 9506 and ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames. 
The SCSM uses the 7-layer OSI reference model (ISO/IEC 7498-1) where layering of 
communication functions is defined. The layers are grouped in an application profile (A-
Profile) and transport profile (T-Profile)  
The upper three layers of the ISO A-Profile consist out of application, presentation, and 
session layers. The lower 4 layers of the ISO T-Profile consist out of the transport, network, 
datalink and physical layers. The combination of A and T-profiles is specified for each 
SCSM. 
Each SCSM consists of: 
• the mapping of the abstract specifications of IEC 61850-7 series on the real elements 
of the stack being used, and 
• the implementation specification of functionality, which is not covered by the stack 
being used. 
The Server, Logical device and Logical node objects models of 61850 as well as the generic 
substation event model (GSE) can be mapped to MMS (IEC, 2011b). 
  
B.2 Server class model 
The ACSI Server class is mapped to an MMS Virtual Manufacturing Device (VMD) object. 
Each VMD has a communication Service Access Point (SAP) through which MMS services 
such as control and monitoring can be exchanged. Each server object shall contain one or 
more MMS domain objects. 
 
B.3 Logical device (LD) model 
The ACSI logical device class, IEC 61850-7-2 GenLogicalDeviceClass is mapped to an 
MMS domain object. The domain object may have subordinate object that is uniquely 
named. The logical device objects and services are represented by the MMS domain object. 
Each physical device domain shall contain at least a LLN0 and a LPHD logical node. 
 
B.4 Logical node (LN) class model 
The ACSI logical node class, GenLogicalNodeClass maps to a single MMS NamedVariable. 
The MMS NamedVariable has a hierarchy of the MMS TypeDescription consists of multiple 
levels of components. The DataObject of the LN can have Functional Constraints (FC) with 
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Functionally Constrained Data (FCD) The FCD will determine the MMS NamedVariable 
ComponentName and ComponentType. The MMS named variables shall be created 
through the concatenation of the component names separated by “$”. The LN with data 
objects and FC will be represented by the MMS named variable 
<LNVariableName>$<FC>$<LNDataObjectName1>$<SubDataObjectName1> (e.g. 
MMXU1$MX$A$phsA). The data attributes DataAttr of the DataObjects is mapped in a 
similary to the DataObjects. The data attribute name is also included within the hierarchy 
<LNVariableName>$<FC>$<LNDataName1>$<AttributeName1>$<subDataAttributeNam
e1> (e.g. XBCR1$ST$Pos$origin$orCat). 
 
B.5 The Generic Substation Event (GSE) model 
The GOOSE Control, as defined in IEC 61850-7-2, shall be mapped to an MMS GOOSE 
Control Block (GoCB). The GoCB MMS structure defines component names with MMS 
TypeDescription. The following are examples of MMS GoCB components, each having a 
type description: GoEna, GoID, DatSet, ConfRev, NdsCom, DstAddress, MinTime, 
MaxTime and FixedOffs. 
GOOSE services such as the GetGoCBValues service shall be mapped to the MMS read 
service and SetGoCBValues service shall be mapped to the MMS write service. 
This SCSM uses a specific scheme of re-transmission to achieve reliability for the 
SendGOOSEMessage service. The re-transmitting of the same data is done with gradually 
increasing SqNum and retransmission time between GOOSE messages. 
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APPENDIX C  
Communication Network Architecture 
C  
Different architectures can be implemented in a digital substation communication network. 
The architecture will depend on the budget available as well as the reliability and availability 
requirements. The most common used architectures are cascaded, star, ring and a 
combination of them.  
 
C.1 Cascaded Architecture 
The Bay IEDs can be connected to an Ethernet switch in a sub-system. The first bay switch 
is connected to a station switch and the rest of the switches are connected cascaded to 
each other where. each Ethernet switch is connected to the next switch via one of its ports. 
The IEDs have a single network port and are connected to the network with one link. 
A typical cascaded architecture is illustrated in Figure C.1.1. 
Each switch adds to the system latency (Ingram, Steinhauser, et al., 2012; Mekkanen et al., 
2014). The maximum number of switches that can be connected, depends on the system 
latency which can be tolerated. 
 
 
Figure C.1.1 Cascaded Network 
  
The system availability must also be considered. The non-redundant switches and the 
cascaded architecture give the lowest reliability according to studies (Younis, 2016). 
This architecture is simple but with a generally higher latency. 
 
C.2 Star Architecture 
All the IED are connected to a single central multi-port Ethernet switch. 
A typical star architecture is illustrated in Figure C.2.1. 
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The IEDs have a single network port and are connected point to point to the network with 
one link. 
 
 
Figure C.2.1 Star Network 
 
This architecture is simple but the switch as a single point of failure can be a problem. 
Redundancy can be improved by duplicating the system. 
 
C.3 Ring Architecture 
The ring architecture is very similar to cascaded architecture. The chain of switches is 
closed from the last switch to the first switch to form the ring. 
A typical ring architecture is illustrated in Figure C.3.1. 
The ring architecture creates message loops. Messages could circulate indefinitely in these 
loops and all the available bandwidth will be used as a result. A manage switch is required 
to prevent the communication loops. Managed switches are more expensive than standard 
switches. 
 
Figure C.3.1 Ring Network 
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The ring architecture has an advantage over a star architecture due to not having the 
network switch as a single point of failure, but it is not as simple and more expensive than 
the star architecture. 
 
D- 1 - 
APPENDIX D  
Network redundancy protocols 
D  
Redundant network connections are essential when designing high availability 
communication networks. Different mechanisms and protocols can be implemented in 
substation communication networks to obtain redundancy and to have high availability by 
keeping the outage time as short as possible. The outage time that can be tolerated can 
depend on the type of substation, how critical it is for the power system and the importance 
and supply contract of the customer. IEC 62439-1:2010 is applicable to high-availability 
automation networks based on the ISO/IEC 8802-3 (IEEE 802.3) Ethernet technology. 
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) and MSTP are network spanning tree redundancy 
protocols. Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High Availability Seamless 
Redundancy (HSR) are bus redundancy architecture proposed by the IEC 62439-3 
standard (Igarashi et al., 2015: 3; Kumar et al., 2015b). 
 
D.1 Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) 
A Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) is an improved and faster version of STP. A 
Spanning tree topology such as RSTP consist out of a Root Bridge, Designated Switches 
and End Nodes connected in a LAN in such a way that all equipment is connected and there 
are no loops. 
RSTP uses two communication links or loops from the source to destination. The redundant 
links are temporary disabled until a failure in the primary link occurs. RSTP will enable the 
secondary link when a primary link fails. 
Any switch in a network can be a Root Bridge but only one Root Bridge can exist at a specific 
time. The priority part and MAC address of a switch or bridge ID can be selected. The switch 
with the lowest value priority will be the Root Bridge. The lowest MAC address will be used 
to select a Root Bridge if two switches have the same priority. The Designated switch is 
responsible to forward information from the Root bridge to the End Node (Wojdak, 2003). 
(Goraj & Harada, 2012) reason that one of the disadvantages of RSTP, is that Ethernet root 
switch failures can be non-deterministic in highly meshed networks and is recommended to 
be avoided using RSTP in highly meshed networks for substation automation. 
Another spanning tree protocol, MSTP, allows multiple instances of Spanning Tree Protocol 
on Virtual LANs. In a single physical network, there can be multiple VLANs, each with their 
own instance of Spanning Tree Protocol. An example could be where GOOSE applications 
are logically segregated to a separate VLANs.  
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D.2 Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) 
Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) uses parallel communication networks to obtain 
redundancy. PRP duplicates all transmitted data via two Ethernet ports for each device or 
node. Each port is connected to a separate independent Local Area Network (LAN). PRP 
continuously check the redundancy to avoid network failures 
The node of a PRP device with two communication ports is called a doubly attached node 
(DANP). Within a node, both ports are merged at the link layer and present themselves to 
the upper protocol stack as one single network interface with the same MAC address. PRP 
devices regularly supervise the network configuration to ensure that the two LANs are not 
connected. The supervision is done by using supervision frames. 
DANP sends the same frame on both LANs. The data frame has a six-octet trailer added, 
which contains a protocol identifier and a sequence number. The destination nodes receive 
the first frame of a pair and discard the duplicate frame on the base of its source address 
and on its sequence number. 
Nodes with a single port called Singly Attached Nodes (SAN) can be connected to separate 
LANs of a PRP network using a Redundancy Box (RedBox) and have redundancy. SAN 
can, without the Redbox, connect to only one of the networks and this will not have 
redundancy. 
 
D.3 High Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) 
HSR is specified in Clause 5 of IEC 62439-3:2012 standard and provides redundancy with 
seamless failover time in case of network failure. No topology reconfiguration is required to 
recover the communication. HSR topologies are compatible with the Ethernet standard 
IEEE802.3. 
HSR also duplicates all transmitted data via two Ethernet ports for each device or node like 
with PRP but all ports are connected daisy chained to the same network. The same data 
frame is sent from the sending node in two directions and the two frames are received by 
the receiving node from two directions. Each node receives a message on one port and 
forward the message on the other port. The message sequence number in the header is 
used by the source to reject the message when it reaches the source again to prevent any 
looping. 
HSR does not require the duplication of networks for redundancy as with PRP. The node of 
a HSR device with two communication ports is called a Doubly Attached Node (DANH). 
Within a node, both ports are merged at the link layer and present themselves to the upper 
protocol stack as one single network interface with the same MAC address.  
The cost of the HSR network will be less due to less hardware that is required. The network 
does not have to be duplicated and the HSR network does not require switches. 
SAN devices or nodes can only be connected to the HSR network using a RedBox. 
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Disadvantages of an HSR ring and particularly related to process bus and multicast 
sampled value frames is that all frames will have to be processed twice by every IED 
connected in the HSR ring, even if the IED is not subscribed to receive the message. More 
processing power will be required for the two Ethernet ports. The network will also have 
twice less available bandwidth because of the duplication of the data frames in the network. 
Every DANH requires a time to receive and forward a message. This time delay will increase 
and is depending on the amount nodes in the HSR ring. 
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APPENDIX E  
Physical Layer 
E  
The physical layer defines specifications of the data physical transmission medium. The 
IEC 61850 caters for future development and therefore is not specific on the communication 
medium and required speed. It usually considers networks with copper and fibre physical 
layers and 100 Mbit/s and 1 Gbit/s bit rates. 
Fibre has the advantage of galvanic isolation over copper. Each medium has a specific 
price, bandwidth and distance that it can cover. The distance that can be covered decreases 
with increasing data rate  
IEC 61850 assumes that communication is full-duplex and auto-negotiated. The peer ports 
are configured to recognize automatically the polarity, the duplex setting and highest 
common speed.100Mbit/s copper, 100Mbit/s and 1Gbit/s optical fibre as physical layers is 
discussed in Appendix C. 
 
E.1 100 Mbit/s (100BASE-FX) Optical Fibre 
100BASE-FX is a version of Fast Ethernet over optical fibre. It uses a 1300 nm near-infrared 
(NIR) light wavelength transmitted via two strands of optical fibre, one for receive (RX) and 
the other for transmit (TX). The maximum length is 2 kilometres for full-duplex over multi-
mode optical fibre. Multi-mode optical fibre is recommended because the communication 
equipment used over multi-mode optical fibre is less expensive than that for single-mode 
optical fibre. The recommended optical cable is multimode 50 µm (50/125) fibres, where 
the fibre has a core size of 50 micrometres (µm) and a cladding diameter of 125 µm.  
A typical single-mode optical fibre has a smaller core diameter than multi-mode fibre, 
between 8 and 10.5 µm and a cladding diameter of 125 µm. The maximum length is 10 km 
over single mode fibre. 
The transition between the core and cladding can be sharp, which is called a step-index 
profile, or a gradual transition, which is called a graded-index profile 
ST connectors are widely used where individual connectors are used for RX and TX. The 
individual optical cables need to be labelled for identification. No identification is required 
when paired cables and LC connectors are used. 
 
E.2 100Mbit/s Copper 
Copper has the lowest cost and can be used inside cabinets where electromagnetic 
interference is low, over distances shorter than 100m and when galvanic isolation is not 
required. 
The recommended cable is Cat5e with two twisted pairs and with RJ45 connectors  
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E.3 1 Gbit/s (1000BASE-X) Optical Fibre 
1000BASE-X is used in industry to refer to Gigabit Ethernet transmission over fibre, where 
options include 1000BASE-SX, 1000BASE-LX, 1000BASE-LX10. 
1000BASE-SX is a standard for operation over multi-mode fibre using a 770 to 860 nm, 
near infrared (NIR) light wavelength, for a maximum length of 550 m using a 50 µm multi-
mode fibre. 1000BASE-LX10 is practically identical to 1000BASE-LX, but achieves longer 
distances up to 10 km over a pair of 10 µm single-mode fibre 
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APPENDIX F  
Data Link layer 
F  
The data link layer or layer 2 is the second layer of the seven-layer Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model. It defines the protocol for the transmission of data frames and 
to establish and terminate a connection between two physically connected devices. The 
data link layer has two sublayers: logical link control (LLC) and media access control (MAC). 
A media access control address (MAC address) is a 48-bit address space and a unique 
identifier assigned to network interface controllers (NIC) for communications at the data link 
layer. 
 
F.1 Unicast and multicast MAC addresses 
Each frame carries a source and destination address. The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) allocates the source addresses to the manufacturers. The 
destination address can be unicast, multicast or broadcast. 
A frame sent to one receiver is called unicast. The least significant bit of the first octet of an 
address is set to 0 (zero). In IEC 61850, the MMS traffic uses unicast addresses. 
A frame sent to a group of destinations is multicast and the least significant bit of the first 
octet is set to 1. The IEC61850, GOOSE and SV traffic use multicast addresses. Packets 
sent to a multicast addresses are received by all devices on a LAN that has been configured 
to receive it. This set of devices is called a multicast domain. 
A broadcast is sent to all nodes on the local area network. A device will receive all traffic if 
the receiving controller is set to be in promiscuous mode. 
  
F.2 Layer 2 switch 
A bridge is often referred to as a layer 2 switch. A bridge is a type of network device that 
works on the OSI Layer 2. Data frame enters the bridge on ingress ports and leave the 
bridge on egress ports. When a frame enters the bridge on an ingress port it will use the 
MAC address to determine on which egress ports the frames are to be forwarded to. 
 
F.3 MAC address filtering 
MAC address filtering is traffic control mechanism that reduces the traffic that an end device 
handle. The bridge sends only the relevant part of the traffic to the end device. End devices 
normally do not filter traffic except if their controller is able to decode the MAC addresses. 
In IEC 61850, the MAC address filtering only reduces the MMS traffic, since the GOOSE 
and SV traffic is multicast. 
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F.4 Multicast filtering 
A bridge does not apply MAC address filtering to multicast traffic, since the multicast frames 
are forwarded on all egress ports. 
The network is flooded by multicast messages if not filtered. This results in excessive 
bandwidth consumption and unnecessary processing of unwanted traffic by IEDs or end 
devices. Multicast filtering can reduce the traffic to end devices by letting through only those 
multicast addresses the end device is interested in. The end devices normally have no 
multicast filtering ability, so the edge port on the bridge does the filtering on their behalf. A 
bridge port uses a configurable multicast filtering table to know which multicast addresses 
may egress from that port. 
 
F.5 Virtual LANs (VLAN) traffic control 
VLANs is a method to separate different types of traffic that share the same bandwidth on 
physical medium at the data link layer (OSI layer 2). The protocol most commonly used to 
configure VLANs is IEEE 802.1Q. The IEEE 802.3 frames carry a header, called the VLAN 
tag, 32-bit field between the source MAC address and the Ether Type fields of the original 
frame.  
The header consists out of a 16-bit field Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) and a 16-bit field Tag 
Control Information (TCI).  
The TPID field is set to a value of 0x8100 to identify the frame as an IEEE 802.1Q-tagged 
frame. This field is located at the same position as the EtherType field in untagged frames 
and used to distinguish the frame from untagged frames. 
Tag control information (TCI) field contains the following sub-fields, 3-bit field Priority Code 
Point (PCP), 1-bit field Drop Eligible Indicator (DEI) and 12-bit field VLAN identifier (VID). 
The VID with hexadecimal reserved value 0x000 indicates that the frame does not carry a 
VLAN ID and is called a priority tag. The priority tag specifies only a priority in the PCP and 
DEI fields.  
A default VID value 0x001 is often reserved for a network management VLAN.  
 
F.6 Quality of Service (QoS) 
Priority tagging (IEEE 802.1p) and VLANs are specified in the same standard IEEE 802.1Q 
and share the same tag, but they are separate concepts.  
The QoS technique, class of service (CoS) is the 3-bit field PCP and specifies a priority 
value of between 0 and 7 that can be used by QoS to priorities the traffic. Priority means 
that a bridge that receives several frames simultaneously will forward the highest priority 
frames and queue the other lower priority frames. IEC 61850 prescribes that GOOSE and 
SV frames are priority-tagged. The value 1 is the lowest priority mark and priority 7 is the 
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highest. Default priority is 4 for GOOSE and SV message given in IEC61850-9-2 but 
different priority can be assigned for GOOSE and SV messages. 
 
F.7 Bridge port filtering 
The bridge needs to be VLAN-aware to recognise the frames with the IEEE 802.1Q tag. 
The bridge ports need to be configured or set to allow the frames to enter. This can be done 
by a Port VLAN member set (PVMS) or VLAN ID table. Frames will not be allowed to ingress 
when a frame does not have a VLAN ID that is a member in the PVMS of that port. According 
to IEEE 802.1Q-2011, A bridge port can be set to admit the following frames: 
• only VLAN-tagged frames; 
• only untagged and priority-tagged frames; 
• all frames (not VLAN-aware). 
Manufacturers have different names for the port types in the port settings to admit the 
different types of frames. (E.g. Edge, Access, Trunk or Hybrid) The port can have its own 
Port Priority Code Point (PPCP) and Port VLAN identifier, (PVID). The port Native VLAN is 
the assigned VLAN number for the PVID. The port will use its default PPCP and PVID if the 
ingress frame does not have an IEEE 802.1Q-tagged frame. 
An ingress frame can have a value between 1-7 for the PCP, (priority tagged), but VID = 0 
(no VLAN). The port ignores its own PPCP, uses the frame PCP and inserts its PVID to 
form the VLAN tag. 
The option to admit all frames or VLAN un-aware, must be used when an IED connected to 
a port, sent tagged (GOOSE, SV) and untagged (MMS) messages. 
The egress from a port of a bridge is also controlled by the Port VLAN Member Set (PVMS). 
This port will forward the frames tagged or untagged. 
An egress port sends the frame only if the frame VID belongs to the port membership set 
PVMS. 
The port sends the frame without a change if it is configured to forward tagged frames. The 
port removes the VLAN tag including the PCP if it is configured to forward untagged. 
 
F.8 Static and Dynamic VLAN configuration 
Static VLAN configuration is done by using a network management and configuration tool 
to assign the priority PPCP and PVIDs to all device ports. 
 Dynamic VLAN configuration can be done by using protocols such as Generic VLAN 
Registration Protocol (GVRP) or Multiple VLAN Registration Protocol (MVRP). All devices 
broadcast their configured VLAN settings and dynamically learn the rest of the VLANs 
configured elsewhere in the network via GVRP. Dynamic allocation requires that all bridges 
and nodes support this protocol.  
F- 4 - 
Dynamic VLAN configuration simplifies the replacement of bridges. Traffic bursts during 
initialization and reconfiguration can occur.  
It is recommended by TR 61850-90-4 Technical report that substation automation should 
avoid dynamic VLAN assignment. 
 
 
G- 1 - 
APPENDIX G  
Time Synchronization 
G  
The equipment status collected at the process level by protection and control devices 
needs to be time stamped and published in a frame format on the substation 
communication network. All the devices therefore need an internal clock that is 
synchronized with a substation GPS clock. The synchronization is performed through 
IRIG-B, or indirectly over a network using one of several standards.  
The IEC 61850 standard recommends the Network Time Protocol (NTP) as 
synchronization method. The NTP time accuracy (0.1 to 1 ms) can be considered enough 
for data acquisition and control applications but not for Sampled Values. Timing classes 
are defined in IEC 61850-5 standard (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2013: 
68). The IEEE came up with IEEE 1588 standard (De Dominicis et al., 2011) to 
synchronize multiple devices over a network where their clock is in master/slave mode 
(Bhardwaj et al., 2014: 4). A single network implementation can be accomplished by 
using IEEE 1588 Precision Time Synchronization Protocol (PTP) (Skendzic et al., 2007: 
5). IRIG and PTP can be considered as better alternatives to NTP for process bus 
application. 
 
G.1 IRIG time codes 
The IRIG time codes were originally developed by the Inter-Range Instrumentation 
Group (IRIG), part of the Range Commanders Council (RCC) of the US Army. The latest 
version is IRIG standard 200-04, “IRIG Serial Time Code Formats,” updated in 
September 2004. 
IRIG-B has the capability to provide a 1µs time synchronization accuracy. 
Typically, the signal transmission of modulated IRIG-B is over Coaxial cable or Shielded 
twisted-pair cable. Unmodulated IRIG-B can be transmitted over Coaxial cable, Shielded 
twisted-pair cable or optical fibre. 
The name of an IRIG code format consists of a single letter plus 3 subsequent digits. 
The letters (A,B,D,E,G and H) are used for six IRIG Time Code Formats and one of them 
is IRIG-B. The different formats have different pulse or bit rates. IRIG-B has a pulse rate 
of 100 PPS. 
IRIG time code signals may be the first digit indicating if the signal is Unmodulated (DC 
level shift, no carrier signal), Modulated (amplitude-modulated, sine wave carrier) or 
Modified Manchester (amplitude-modulated, square wave carrier). The second digit 
identify the carrier frequency and the third digit coded expressions. There are three 
functional groups of bits in the IRIG-B time code: Binary Coded Decimal (BCD),Control 
Functions (CF) and Straight Binary Seconds (SBS). The BCD group contains time 
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information including seconds, minutes, hours and days, recycled yearly. The BCD time-
of-year code (BCDTOY) reads zero (0) hours, minutes, seconds, and fraction of seconds. 
The BCD year code (BCDYEAR) counts year and cycles to the next year on January 1st 
of each year and will count to year 2099. The CF group contains year, time quality, leap 
year, pending leap seconds, parity and a set of bits reserved for user applications. The 
(optional) SBS time-of-day code consists of the total elapsed seconds, recycling daily 
(Cyber Sciences Inc, 2017). It is therefore required to confirm that all devices connected 
support the same version of IRIG-B. 
The number of devices to be synchronized and the distances between devices affect the 
IRIG-B system architecture. 
 
G.2 Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) 
IEC 61850 proposes the implementation of time synchronization on a LAN using a simple 
network time protocol (SNTP). SNTP is a simplified version of NTP (Network Time 
Protocol) that uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) on port 123 as its transport layer to 
send datagrams in a client-server scheme. Both unicast and broadcast SNTP can be 
supported in an IED. The IED acts as a SNTP client to request and receive time values 
from a SNTP server in a SNTP unicast mode. The client uses the transmit and arrival 
times to calculate the offset between itself and the SNTP server.(Wester & Adamiak, 
2011) 
The SNTP client assumes that the delays are symmetrical in both directions, but this can 
be different depending on the data traffic (Ussoli & Prytz, 2013). 
The SNTP time synchronization system uses the substation communication network. 
The performance of the network switches and the loading of the network can influence 
the accuracy of the SNTP synchronization system.(JV & Gao, 2008: 3) 
In the first edition of the IEC 61850 Standard it was proposed to perform synchronization 
of devices in the substation by using SNTP. SNTP provides an accuracy of only 1 ms 
compared to the 1µs of IRIG-B. Micro second accuracy is required for synchronized IEC 
61850-9-2 Sampled Values. The IEC61850-9-2LE document proposed a separate 
synchronization network in 1pps or IRIG-B format.(Igarashi & Santos, 2014a)  
 
G.3 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) 
The Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a protocol used to synchronize clocks throughout 
an Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) using the same Ethernet medium as the data 
communications for the time synchronization information communication. When 
compared to IRIG-B, PTP reduces the cabling infrastructure requirements as there is no 
need of dedicated network for time synchronization information (Kanabar et al., 2012). 
PTP messages may use the User Datagram Protocol over Internet Protocol (UDP/IP) for 
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transport. PTP was originally defined in the IEEE 1588-2002 standard and adopted by 
IEC 61588-2004, entitled “Precision clock synchronization protocol for networked 
measurement and control systems (IEC, 2004). In 2008, IEEE 1588-2008 was released 
as a revised standard; also known as PTP Version 2. The second edition of the IEC 
61850 Standard proposes the use of PTP defined by the IEEE 1588v2 to cater for micro 
second accuracy that is required for synchronized IEC 61850-9-2 Sampled Values. 
Version 2 was more flexible and created potential incompatibility between devices. A 
profile was necessary to ensure device interoperability and that the specific needs of 
electric utility automation are met. The IEEE Std C37.238™-2011 profile was published 
to facilitate adoption of IEEE Std 1588-2008 for power system applications requiring high 
precision time synchronization(IEEE, 2011). The two versions of IEEE Std 1588 are not 
compatible and it is therefore not possible to have  Version 1 and 2 devices in the same 
network (Watt et al., 2015). 
The IEEE 1588 standards describe a master-slave architecture for synchronising clocks. 
The time master broadcasts a sync message containing its reference time to the slaves. 
 
G.4 Different PTP Clocks 
Different clocks are described in this architecture (Mallela et al., 2016). An ordinary clock 
(OC) can be either the master or slave clock. IEDs are typically slave-only clocks. A time 
distribution system can consist out of one or more communication network segments in 
a system and a synchronization master is selected for each of the network segments. 
The top-level master clock is called a Grand Master Clock (GMC) which is usually 
connected to a reference signal (GPS or atomic clock) The different network segments 
is connected by a Boundary Clock (BC) that can accurately synchronize one network 
segment to another. The BC has a slave port synchronized by a master clock in one 
segment and a master port that sends the PTP time synchronization message in another 
segment. A BC functionality is typically built into PTP-aware network components such 
as switches, bridges and routers. 
Sync message sent through a network suffers network delay consisting of link and 
residence delays. Transparent clocks (TC) measure the peer to peer and end to end 
delays. A TC uses a peer-to-peer delay mechanism to calculate the link delay in a 
network between the clocks in PTP-aware devices. A TC also measures the residence 
delay which is the length of time a PTP message takes to travel through a device as it is 
routed from the ingress port to the egress port. Hybrid Clocks (HC) combine a 
transparent clock and an Ordinary Clock (IEC, 2013c; Watt et al., 2015). 
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G.5 Time gateways 
Time gateways can be used to mix PTP and SNTP in the same network. It is not 
compulsory to replace all the existing SNTP devices when upgrading an existing time 
synchronization networks to PTP for microsecond accuracy. Time gateways are 
transparent two-port devices which are inserted in the network to perform the time 
conversion from IEEE 1588 PTP to SNTP (Ferrari, Flammini & Rinaldi, 2011; Ferrari et 
al., 2012).  
Time gateways may constitute a valid alter-native to the full replacement of an old device, 
when high synchronization accuracy is required, or large networks must be implemented. 
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APPENDIX H  
IEC 61850 IED Configurator 
H  
The MiCOM S1 Studio software provides a tool, the IED Configurator V7.1.0.0 to 
configure the files and transfer them to and from a MiCOM IED. The configuration can 
be done offline or online. MiCOM Configuration Language (MCL) files are vendor-
specific, containing a single device IEC61850 configuration information. The data file 
which contains the IED's IEC 61850 configuration information has a .mcl file extension. 
A new MiCOM configuration is created when the IED operates in an offline mode from a 
template or an IED Capability Description (ICD) file. The IED model number is used to 
choose the ICD file. The IED Configurator is shown in Figure H.1. 
The ICD file is selected and opened in the Configuration tool. The main area is shown 
on the left side window. The detail of selected category is shown on the right-hand side. 
The IED configuration can also be extracted from the IED online.  
The edited configuration file must be validated before it is sent to the device. The right-
hand lower pane shows lists of Errors, Warnings and Messages. 
 
 
Figure H.1 IED Configurator 
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The configurable items are categorised into groups in the Editor left-hand window. The 
Groups are IED details, Communications, SNTP, Dataset Definitions, GOOSE 
Publishing, GOOSE Subscribing, Report Control Blocks, Controls and Measurements. 
The sub-sections in the right-hand side window provide details on each configurable item 
type. The Item can be Read only or Editable. 
The configuration file can be created as new from and ICD file or opened from a 
configured SCL/MCL file. The items in the sub-sections in the right-hand side window 
will be read only when an already configured MCL is opened. The Manual Editing Mode 
must be used if it is necessary to edit these configuration files. Some items will be 
editable in the Manual Editing Model. A new configuration file will be edible when it is 
open from a template ICD file.  
 
H.1 IED Details 
The IED details tab, displays general configuration and data about the IED and selected 
ICD Template file. The IED Details are shown in Figure H.1.1. 
 
Figure H.1.1 P645 IED Details 
 
The IED name is configurable but some greyed out data e.g. the ICD Template data is 
not user configurable. 
 
H.2 Communications 
The communication configuration is shown in Figure H.2.1. 
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Figure H.2.1 P645 Communications 
 
Connected Sub-Network displays the Sub-Network name to which the IED is connected. 
An IED can only subscribe to GOOSE messages published by IEDS that are connected 
to the same Sub-Network. The Sub-Network name is taken from the Communications 
section of a configured SCL file. 
The Access Point data is read only and displays the physical port name for the MiCOM 
IED. It is taken from the IED AccessPoint section of the ICD template file. This data is 
not stored in MCL data and therefore not sent to the MiCOM IED. 
The IP address and IP SubNet mask of the P645 is configured when a new file is opened. 
When a configured MCL file is opened, it is taken from the ConnectedAP Address section 
of the configured SCL file. 
The IP address of any gateway or proxy device, to which the P645 is connected was not 
configured and left at its default unconfigured value of 0.0.0.0. When a configured MCL 
file is opened, this data is taken from the ConnectedAP Address section of the configured 
SCL file. 
The communication media used to connect the P645 to other IEDs is configured for a 
copper or fibre optic Ethernet interface. The ConnectedAP/PhysConn section of the 
configured SCL file is used. 
TCP Keepalive Packets can be used to determine if a connection is still valid. The 
frequency between 1-20 second is configured for the P645 to use to send a TCP 
Keepalive message. 
Database Lock Timeout configure the time that the P645 will wait during an active 
connection link without receiving any messages. The P645 will reverts to its default state, 
H- 4 - 
resetting any password access that was enabled after a timeout. The configured data is 
taken from the IED/AccessPoint/Server section of a configured SCL file. A valid setting 
is configured in a range of between 60 to 1800 seconds. This parameter is only 
application to MiCOM IEDs that supports setting changes over the IEC61850 interface. 
 
H.3 SNTP 
The configuration of SNTP is divided into the generic configuration within the IED and 
the configuration of two external SNTP time servers. The IED will attempt to synchronise 
with the time servers. The General SNTP configuration is shown in Figure H.3.1. 
 
Figure H.3.1 P645 SNTP Configuration 
 
The Poll Rate sets the interval in seconds at which the MiCOM IED requests time 
synchronisation from the selected SNTP servers. 
Accepted Stratum level can be specified that SNTP servers must meet for the MiCOM 
IED to accept time synchronisation responses. A Response with an unacceptable 
Stratum will be discarded. 
The IED can be configured to act as a Time server for other devices. The configured 
value is taken from the IED/AccessPoint section of the configured SCL file. 
A main and backup external SNTP time server can be configured. This configuration of 
the first external time server is shown in Figure H.3.2. The configuration of the second 
time sever is identical to the first. 
 
Figure H.3.2 P645 External SNTP Server 
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Server Name, Access Point and Sub Network Name data will be displayed for a 
configured IED if the configuration is opened from a configured SCL file. The MiCOM 
IED will attempt to synchronise its clock with this device. The data is READ-only. This is 
not stored in MCL data nor sent to the MiCOM IED. 
The IP Address of the device that is providing SNTP Time synchronisation services can 
be set. Pressing the Anycast button, shown in the configuration window above, will 
automatically set the SNTP Server IP address to the broadcast address of the Sub 
Network that the MiCOM IED is connected to. 
 
H.4 Dataset Definitions 
A Dataset can be added in the Dataset definitions window. The location of the dataset is 
required to be specified. A dataset can be created within any Logical Node of the IEDs 
data model. The initial character of the dataset name must be an alphabetic character 
while the remainder of the name can be either alphanumeric or the underscore symbol. 
The dataset name must be unique within the Logical Node it is contained. The name 
value is derived from the Dataset section of the selected Logical Node location in the 
configured SCL file.  
A dataset in LLN0 with 3 elements is shown in Figure H.4.1. The Functionally 
Constrained Data Attributes (FCDAs) contained in the dataset are shown in the contents 
window. The size of a GOOSE message cannot be larger than the maximum allowable 
size of an Ethernet frame. The percentage of dataset capacity used by the selected items 
is shown with the GOOSE Capacity gauge.  
 
 
Figure H.4.1 P645 Dataset 
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H.5 GOOSE Publishing 
8 x GOOSE control blocks (GoCB) can be configured for publishing. The first part is to 
configure the network parameters for a GoCB shown in Figure H.5.1. The values are 
taken from the Connected AP/GSE section of the configured SCL file. 
The multicast MAC address to which the GoCB publishes GOOSE messages is 
configured. The first four octets (01 – 0C – CD – 01) are defined by the IEC61850 
standard for multicast messages.  
The Application ID or AppID to which the GoCB will publish GOOSE messages is 
configured as a hexadecimal value with a setting range of 0 to 3FFF. 
 
 
Figure H.5.1 GOOSE Publishing - Network Parameters 
 
VLAN Identifier configures the VLAN (Virtual LAN) on to which the GOOSE messages 
are published. The default value is set if no VLAN is being used. 
VLAN Priority configures the VLAN Priority of published GOOSE messages. The VLAN 
priority has a setting range of 0 to 7 (Lowest priority = 0, highest priority = 7). 
 
Figure H.5.2 GOOSE Publishing-Message parameters 
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The next part of the GOOSE configuration configures the repeat message transmission 
parameters. Minimum and Maximum Cycle Times is determined. The Minimum Cycle 
Time between the first message being transmitted and its first repeat retransmission and 
has a setting range of 1 to 50 milliseconds. The Maximum Cycle Time has a setting range 
of 1 to 60 seconds. 
The Increment determines the step-up rate at which the repeat message transmission 
intervals change from the Minimum Cycle Time to the Maximum Cycle Time. A higher 
increment number will result in a shorter period to reach the Maximum Cycle Time. The 
setting ranges from 0 to 999. 
The GOOSE Identifier (GoID) is a 64-character name of the published GOOSE message. 
The initial character must be an alphabetic character and the rest of the name can be 
either alphanumeric or the underscore symbol. The GoID must be unique for the entire 
system. 
Dataset Reference configures a Dataset to be included in published GoCB message. 
The datasets must belong to the same Logical Node as the GoCB. 
The Configuration Revision must be incremented should there be any change to the 
dataset to identify the change in configuration to others listening to the published 
message. 
 
H.6 GOOSE Subscribing 
GOOSE Subscription configuration is based on Mapped inputs and Unmapped inputs. 
GOOSE Subscribing of a mapped GOOSE Virtual Input is deliberated first. 64 Virtual 
inputs can be configured. The first input is shown in Figure H.6.1 
 
Figure H.6.1 GOOSE Subscribing-Input 1 
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The configuration page for the first Virtual Input is shown in Figure H.6.2. The first part 
of the configuration page is about the source network parameters. This multicast MAC 
address and the Application ID (AppID) of the publishing GoCB is configured. The 
second part is the GOOSE source parameters. 
 
Figure H.6.2 GOOSE Subscribing – Source 
 
The last part is to configure the destination parameters. This is shown Figure 8.2. 
 
Figure 8.2 GOOSE subscribing – Destination 
 
Default Input Value of the Virtual input can be configured to False, True, or Last know 
value. This configured value will be used when no messages are received from the 
configured GOOSE publisher.  
 
H.7 Report Control Blocks 
IEC61850 supports the Buffered and Unbuffered types of Report Control Blocks. 
The IED will buffer the events for transmission when buffered reporting is used. The 
DATA are not lost due to transport flow control constraints or loss of connection.  
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With Unbuffered reporting, the IED will send a report but the delivery to the client is not 
guaranteed. The report data may be lost if no association exists, the transport data flow 
is not fast enough, or the network connection is lost. 
The Report ID, Dataset reference and configuration revision is configured as in Figure 
H.7.1. 
 
Figure H.7.1 Report Control Block 
 
Dataset Reference configures the Dataset whose contents is to be included in the 
generated reports from the RCB. Only datasets that belong to the same Logical Node as 
the RCB can be selected. 
 
H.8 Controls 
The configuration of each Control Object within the IEDs data model is possible. The 
Trip/Close control of a Circuit Breaker can be configured by selecting the Control Model 
to be Direct Operate or Select Before Operate. 
An additional layer of security onto control operations can be added by configuring the 
Uniqueness Of Control. The Uniqueness Of Control allows only 1 Control Object 
throughout the entire system to operate at any one time. 
The sboTimeout parameter, configures the Select Before Operate timeout. The operate 
must follow the select command before the configured time or otherwise the Control 
Object is reset to an unselected state. Figure H.8.1 shows the configuration page with 
the selected Control Object. 
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Figure H.8.1 Control Object configuration 
 
The operation of Uniqueness of Control uses GOOSE and its configuration is very similar 
to GOOSE Subscribing. 
 
H.9 Measurements 
The configuration of measurement object is done in this category. Figure H.9.1 shows 
the configuration of the A phase current of PriMsiMMXU1. 
 
Figure H.9.1 Measurement Object 
 
Unit multiplier configures the value that the measurement value will be scaled when read 
or reported. A Unit multiplier with a setting of 3 or kilo,  will report a value of 2 when 2000 
amp is measured. 
The Min / Max range configures the minimum and maximum values of a measurement 
object. The min and max values are used together with the deadband value to calculate 
the magnitude a measurement must change by in order to be updated/reported to a 
client. 
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The deadband is a percentage change measurements range in units of 0.001% based 
upon the measurements range. A deadband of 0 means the measurement is updated 
instantaneously. The deadband must be specified as a percentage change or as an 
absolute change. A deadband of 1000 specifies a percentage change of 1 percent. 
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APPENDIX I  
Configuration of Network equipment  
I  
 
A MOXA PowerTrans PT-7728 series and a RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 managed 
Ethernet switch are used to set up the substation automation test-bench and connect the 
different components to the process bus network.  
The PT-7728 series Ethernet switch is used to connect the Alstom Agile Merging Units 
(AMU) to the process bus. 
The RSG2288 managed Ethernet switch is used to connect the MiCOM P645 
Transformer protection and control device to the process bus. The PT-7728 and 
RSG2288 are connected to each other. The Acer Aspire ES 15 personal laptop computer 
is connected to the RSG2288 but can be connected to the PT-7728 as well. 
 
I.1 Moxa PT-7728_PTP 
The PT-7728 has a modular design were 4 slots supports modules with different port 
configurations to cater for 1 slot Gigabit and 3 slots Fast Ethernet.  
The switch has dual isolated redundant power supplies to increase the communications 
reliability. 
The Analogue Merging Units (AMUs) are connected to the PT-7728 network switch in 
the test-bench. The 100BASE-FX version of Fast Ethernet over optical fibre is used with 
a 1300 nm near-infrared (NIR) light wavelength transmitted via two strands of optical 
fibre, one for receive (RX) and the other for transmit (TX). 
Full-duplex over multi-mode 50 µm (50/125) optical fibre is used. Multi-mode optical fibre 
is used over short distances because the communication equipment used over multi-
mode optical fibre is less expensive compared to single-mode optical fibre.  
ST connectors are used on the PT-7728 network switch where individual connectors are 
used for RX and TX to connect the optical fibre from the AMUs. LC Connectors are used 
on the AMU. 
 
The PT-7728's configuration settings can be access using the serial console, Telnet 
console, and web console. A Main menu with folders in the left navigation panel is used 
to go to different configuration pages. 
 
I.1.1 Basic settings 
The web console is used to display the port settings page is shown in Figure I.1.1. 
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Figure I.1.1 PT-7728 Port Configuration 
 
Each of the ports can be disabled. Enabling the port allows data transmission through 
the port. Ports 4-1 and 4-2 are used to connect the AMUs. Speed, FDX Flow Control and 
MDI/MDIX are not configurable for these ports. 100BASE-FX version of Fast Ethernet 
over optical fibre (OF) must be used on both sides of the OF connection, at the switch 
port as well as the port on the AMU  
Network parameters are configured and are shown in Figure I.1.2. 
 
Figure I.1.2 PT-7728 Network Configuration 
 
The PT-7728’s IP address can be set manually or automatic by a DHCP or BootP server. 
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The switch IP address and Subnet Mask were set to default values. A Gateway can be 
configured for a router that connects the LAN to an outside network. A primary and 
secondary DNS Server IP address can be set. A Gateway was not used as part of the 
test-bench setup and was not configured. 
 
The PT-7728 does not have a real-time clock. The Current Date, Time, Daylight savings 
time and NTP time server on the LAN is configurable. The IP or domain address can be 
used for the time server. Figure I.1.3 shows the page for configuring the system time. 
 
Figure I.1.3 PT-7728 Time settings 
 
I.1.2 Port Trunking 
Port trunking can be used to combine up to 8 ports between two PT-7728 switches. The 
full duplex 100BaseTX ports can be used to trunk links together to increase the 
bandwidth to quadruple between two switches. Trunking also provides redundancy if one 
link fails and enables the sharing of load across multiple links. Port trunking was not 
configured as only one PT-7728 switch was used in the test-bench setup. 
 
I.1.3 Communication redundancy 
The PT-7728 supports Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE-802.1w), Turbo Ring and 
Turbo Ring V2 protocols for communication network redundancy. Turbo Ring and Turbo 
Ring V2 are Moxa proprietary protocols for managed switches and cannot be used in the 
test-bench setup where the other switch is a Ruggedcom RSG2288 switch. 
Communication redundancy was not configured, simulated and tested. 
 
I.1.4 Traffic periodization 
The PT-7728’s traffic prioritization capability provides Quality of Service (QoS) to 
prioritize network traffic to ensure high priority data are transmitted and passed through 
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the switch with minimum delay. The PT-7728 can inspect both IEEE 802.1p/1Q layer 2 
CoS tags, and even layer 3 Type Of Service (TOS) information. The IEEE 802.1Q tags 
are removed when the packets pass through a router and can therefore only be used on 
a LAN and not across routed WAN links. The 4-byte tag immediately follows the 
destination MAC address and Source MAC address in the data frame. 
a Layer 3 marking scheme that uses the DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) field in the IP 
header to store the packet priority information can be used. No extra tags are required 
in the packet. DSCP uses the IP header of a packet and therefore priority is preserved 
across the Internet 
 
I.1.5 Virtual LAN 
The PT-7728 has Virtual LAN (VLAN) and traffic prioritization capability to recognise 
802.1Q VLAN packets which are used to carry VLAN identification as well as IEEE 
802.1p priority information. VLAN settings are shown in Figure I.1.5.1. VLAN 
configuration is achieved by using trunk or access ports settings.  
The Access Port setting is used when the port connects to a single device that is not 
tagged. Port 4-1 and 4-2 connected to AMUs are set to be Access ports for the test-
bench setup. The default port PVID is set to the VLAN the device belongs to. The PT-
7728 will insert this PVID into this packet to help the next 802.1Q VLAN switch 
recognizes it when the ingress packet of this Access Port egresses to another Trunk 
Port. 
 
Figure I.1.5.1 PT-7728 VLAN 
 
I- 5 - 
The Trunk Port setting is used for ports that connect to a LAN that consists of untagged 
devices/tagged devices and/or switches. A PVID can be assigned to a Trunk Port. The 
untagged packet on the Trunk Port will be assigned the port default PVID as its VID. 
A router or Layer 3 switching device with connections to both VLANs needs to be 
installed If devices connected to a VLAN need to communicate to devices on a different 
VLAN. 
 
I.1.6 Multicast filtering 
Multicast filtering is useful for publisher/subscriber communications that use multicast 
messages. The filtering ensures that only subscribers groups receive multicast traffic. 
Network devices only forward multicast traffic to the ports that are connected to 
registered subscribers. 
The PT-7728 achieves multicast filtering by using Internet Group Management Protocol 
(IGMP) Snooping, GARP Multicast Registration Protocol (GMRP), and adding a static 
multicast MAC manually. GMRP is a MAC-based multicast management protocol, 
whereas IGMP is IP-based. Other network devices are required to support IGMP and 
GARP protocols if these protocols are used for multicast filtering. Static multicast groups 
can be added manually. 
The other switch used in this test-bench network supports IGMP and GARP protocols.  
 
I.2 Ruggedcom RSG2288 
The MiCOM P645 IED is connected to the RSG2288 network switch on the Ethernet 
network. 
Two separate IEC 61850 network connections are made for the station bus and process 
bus IEC 61850-9-2 LE interfaces from the P645 IED to the RSG2288 network switch.  
 
I.2.1 Network connections 
The rear Ethernet board on the P645 IED for the IEC61850 station bus interface provides 
for two types of communication ports. 10BaseT/100BaseTX communication using a 
RJ45 connector connecting to a Screened Twisted Pair (STP) copper cable and 100Base 
FX fibre optic interface ,1310 nm multi-mode 50/125 μm with ST connectors is available. 
An additional 9-2 Ethernet board allows a path with IEC61850-9.2LE Ethernet link with 
optical fibre or RJ45 connector to copper wire. The 100BASE-FX version over optical 
fibre is used with a 1300 nm, multi-mode 50/125 μm with ST connectors via two strands 
of optical fibre, one for receive (RX) and the other for transmit (TX). 
The RSG2288 used in the test-bench setup only provides for 1000BASE-FX version 
optical fibre LC Connectors. The 1000BASE-FX type of fibre optic communication used 
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on the RSG2288 is not compatible with the 100BASE FX type of communication on the 
P645 IED. The RJ45 Connectors were therefore used instead. 
 
I.2.2 The ROS user interface 
The RSG2288 is embedded with the Rugged Operating System (ROS). A laptop 
computer can be connected directly to the RS232 console port to access the device.  
The RSG2288 can be configured using a telnet session or web interface. The default 
administrator username and password are "admin". 
100BaseTX communication using one of the RJ45 connector ports was used to connect 
the laptop computer with STP copper cable to the RSG2288. 
A screenshot is shown with the product information in Figure I.2.2.1 used to configure 
the RSG2288. 
 
Figure I.2.2.1 RSG2288 Telnet session 
 
A telnet interface configuration page, Figure I.2.2.2 shows the top level of the menu 
hierarchy which can be expanded to a lower-level for each configuration sublevel.  
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Figure I.2.2.2 RSG2288 ROS Main level 
 
I.2.3 Administration 
The sub levels of Administration level are shown in Figure I.2.3.1. The levels enable the 
user to set up the network configuration and set the switch administration parameters. 
 
Figure I.2.3.1 RSG2288 Administration 
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The IP interface parameters can be set to configure IP connection parameters such as 
address, network, and mask. 
The user can configure different IP interface for each VLAN. The RSG2288 supports the 
configuration of 255 IP interfaces. One of the interfaces is configured to be the 
management interface. 
The following IP services are only available through the management interface: TFTP 
server, SNMP server, Telnet server, SSH server, RSH server, Web server, 
authentication using a RADIUS server, DHCP client, and BOOTP client. 
In VLAN unaware mode, only one IP interface can be configured. 
On non-management interfaces, only static IP addresses can be assigned. On the 
management interface, the user can choose from the following IP Address types: Static, 
DHCP, BOOTP and Dynamic. Static IP Address type refers to the manual assignment 
of an IP address while DHCP, BOOTP and Dynamic IP Address types refer to the 
automatic assignment of an IP address. 
A static IP address was used for the test-bench setup, Figure I.2.3.. 
 
Figure I.2.3.2 RSG2288 IP Interfaces 
 
I.2.4 Ethernet ports 
The sub levels of Ethernet ports level are shown in Figure I.2.4.1. The levels enable the 
user to configure port physical parameters as well as other parameters that include 
alarms, diagnostics and status viewing. Configuring of port rate limiting, Port Mirroring 
and Link-Fault-Indication (LFI) is possible. 
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Backup Ethernet ports and having main and backup links used in the event of a link 
failure was not configured and tested in the test-bench setup. 
 
Figure I.2.4.1 RSG2288 Ethernet Ports 
 
The configuration of the Ethernet ports is shown in Figure I.2.4.2. Each of the ports can 
be disabled. Enabling the port allows data transmission through the port. This state 
column indicates that all ports are enabled. 
Ports 1-5,7 are 1000T RJ45 copper ports and ports 6,8 and 11 are 1000X fibre optic LC 
ports. Port 2 is connected to the Moxa PT-7728 switch. Ports 1 and 4 are used to connect 
the P645 IED and port 3 is used to connect the laptop PC for the test-bench set up. The 
1000X fibre ports could not be used due to the P645 IED having only 100BASE-FX ports. 
Enable or disable IEEE 802.3 auto-negotiation is done by selecting AutoN on or off. 
Enabling auto-negotiation results in speed and duplex mode being negotiated upon link 
detection; both end devices must be auto negotiation compliant. The fiber optic media 
do not support auto-negotiation and is configured to full-duplex mode. Full-duplex 
operation requires both ends to be configured as such. 
The Speed can be selected to Auto, 10 / 100Megabit-per-second or 1 Gigabit-per-
second. The speed is fixed to 1 Gbps for the fibre optic ports on the RSG2288 and cannot 
be connected to the 100Mbps for the fibre optic ports on the P645 IED. 
Flow Control is useful for preventing frame loss during times of severe network traffic. 
This setting can be useful for a process bus application where severe network traffic with 
sampled value frames can be expected. The receiving device will send PAUSE frames 
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to the sending device to pause transmission of data for a period, when the port is selected 
to full-duplex mode. 
Link-Fault-Indication (LFI) can be switched on or off. The transmission of the link integrity 
signal when the receiving link has failed can be inhibited by enabling LFI. 
 
 
Figure I.2.4.2 RSG2288 Port Parameters 
 
The Ethernet port status is shown in Figure I.2.4.3. The link status whether it is up or 
down, the speed and the duplex status are indicated for each port. The figure shows 
links connected to ports 1,2 and 3 to be up. Port 2 is connected to the Moxa PT-7728 
switch, Port 1 for sampled values streams is connected the P645 IED and port 3 is 
connect to the laptop PC. The auto-negotiation is enabled for these ports and results in 
speed and duplex mode being negotiated upon link detection and connected at a speed 
of 100Mbps and full duplex. 
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Figure I.2.4.3 RSG2288 Port status 
 
I.2.5 VLAN Operation 
Tagged frames with 802.1Q (VLAN) tags specified with a VLAN identifier (VID) =2 is 
used for the IEC61850-9-2 sampled value streams sent from the Merging Units in the 
test-bench setup. 
When the RSG2288 switch receives a tagged frame, it extracts the VID and forwards the 
frame to other ports in the same VLAN. 
The port VLAN configuration is shown in Figure I.2.5.1. Each port can be configured to 
be a type of Edge or Trunk. 
An Edge port attaches to a single end device and carries traffic on a single pre-configured 
VLAN. 
Port 1 is connected to the P645 IED and requires receiving the Sampled values stream 
on VLAN 2. It is therefore configured as an Edge port with PVID=2 and tagged frames.  
Trunk ports are part of the network and carry traffic for all VLANs between switches. 
Trunk ports are automatically members of all VLANs configured in the switch and will 
carry information of both VLANs 1 & 2. Port 2 is connected to the Moxa PT-7728 switch 
and is configured to be a Trunk port. 
All traffic on the network must belong to a specific VLAN. Management traffic is carried 
on the management VLAN. The management VLAN is configurable. The defaults VLAN 
1 was used for the test-bench setup. 
Port 3 is used to connect the laptop PC. The PC is used to configure the switch and must 
be able to send and receive traffic on VLAN 1. It is therefore configured as an Edge port 
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with PVID=1 and untagged frames. Port 4 is used to connect the PC to monitor the 
Sampled Values streams on VLAN 2. It is therefore configured as an Edge port with 
PVID=2 and tagged frames. 
GVRP was not enabled for the ports and the ports were manually configured for the 
VLANs. GVRP is a standard protocol built on GARP (the Generic Attribute Registration 
Protocol) to automatically distribute VLAN configuration information in a network. Each 
switch in a network needs only to be configured with local VLAN requirement and 
dynamically learns the rest of the VLANs configured elsewhere in the network via GVRP. 
The trunk connected Moxa PT-7728 switch in the network needs to be a GVRP-aware 
switch in order to use this function. 
 
Figure I.2.5.1 RSG2288 Port VLAN Parameters 
 
I.2.6 Multicast filtering 
Multicast Filtering can be configured in the RSG2288 using the following methods: Static 
Multicast Groups, Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) snooping and IEEE 
standard GARP Multicast Registration protocol (GMRP). 
Static Multicast filtering were configured manually for the test-bench setup. The other 
Moxa PT-7728 switch in the test setup network supports IGMP and GMRP and this could 
also be used for the setup of the Multicast groups. The multicast destination MAC 
Address configured in the Merging Units to identify SV data streams were manually 
configured in the RSG2288 to test and show that only these SVs will be allowed to pass 
through the RSG2288 switch to be sent to the P645 IED. 
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These multicast MAC addresses of the SV streams are shown in Figure I.2.6.1. 
 
Figure I.2.6.1 RSG2288 Static Multicast Groups 
 
I.2.7 MAC Address 
The MAC addresses learned by the switch can be viewed in the MAC address tables. 
The VLAN Identifier of the VLAN on which the MAC address operates is shown in Figure 
I.2.7.1. 
The Type Synopsis describes if the MAC address has been learned as Static or Dynamic 
by the switch. 
STATIC - the address has been learned as a result of a Static MAC Address Table 
configuration or some other management activity and cannot be automatically unlearned 
or relearned by the switch. 
DYNAMIC - The address has been automatically learned by the switch and can be 
automatically unlearned. 
CoS Synopsis specifies what Class of Service is assigned to frames carrying this 
address as source or destination address. It can be N/A, Normal, Medium, High, Crit. 
N/A option prioritizes traffic based on the priority value in the VLAN tag or based on the 
default priority configured in Port CoS Parameters. 
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Figure I.2.7.1 RSG2288 MAC Addresses 
 
 
